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Abstract 
 
During the 2001 war in Afghanistan hundreds of people associated with the Taliban 
or al Qaeda were arrested by United States forces and transported to the Naval Base at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  The legal status and treatment of these detainees has been an 
ongoing problem over the last five years.  The majority have been given no recourse 
to justice and allegations of inhuman treatment and torture have been frequent.  The 
first issue raised by the incarceration of these people is whether any of them may be 
entitled to Prisoner of War status.  The evidence shows that, in general, the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda fighters were not lawful combatants, and hence they are not entitled to 
Prisoner of War status.  While the rights of Prisoners of War are well documented and 
generally uncontested, the rights of people not entitled to Prisoner of War status are 
not so easily definable. 
 
Despite classification as unlawful or unprivileged combatants, the detainees are not in 
legal limbo – they are still entitled to the benefit of certain fundamental human rights.  
There are applicable protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Additional 
Protocol I, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture.  The main rights upheld by these documents are 
the right to liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention; the right to a fair trial; and 
the right to life.  Furthermore, there is a requirement of humane treatment and an 
absolute prohibition on torture. 
 
Reports from international humanitarian watchdogs such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
suggest that the United States Government is not upholding the rights held by the 
detainees.  It is essential that the United States Government recognises the 
fundamental rights owed to the detainees and ensures that they receive the requisite 
treatment and access to justice. 
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Abstract 
 
During the 2001 war in Afghanistan hundreds of people associated with the 
Taliban or al Qaeda were arrested by United States forces and transported to the 
Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  The legal status and treatment of these 
detainees has been an ongoing problem over the last five years.  The majority 
have been given no recourse to justice and allegations of inhuman treatment and 
torture have been frequent.  The first issue raised by the incarceration of these 
people is whether any of them may be entitled to Prisoner of War status.  The 
evidence shows that, in general, the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were not lawful 
combatants, and hence they are not entitled to Prisoner of War status.  While the 
rights of Prisoners of War are well documented and generally uncontested, the 
rights of people not entitled to Prisoner of War status are not so easily definable. 
 
Despite classification as unlawful or unprivileged combatants, the detainees are 
not in legal limbo – they are still entitled to the benefit of certain fundamental 
human rights.  There are applicable protections under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Additional Protocol I, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  The main 
rights upheld by these documents are the right to liberty and freedom from 
arbitrary detention; the right to a fair trial; and the right to life.  Furthermore, there 
is a requirement of humane treatment and an absolute prohibition on torture. 
 
Reports from international humanitarian watchdogs such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
suggest that the United States Government is not upholding the rights held by the 
detainees.  It is essential that the United States Government recognises the 
fundamental rights owed to the detainees and ensures that they receive the 
requisite treatment and access to justice. 
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Although a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back, it 
nonetheless has the upper hand.  Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of 
an individual’s liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of 
security.  At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow 
it to overcome its difficulties.1 
Chief Justice Barak 
 
                                                 
1
 Legality of the GSS Interrogation Methods Supreme Court of Israel (6 September 1999).  
Reproduced in 38 International Legal Materials (1999) 1471. 
  
2 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Background 
September 11, 2001 is a date which has become synonymous with modern 
terrorism and the concept of a ‘war on terror’.  On this date 19 men affiliated with 
the al-Qaeda terrorist network hijacked four commercial passenger jets and, in a 
series of coordinated suicide attacks on the United States of America (US), two 
planes were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York, the third plane was 
flown into the Pentagon in Virginia, and the fourth crashed in a field in 
Pennsylvania.  The death toll totalled nearly 3000 people, predominantly civilians.  
On October 7, 2001 the US, with assistance from, inter alia, the United Kingdom 
(UK), Australia, New Zealand and the Northern Alliance and “supported by the 
collective will of the world”2 began a military invasion of Afghanistan, reacting in 
self-defence to the September 11 attacks.  The purpose of the military action, 
codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom, was to target Osama bin Laden who 
was suspected of planning and funding the attacks, his terrorist network al-Qaeda, 
and the Taliban government in Afghanistan which had allegedly provided support 
to al-Qaeda and extended them protection.  The 2001 war in Afghanistan was a 
legitimate war on the basis of self-defence and was supported by the United 
Nations (UN).3 
 
The Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan as it controlled the 
majority of the territory of the country but it was not recognised as the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan.4  Al-Qaeda was a terrorist network which allegedly 
conducted operations and training on Afghan territory and was supported by the 
                                                 
2
 President George W. Bush “Presidential address to the Nation” [7 October 2001] 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>. 
3
 See UN General Assembly Res. A/Res/56/176 [19 December 2001]. 
4
 Lansford, T A bitter harvest.  US foreign policy in Afghanistan (2003) 136. 
  
3 
de facto Taliban government.5  During the conflict following the September 11 
terrorist attacks the US led coalition apprehended many Taliban and al-Qaeda 
fighters on the battlefield.  A significant number of those captured were 
transferred to a detention facility on the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  
The war in Afghanistan began in 2001.  It is now 2007 and there are still Taliban 
and al-Qaeda members detained in Guantánamo Bay who have not been charged 
or given access to justice of any kind.  The information available on the total 
number of detainees and their treatment is insufficient and inconclusive.  As of the 
end of September 2006 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
estimated that Guantánamo Bay housed around 450 prisoners in long-term 
indefinite detention.6  Amnesty International asserts that detainees are being kept 
in a “legal black hole”7 due to the lack of access to judicial proceedings, legal 
counsel or family visits.  In fact, Amnesty International declares, the black hole is 
literal as well as metaphorical as many of the detainees are “subjected to 
confinement in small cells for up to 24 hours a day with minimal opportunity to 
exercise.”8 
 
Some detainees have been charged with crimes and have had their cases heard by 
courts or military commissions.  A small number of these cases have come before 
the US Supreme Court in spite of the difficulties in accessing justice: 
“Despite the logistic obstacles to representing incarcerated clients who did not 
even know that they had lawyers or that lawsuits had been brought on their behalf 
and who until after, or just before, the Supreme Court heard their cases never got 
to see or talk to anyone about their legal rights, a half dozen habeas corpus suits 
were filed and lurched their way up to the Supreme Court.”9 
These cases will be mentioned where they are relevant.  However, the vast 
majority of prisoners have not been charged and nor have they had access to 
justice or legal counsel.  As the prisoners have not been charged or tried they have 
not been given the opportunity to dispute their alleged status as ‘enemy 
combatants’.  A serious concern is the numerous allegations that the detainees at 
                                                 
5
 Dinstein, Y The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict (2004) 47. 
6
 ICRC, “US detention related to the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath – the role of 
the ICRC” [30 September 2006] 
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList454/3AA18DEB7A670BEBC12571FB00533D
3F>. 
7
 Amnesty International, “Guantánamo detainees:  More than 4 years without justice” [2006] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/pages/usa-100106-action-eng>. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Wald, P “The Supreme Court goes to war” in Berkowitz, P (ed) Terrorism, the laws of war, and 
the constitution (2005) 37, 39. 
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Guantánamo include some civilians – people with no meaningful ties to either the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda.10  It is not uncommon for civilians to be apprehended during 
an armed conflict and a brief period of detention while their status is determined is 
unavoidable.  This is one of the hazards of war.  However, there have been no 
attempts on the part of the US government to determine the status of those 
captured and to release any civilians who were simply in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  The focus of this thesis is the legal situation of detainees who were 
members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but it is important to realise that civilians 
may also have been incarcerated.  It is significant, and unlawful, that there has 
been no individual consideration of the case of each detainee.  Rather they have 
been lumped together and publicly determined to be guilty sans trial. 
 
Detention conditions 
The lack of access to justice and fair trials is not the only matter for concern at the 
Guantánamo Bay detention facility.  There have been frequent allegations of 
torture and mistreatment of the detainees.  Renowned international human rights 
group, Amnesty International, controversially referred to the detention centre at 
Guantánamo Bay as “the gulag of our times,”11 likening it to the Soviet camps for 
political repression from the 1930s to 1960s.  This allegation from Amnesty 
International was described by the Bush Administration as “absurd, reprehensible 
and offensive”12 but Amnesty International refused to back down, claiming that 
there are similarities between the two detention regimes.13  William Schulz, the 
American Director of Amnesty International, defended the comment with the 
following assertion: 
“The United States is maintaining an archipelago of prisons around the world, 
many of them secret prisons into which people are being literally disappeared, 
held in indefinite, incommunicado detention without access to lawyers or a 
judicial system, or to their families, and in some cases at least, we know that they 
are being mistreated, abused, tortured and even killed.  And those are similar at 
least in character, if not in size, to what happened in the Gulag.”14 
 
                                                 
10
 Roth, K “Human Rights Watch letter to Donald Rumsfeld” [6 March 2003] 
<http://hrw.org/press/2003/03/us030603-ltr.htm>. 
11
 Khan, I “Amnesty International Report 2005” [25 May 2005] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL100142005>. 
12
 Sales, L “Amnesty International refuses to back down from ‘gulag’ comments” The World 
Today, 6 June 2005, <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2005/s1385518.htm>. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
  
5 
In 2005 prolonged hunger strikes were undertaken on a number of occasions by at 
least 130 detainees.15  They were often life-threatening and presented an attempt 
by the detainees to protest their detention and treatment.  Force feeding through 
nasal tubes was carried out “but without effective medical care.”16  Human Rights 
First suggests as many as 200 detainees have participated in hunger strikes, but 
admits that the details remain unclear.17  In 2006 three Guantánamo detainees 
committed suicide, supposedly in protest at their detention and the conditions of 
that detention.  This act was followed by the now infamous statement issued by 
the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility that the three men had 
committed “an act of asymmetric warfare against us.”18  The statement attempted 
to draw criticism away from the conditions of detention which may well have 
been what forced the three men to commit such an act.  Due to the situation at 
Guantánamo Bay, a report from the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
calls for the closure of the detention facility “without further delay.”19 
 
The Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University School 
of Law, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First jointly undertook to 
consider allegations of abuse of detainees in US custody.  In 2006 they published 
the results of the project which had tracked allegations of abuse and examined the 
investigations, disciplinary measures or criminal prosecutions that were linked to 
them.20  In the report it was asserted that at least fifty cases of abuse had taken 
place at the Guantánamo Bay detention centre in Cuba.21  It is clear from the 
report that detainee abuse has been widespread but that many abuses were never 
investigated, and investigations that did occur often closed prematurely, or stalled 
without resolution.  Furthermore, where abuse cases were substantiated and 
                                                 
15
 Human Rights Watch, “Guantánamo Bay and military commissions” [18 January 2006] 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/usdom12292.htm#Detainee%20Abuse>. 
16
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Pertinent parts of October 28, 2005 reiteration 
and further amplification of precautionary measures (detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)” (2006) 
45 ILM 673, 675. 
17
 Human Rights First, “Guantánamo Bay hunger strikes” [30 September 2005] 
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/etn_0930_gitmo.htm>. 
18
 White, J “Three detainees commit suicide at Guantánamo” Washington Post, 11 June 2006, 
A01. 
19
 United Nations Economic and Social Council “Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay” [15 
February 2006] E/CN.4/2006/120 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_06_un_Guantánamo.pdf> 38. 
20
 Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project, “By the numbers” [April 2006] 
<http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ct0406/ct0406webwcover.pdf> 2. 
21
 Ibid, 6. 
  
6 
perpetrators identified by military investigators, military commanders often chose 
to use weak non-judicial disciplinary measures as punishment, instead of pursuing 
criminal courts-martial.22   
 
In summary, a large group of men is being held indefinitely without recourse to 
justice.  It is possible that some are indeed hardened terrorists, but even they are 
entitled to a fair trial and the benefit of basic human rights.  Furthermore, there 
may well be others who have no connection whatsoever to terrorism or the 
conflicts in Afghanistan or elsewhere.  Many of these people have been held for 
upwards of five years and there seems to be no end in sight for their incarceration.   
 
This led me to ask my research question:  what rights, if any, do these people 
have?  I had read many articles and news reports on the situation but was unable 
to find a comprehensive study which showed, in a clear and logical manner, the 
rights of the detainees.  This thesis is my attempt to provide such a document. 
 
Question 
 
What rights do the Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees held in the Guantánamo 
Bay detention facility have? 
 
To answer this question it first had to be determined whether the Taliban and al-
Qaeda detainees were lawful or unlawful combatants.  Lawful combatants have 
the right to Prisoner of War (POW) status whereas unlawful combatants do not.  
To this end Chapter Two gives a comprehensive discussion of the law of 
combatancy.  In Chapter Two it is explained that there are only two categories of 
persons during an armed conflict – lawful combatants or civilians.  People who 
satisfy the four criteria in the Third 1949 Geneva Convention for lawful 
combatancy are combatants and are entitled to POW status; people who do not 
satisfy the four criteria are civilians.  Civilians who engage directly in hostilities 
are not entitled to POW protections and are referred to as unlawful combatants.  
Unlawful combatants may be prosecuted for the act of having taken up arms, and 
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may even be executed.  In contrast, POWs cannot be prosecuted for taking part in 
hostilities provided they do not breach the laws of war. 
 
In Chapter Three the law on combatancy (explained in Chapter Two) is applied to 
the situation in Afghanistan during the recent armed conflict.  This is done to 
determine whether the members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda were lawful or 
unlawful combatants.  Information on the Taliban and al-Qaeda as regards the 
combatancy criteria is limited, however the available evidence suggests that some 
of the Taliban members fulfilled the combatancy criteria.  Hence, individual 
determinations of their status should be made under article 5 of the Third Geneva 
Convention.  As regards al-Qaeda, due to their failure to adequately distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population, no members of this terrorist group were 
lawful combatants and hence they are not entitled to POW status. 
 
Having decided that some Taliban members may be entitled to POW status but 
that no al-Qaeda members were I could then consider my main question:  what 
rights do these prisoners have?  The rights for POWs are well documented and 
hence those rights will not be considered here.  The focus of this thesis is on the 
rights of unlawful combatants, not entitled to POW status, as these people are not 
recognised as a particular group and it is therefore harder to extrapolate their 
rights from law.  Chapter Four seeks to answer the question of rights for unlawful 
combatants by first considering what rights may be found under international 
humanitarian law documents such as the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention;23 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; and article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.24  Secondly, consideration is given to the 
rights unlawful combatants have under international human rights law, focusing 
on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights25 and the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture.26  In brief, the detainees have the right to 
liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention; the right to a fair trial; the right to 
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life; and the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
 
From the application of the evidence to the law it is possible to conclude that 
many of the rights unlawful combatants are entitled to are not being upheld by the 
US authorities in their treatment of prisoners in the Guantánamo Bay detention 
centre.  Unlawful combatants have many of the same rights as lawful combatants 
granted POW status.  The main difference between the rights of lawful 
combatants (POWs) and unlawful combatants (non-POWs) is that unlawful 
combatants can be tried and executed simply for taking part in hostilities.  POWs 
can not be prosecuted due to taking part in hostilities although they can be tried, 
and possibly put to death, for war crimes or crimes against humanity.  Apart from 
this significant difference the fundamental rights of those granted POW status and 
those who are not POWs are remarkably similar. 
 
Research 
This thesis has been structured using a simple yet effective framework to present 
the evidence gathered.  The first section of research was on the international law 
in the areas of combatancy and human rights.  This information was gathered 
from international law documents such as treaties and conventions, in particular 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as secondary sources including text books 
and journal articles.  Second, the facts had to be determined in order to apply them 
to the law described.  To do this the websites of highly respected international 
human rights groups such as the ICRC, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International were used.  From these websites it was possible to gather a relatively 
comprehensive view of the conditions at the Guantánamo Bay prison and 
determine whether the US authorities were upholding their international 
obligations. 
 
It is necessary to mention that the factual problem described – the scarcity of 
rights being accorded the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay – is not an isolated 
incident.  This thesis uses Guantánamo Bay as an example of a much more 
extensive, worldwide problem.  There are allegedly many other detention facilities 
in the US and around the world about which little is known but it is likely that 
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conditions are inadequate, people treated inhumanely, and the risk of torture, 
significant.27  There is some evidence that ‘extraordinary renditions’ (kidnapping 
people and taking them to other countries for detention, interrogation and torture) 
and ‘forced disappearances’ are happening on a large scale and such actions have 
been soundly condemned by international human rights groups.28  Guantánamo 
Bay is discussed as there is more evidence available, but there is no intention to 
detract from the conditions at any other detention facility.  The rights discussed 
which are applicable to the Guantánamo detainees are largely minimum 
guarantees so will be equally applicable to detainees the world over. 
 
Customary international law 
Customary international law will be mentioned often in this thesis so it is useful to 
provide an explanation of it early on.  Customary international law is law which 
arises from the general practice of States rather than from international treaties or 
agreements.  There are two conditions which must be met for a practice to become 
customary international law.  It must be the accepted, widespread practice of 
States and they act in that way because they believe they are legally obliged to.  
Evidently, something in addition to state practice is necessary to constitute 
customary law, as it is essential to be able to distinguish between legally binding 
rules, and patterns of behaviour which are not legally required.  The best evidence 
for a customary rule of international law is 
“to be found in what States say they think the rule is (opinion juris), and what 
they say they are doing (or not doing) in terms of that rule.”29 
It was held in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case30 that there must be evidence 
of substantial uniformity of practice by a significant number of States before a 
custom can come into existence.  However, the Nicaragua case31 emphasised that 
it is not necessary for the practice in question to be “in absolutely rigorous 
conformity” with the purported customary rule.  It is 
“sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such 
rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should 
                                                 
27
 Human Rights Watch, “Statement on U.S. secret detention facilities in Europe” [7 November 
2005] <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/07/usint11995.htm>. 
28
 Naqvi, Y “The right to the truth in international law:  fact or fiction?” (2006) 88 IRRC 245, 266. 
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 Rodley, N The treatment of prisoners under international law (2nd ed, 1999) 67. 
30
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31
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generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.”32 
 
For a practice to become customary international law there must be a general 
recognition by States that the practice amounts to an obligation binding on States 
in international law.33  In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases34 the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that: 
“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it…  
The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.” 
In essence, States creating new customary rules must believe that those rules 
already exist, and that their practice therefore, is in accordance with previously 
binding rules of law.35  Both acts and statements are evidence of developing 
international law. 
 
The status of jus cogens is reserved for fundamental principles or ‘peremptory 
norms’ of international law.  Ordinary customary international law can be altered 
by States via treaties but peremptory or jus cogens norms cannot be violated or 
modified by any State.  Under article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law.  Article 53 defines a peremptory norm as 
“a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”36   
Jus cogens is the highest form of international law and there are few norms which 
are undeniably peremptory in nature.37  It has been suggested that the only 
generally accepted examples of jus cogens are the prohibitions on the use of force 
(as laid down in the UN Charter) and on genocide, slavery and torture.38   
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 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] 3 ICJ Reports 22, para 77. 
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international law (1999) 131. 
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Customary international law is a central concept in this thesis as many of the 
rights under international humanitarian law and human rights law which will be 
mentioned are applicable due to their status as customary international law.  For 
international conventions to be binding on States in their relations with 
individuals the rules in the convention must have been incorporated into domestic 
law or have the status of customary international law.  Rather than delving into 
the domestic law of the US it is more straightforward to prove the position of a 
number of the conventions as customary international law. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Combatancy law 
 
The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and 
trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and practice, are important 
incidents of war.39 
Justice O’Connor 
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Introduction 
It is a core concept of international humanitarian law (and one which will be 
referred to frequently throughout this thesis) that there are two, and only two, 
distinct categories of people during an armed conflict – civilians and combatants.  
Chapter Two will firstly focus on the position of, and protections for, civilians 
during times of war.  Mention must be made of civilians, as protecting civilians is 
one of the underlying reasons for combatancy law.  Subsequently, the main body 
of this Chapter examines the legal position of combatants and provides a 
comprehensive discussion on the requirements which must be fulfilled in order to 
reach lawful combatant status.  Furthermore, consideration will be given to the 
status of people who take part in hostilities despite the fact that they do not fulfil 
the conditions for lawful combatancy – civilians who take up arms or lawful 
combatants who lose their combatancy status. 
 
It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the law of combatant status so that 
in Chapter Three this law can be applied to the factual situation of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda fighters and their status can be determined. 
 
2.1 Civilians 
 
Prior to a discussion on the law of combatancy it is necessary to mention two of 
the fundamental principles regarding the protection of civilians as these function 
in conjunction with combatancy law.  One of the main reasons for the law on 
combatancy status and the laws of war is, prima facie, to protect civilians from the 
ravages of war.  Civilians are not sacrosanct but there are a number of principles 
in force to protect them and a brief description of two of these is given below.  
The most important principle concerning civilians and combatancy is the principle 
of distinction.  The associated principle of civilian immunity is also significant as 
it is this that the principle of distinction serves to uphold. 
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The principle of distinction 
During times of armed conflict there is a requirement that there be a clear 
distinction between combatants and civilians.  It must be possible for all parties to 
the conflict to be able to distinguish between civilians and enemy soldiers; and 
therefore to ensure that war is waged only between the combatants of the 
belligerent parties:  
“A distinction must exist if [international humanitarian law] is to be respected:  
civilians can and will only be respected if enemy combatants can expect those 
looking like civilians not to attack them.”40 
The primary reason for the distinction principle is to protect civilians from the 
sufferings caused by war.  The requirement is the foundation on which the laws of 
war rest, many others of which are also deliberately designed to protect civilians.  
By requiring that combatants distinguish themselves from civilians, the principle 
of distinction helps to uphold the concept of civilian immunity. 
 
Civilian immunity 
Like the principle of distinction, the principle of civilian or non-combatant 
immunity attempts to protect civilians from the sufferings caused by war.  It is the 
longest established principle of restraint in war, predating prohibitions on 
weaponry41 and was codified in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and 
later developed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.  The 
principle of civilian immunity prohibits the direct targeting of civilians.  
According to article 51 of Additional Protocol I military operations must be 
directed against military targets, not civilian ones.  Indiscriminate attacks are 
those which are not directed against a specific military target; those which employ 
weapons that cannot be so directed; or those which have effects which cannot be 
limited as required.  These attacks are consequently “of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”42  The prohibition 
on indiscriminate attacks is an attempt to protect civilians from the worst 
consequences of war. 
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The laws on civilian protection relate directly to combatancy law, as to be lawful 
combatants belligerents must ensure they uphold the principles of distinction and 
civilian immunity. 
 
2.2 Combatants 
 
There are only two categories of persons during times of armed conflict – 
civilians, discussed above, and combatants.  Combatants can be grouped into two 
separate categories – lawful combatants and unlawful combatants, both of which 
will be discussed in detail below. 
 
2.2.1 Lawful combatants 
The law of combatancy is central to the goal of this thesis which is to determine 
the status and rights of the detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention centre in 
Cuba.  Combatants are people who are legally allowed to participate directly in 
hostilities, and therefore cannot be punished for acts which do not violate the laws 
of war – this is called combatants’ privilege.  The privilege can be likened to a 
licence to kill (within the laws of war).  Those who benefit from this privilege 
have a corresponding obligation to observe international humanitarian law.  A 
combatant who violates the laws of war can be punished for their illegal actions. 
 
In the words of General Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg court: 
“war consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of peace 
– killing, wounding, kidnapping, destroying or carrying off other people’s 
property.  Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the course 
of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.  
But the area of immunity is not unlimited, and its boundaries are marked by the 
laws of war.”43 
The limited immunity which he refers to is the combatants’ privilege, acting in 
accordance with the laws of armed conflict, which prevents combatants being 
prosecuted for those actions which would be criminal in peace time. 
 
However, there are certain requirements which must be met in order for people to 
obtain combatant status.  These requirements will be discussed in depth below.  
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International humanitarian law provides an incentive for combatants to fulfil these 
conditions of lawful combatant status as, if they are captured, they will be entitled 
to POW status: 
“Great attention was given to developing distinctive means of identification of 
belligerents and, as an incentive and, to an extent, a reward, assuring those who 
were so identified of the special protections available to prisoners of war.”44   
POWs enjoy greater protections45 under international humanitarian law than 
detainees who do not qualify as POWs.  Hence, the guarantee of POW status 
works as an inducement to people participating in hostilities to satisfy combatancy 
requirements. 
 
The right to detain combatants as POWs during an armed conflict is not based on 
the supposition of ‘guilt’ for any crime.  Combatants may be detained by the 
opposition for the duration of the conflict for security purposes - simply to prevent 
them from continuing to participate in combat.46  The 1947 Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg held that captivity during war is 
“neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose 
of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the 
war.”47 
 
Having ascertained the advantages that attach to lawful combatant status – 
combatants’ privilege and POW status – a detailed explanation is given as to how 
one attains this position of ‘lawful combatant’.  The steps taken in the codification 
of the law on combatancy status over the century leading up to the creation of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions will be outlined.  This process culminated in article 4A 
of the Third Geneva Convention which contains the criteria for lawful combatant 
status and is central to this thesis.  The drafters of Additional Protocol I attempted 
to make changes to the combatancy criteria.  However, the US refused to ratify 
the Protocol due to those very provisions.  Hence, article 4A remains the foremost 
law in this area when considering any conflict involving the US. 
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The origins of the laws of war and combatancy 
The idea of having rules regarding the conduct of hostilities has long been 
considered by philosophical, legal and military minds.  There is documentation 
showing that fifth century B.C. China recognised that no war should begin 
without just cause and India had rules regulating land warfare in the fourth 
century B.C.48  Similarly, in the Aztec Empire there were rules for warfare and the 
ancient Egyptians believed humanitarian actions important enough to be included 
in their records of war.49  Clearly the concept of having laws for war is not a new 
one.  Nor is the opposing view that there can be no law during wartime.  Over 
2000 years ago the Latin political theorist Cicero maintained “silent enim leges 
inter armes”50 which has been translated as “when arms speak the laws are 
silent”51 or “laws are inoperative in war.”52  Clausewitz, a military theorist writing 
in the early 19th Century, asserted that “to introduce the principle of moderation 
into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.”53 
 
However, it is evident that as far back as Roman times, the idea of civilians 
becoming self-appointed warriors was frowned upon:54  Cicero asserted that “it is 
not lawful for one who is not a soldier to fight [against] the enemy.”55  In the 
Middle Ages civilians were forbidden to fight without the authority of their 
soverign56 and it is from the Codes of Chivalry of this time (the jus militaire) that 
the roots of the idea that there is a privileged class of soldiers who are bound by 
and benefit from the law of war can be found.57  This law was primarily 
concerned with the loss of personal honour or valuable ransom but it did entail a 
separation of military forces from the civilian population.58  It is clear that the idea 
of a distinction between combatants and civilians is by no means a new one. 
 
                                                 
48
 Christopher, P The ethics of war and peace (3rd ed, 2004) 8. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Cicero, M The speeches of Cicero Watts, N (trans) (1931) 16. 
51
 Ibid, 17. 
52
 Green, L The contemporary law of armed conflict (2nd ed, 2000) 1. 
53
 Clausewitz, C von On war Howard, M and Paret, P (eds, trans) (1993) 84. 
54
 Neff, S War and the law of nations (2005) 208. 
55
 Cicero, M On duties Griffin, M and Atkins, E (eds) (1991) 16. 
56
 Neff, supra n 54. 
57
 Keen, M The laws of war in the late Middle Ages (1965) 19. 
58
 Watkin, K “Warriors without rights?  Combatants, unprivileged belligerents, and the struggle 
over legitimacy” [2005] <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/hpcr-gen-09may.pdf> 
12. 
  
18 
It is generally accepted that the earliest modern writer on the laws of war was 
Grotius, a Dutch jurist and philosopher writing in the seventeenth century.59  
Grotius does not give a definition of combatants, but he did consider the position 
of enemy civilians.  In his treatise, The Law of War and Peace, Grotius allows for 
the killing of all enemies, whether they be civilians or soldiers: 
“As for those who are actually subjects of the enemy…the law of nations permits 
injuring them in their persons wherever they are….Such people, then, may be 
killed with impunity on our own soil, on enemy’s soil, on no man’s soil, or on the 
sea.”60 
Grotius goes so far as to assert that “the slaughter of infants and women too is 
committed with impunity.”61 However, later he claims that moderation in the 
exercise of this right is required by morality: 
“An enemy…who wishes to show respect not for what human laws permit him to 
do but for what is his duty and what is right and godly, will spare the blood of his 
adversary….[E]xcept for grave reasons affecting the safety of multitudes, nothing 
should be done that may threaten the destruction of innocent people.”62 
Furthermore, Grotius determined indiscriminate weapons to be objectionable as 
they could not be employed in ways to separate innocents from combatants.63  
Finally, Grotius considered that once a soldier had been taken prisoner he should 
not be killed, but pitied.64 
 
The concept of having laws for wartime and the particular distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants (civilians) has been the focus of some 
consideration for centuries.  The industrial revolution and major advances in 
science and technology led to the creation of new types of weapons with greatly 
increased killing potential.  This considerably intensified the brutality of war and 
amplified the need for general written agreements on restrictions on war.  Hence, 
the international community began to codify limits on the means and methods of 
warfare. 
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Lieber Code 1863 
The first modern codification of the laws of war was initiated during the 
American Civil War by President Abraham Lincoln.65  At his behest legal 
philosopher Francis Lieber drafted the Lieber Code.  President Lincoln was facing 
a war to preserve the Union and end slavery and hence needed a document 
outlining how captured Confederate soldiers ought to be treated.  Furthermore, the 
US military had been massively expanded and a clearly written set of rules and 
values was needed to keep the new volunteers and conscripts in check.66  The 
Lieber Code was a set of instructions which dictated how soldiers should conduct 
themselves during war time.  It was put into effect on April 24, 1863 by Linclon’s 
Secretary of War, Townsend.  Paragraph 155 states: 
“[a]ll enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes--that is to say, 
into combatants and non-combatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile 
government.”67 
It appears then that even as far back as 1863, in the first modern document on the 
laws of warfare, there was an understanding that the population of an opposing 
party in an armed conflict were divided into two categories and two categories 
only – combatants and civilians. 
 
Furthermore, POWs are also mentioned in the Lieber Code.  Paragraph 49 states: 
“all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners 
of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the 
privileges of a prisoner of war.” 
Paragraph 56 requires that no punishment be inflicted on a POW simply for being 
a “public enemy,” and nor may any revenge be imposed through the intentional 
infliction of suffering, disgrace, cruel imprisonment, starvation, mutilation, death, 
“or any other barbarity”.68 
 
Brussels Conference 1874 
The first attempt to produce an internationally accepted definition of combatants 
occurred in the Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War adopted by the Brussels Conference in 1874.  The reason behind 
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the desire to define combatants was the atrocities which occurred during the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.  During this war the uncommanded, irregular 
French forces fighting against the German occupation forces were 
indistinguishable from civilians.  Hence, the frustrated Germans retaliated 
indiscriminately against the civilian population.69  Therefore, when the Brussels 
Conference was convened there was considerable interest in creating regulations 
which would require the obvious separation of combatants from civilians and 
thereby prevent indiscriminate warfare against civilians in future conflicts. 
 
Article 9, under the heading of “Who should be recognised as belligerents 
combatants and non-combatants” (sic) reads as follows: 
“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
(1)  That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(2)  That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance; 
(3)  That they carry arms openly; and 
(4)  That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it, they are 
included under the denomination ' army '.”70 
It is possible that the criteria originated due to the necessity of compromise 
between States with strong standing armies and weaker States whose defence 
might depend on armed citizens.71  The Brussels Declaration effectively included 
armed citizens as combatants provided they fulfilled the stated conditions, thereby 
bestowing on States with weaker armies the ability to turn citizens into lawful 
combatants.  Importantly, the Brussels Declaration was the first international 
document to express the four criteria for combatancy status which will be 
discussed in greater detail below.  Although the Brussels Declaration was never 
ratified, it provided the framework for the Hague Conference of 1899. 
 
Oxford Manual 1880 
The Institute of International Law, founded in 1873, was an association which 
aimed to aid the growth of international law by endeavouring to state the general 
principles of the law and by giving assistance to the gradual codification of 
                                                 
69
 Holmes, R (ed) The Oxford Companion to military history (2001) 320. 
70
 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War 1874, article 9.  
Online at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/135?OpenDocument>. 
71
 Elsea, supra n 46 at 25. 
  
21 
international law.  The Oxford Manual72 was unanimously adopted by the Institute 
in 1880.  Article 2 of the Manual states that: 
“The armed force of a State includes:  
1. The army properly so called, including the militia; 
2. The national guards, landsturm, free corps, and other bodies which fulfil the 
three following conditions: 
(a) That they are under the direction of a responsible chief; 
(b) That they must have a uniform, or a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at 
a distance, and worn by individuals composing such corps; 
(c) That they carry arms openly; 
3. The crews of men-of-war and other military boats; 
4. The inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who, on the approach of the enemy, 
take up arms spontaneously and openly to resist the invading troops, even if they 
have not had time to organise themselves.” 
 
The criteria specified in the Manual for determining who was included in the 
“armed force of a State” were the same as that put forward by the Brussels 
Declaration six years earlier, with the exception of the requirement to obey the 
laws of war.  Subsection (4) includes people engaged in what is known as a levée 
en masse as combatants.  This situation is discussed below.73 
 
Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907 
The Hague Conventions were negotiated at the First and Second Peace 
Conferences held in The Hague, Netherlands, in 1899 and 1907.  Both the Peace 
Conferences were called by Russia and were initiated with the intention of 
reducing armaments.  Although they were unsuccessful in this main purpose, 
there were important discussions at both the Conferences on the provisions 
relating to belligerent status.74  The issue was of significance as it was already 
clear that if a person was accorded belligerent status they were bound by the 
obligations of the laws of war, and entitled to the rights which they conferred – 
most importantly the right, following capture, to be treated as a POW.  Both 
Hague Convention II 189975 and Hague Convention IV 190776 have an annex 
entitled Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  These 
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annexes contain the same article 1, which describes the groups of people to whom 
the laws, rights and duties of war apply.  It is identical, in all material aspects, to 
article 9 of the 1874 Brussels Conference quoted above. 
 
As the 1907 Hague Conventions had not been ratified by a number of the 
participants in World War I (WWI) they were not legally binding during that war.  
However, the 1899 Hague Convention regarding the laws and customs of war on 
land (Hague Convention II) had been ratified by all participants of WWI.  It was 
therefore binding on all parties and governed the conduct of hostilities.77 
 
Geneva Convention on POWs 1929 
During WWI deficiencies in the law relating to POWs were revealed.  
Furthermore, it became apparent that the relevant Hague Regulations lacked 
precision.78  Hence, the ICRC requested that a special convention be adopted 
specifically on the treatment of POWs.  A draft was submitted to the Diplomatic 
Conference at Geneva in 1929 and subsequently became the 1929 Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.79  The new Convention 
did not replace the Hague Regulations but sought to complete them.  Article 1 
extends the protections in the Convention to all persons covered by the 
Regulations annexed to the Second Hague Convention of 1899 and the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 1907 previously mentioned.  Hence, the 1929 POW 
Convention covers the same groups of people as are covered by the 1874 Brussels 
Conference quoted above.  Furthermore, the 1929 Convention explicitly applies 
also to all persons belonging to the armed forces of a belligerent party captured in 
the course of maritime or aerial war.80  This statement needed to be added as the 
Hague Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions only related to the laws of 
land warfare. 
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The 1929 POW Convention, along with the Hague Conventions governed the 
hostilities of World War II (WWII) and formed the applicable international law 
for the post-WWII trials. 
 
Geneva Convention III – article 4A 
Following WWII the four Geneva Conventions were drafted to prevent such 
atrocities occurring in future wars.  It was clear after this war that greater and 
more specific protections and laws were needed during times of war.  The 
maltreatment of POWs constituted an important part of the war crimes 
indictments.  Furthermore, the USSR retained a large number of German POWs 
for several years after the conclusion of the war.  It was clear that the 1929 
Convention required revision on many points.  Like the Brussels Declaration and 
Hague Conventions before it, the Third Geneva Convention defines the categories 
of persons who should, on falling into the hands of the enemy, be granted POW 
status.  This distinguishes lawful combatants from unlawful combatants as POW 
status is only extended to lawful combatants.  Article 4 of the Third Geneva 
Convention is more extensive than any of the previous definitions and is 
correspondingly more complicated.  During the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
article 4 was discussed at great length and there was unanimous agreement that 
the categories of persons to whom the Convention should apply was to be defined 
in harmony with the previous Hague Conventions.81  The four criteria imposed on 
militias and volunteer corps by the Brussels and Hague agreements, delineated 
above, were reproduced in article 4A(2).  The entire text of article 4A has been 
included as it is the current applicable law on lawful combatancy status in any 
conflict involving the US.  Hence, it is central to the determination of whether or 
not the Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters were lawful combatants. 
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Article 4A reads as follows: 
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to 
one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:  
(1)  Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
 
(2)  Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organised resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and 
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, 
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organised 
resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
 
(3)  Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or 
an authority not recognised by the Detaining Power. 
 
(4)  Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members 
thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, 
supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the 
welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorisation, from 
the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose 
with an identity card similar to the annexed model. 
 
(5)  Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant 
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not 
benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international 
law. 
 
(6)  Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time 
to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war. 
 
The basic principle under article 4A is that recognition as a POW, and therefore a 
lawful combatant, depends on two essential conditions:  firstly, a person must 
have fallen into the power of the enemy, and secondly, they must belong to one of 
the categories specified in parts (1) to (6) of paragraph A.  If these two conditions 
are fulfilled then the person in question is a lawful combatant and is entitled to be 
treated as a POW.  The relevant subsections of article 4A for this thesis are 4A(1)-
(3).  People falling under subsections 4A(4) and (5) are also entitled to POW 
status but it will not be necessary to refer to those parts as they have no direct 
bearing on detainees from either the Taliban or al-Qaeda.  Subsection 4A(6) deals 
with the situation of a levée en masse which is discussed below.82 
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The four criteria from article 4A(2) are the same as those found in the Brussels 
and Hague agreements.  Whether the four criteria apply to subsections (1) and (3) 
under article 4A will be discussed in the following section.  When considering 
whether the criteria have been satisfied a question arises as to whether the group 
as a whole must fulfil the four criteria or whether it is the individual members of 
the group who must do so.  If, for example, one member of a militia group 
breaches the laws of war does the entire group lose its status as lawful 
combatants?  The answer to this question is ‘no’.  The first requirement – that of 
being commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates – does apply to 
the group collectively.  However, the other three criteria apply both to the group 
collectively and to its individual members.83  Hence, an individual determination 
must be made for each captured fighter as to whether they had a fixed distinctive 
sign; carried their arms openly; and conducted their operations in accordance with 
the laws of war.  The failure to fulfil one or more of these requirements by one 
member of a group does not automatically exclude other members of the group 
from lawful combatant status. 
The four criteria and regular armed forces 
There is a clear distinction in article 4A between subsections (1) and (2).  
Subsection (2) contains four criteria which must be fulfilled by members of 
militias and volunteer corps in order for them to be POWs on capture.  However, 
these criteria are not listed under subsection (1) for members of armed forces and 
militia or volunteer corps forming part of the armed forces.  The key uncertainty 
concerning article 4A is whether people falling under subsections (1) and (3) must 
also fulfil the four criteria listed under subsection (2) in order to qualify as lawful 
combatants and be entitled to POW status.  Is the right to POW status for 
members of regular armed forces conditional upon the fulfilment of the four 
criteria or is it an absolute right? 
 
Some authors argue that the fact that the criteria are clearly only under the 
subsection for volunteer groups and militias not forming part of the regular army 
of the State, indicates that there is no similar test for members of a regular army 
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and their status is not in doubt – they need fulfil no more stringent test than simply 
being members of the armed forces.84  However, others have suggested that 
despite the structure of the article it is implicit that a captured combatant must 
fulfil the criteria in subsection (2) in order to qualify as a POW, as only those 
elements describe properly a member of the armed forces, and the drafters of the 
Convention felt it would be superfluous to list the criteria with regard to regular 
armies.85 
 
The original formulation of the combatancy requirements article, in the Brussels 
Declaration of 1874, was ambiguous and could be read as applying the four 
criteria to regular armies as well as to militia and volunteer corps: 
“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps, fulfilling the following conditions…”86 
This article remained materially unchanged in the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions.  However, it was substantially changed before being incorporated 
into the Third Geneva Convention in 1949.  It is important to note that neither the 
Hague Regulations nor Geneva Convention III explicitly state that a member of 
regular armed forces must fulfil the four criteria in order to be a POW in the event 
of capture.  The four criteria are in fact only mentioned for irregular forces and 
not for regular ones. 
 
However, this is because the drafters of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions considered that regular armed forces implicitly 
fulfilled the four characteristics and that there was “consequently no need to 
specify those requirements for the said forces.”87  The authoritative ICRC 
commentary on the Third Geneva Convention observes that the drafters of the 
Convention 
“considered that it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed 
forces should have for purposes of recognition.”88 
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This shows States do have a duty to ensure that members of its armed forces can 
be immediately recognised as soldiers and to make certain that they are easily 
distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces or from civilians.  The 
ICRC commentary continues: 
“The Convention does not provide for any reciprocal notification of uniforms or 
insignia, but merely assumes that such items will be well known and that there 
can be no room for doubt.”89 
The reason the Third Geneva Convention does not specifically state that members 
of the regular armed forces must wear uniforms is because this requirement is 
self-evident. 
 
Although, prima facie, the Geneva Conventions do not appear to place conditions 
on the eligibility of regular forces to POW status, 
“nevertheless regular forces are not absolved from meeting the cumulative 
conditions binding irregular forces.  There is merely a presumption that regular 
forces would, by their very nature, meet those conditions” (emphasis added). 
The idea underlying the article 4A definitions is that 
“the regular armed forces fulfil these four conditions per se and, as a result, they 
are not explicitly enumerated with respect to them.”90 
Due to the fact that regular armed forces are expected to automatically fulfil the 
criteria – simply due to being regular armed forces – it is not necessary to 
explicitly mention the criteria under subsections (1) and (3).  Furthermore, it 
would in fact be illogical to read ‘armed forces’ in article 4A(1) as somehow 
relieving members of armed forces from the same requirements imposed on 
members of militias or volunteer corps. 
 
The foremost distinction developed by the Hague and Geneva Conventions was 
the distinction between soldier and civilian.  To prevent civilians being fired upon 
in error, features which can easily distinguish combatants from civilians are 
necessary – and they are necessary for both regular armed forces and irregular 
fighters.  In order to protect civilians, soldiers must be able to tell the difference 
between civilians and opposition forces.  This difference needs to be clear for both 
regular and irregular opposition soldiers.  The principle of distinction cannot be 
maintained if only irregular soldiers are required to distinguish themselves from 
the civilian population.  Historically, there has been an emphasis on carrying arms 
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openly and wearing uniforms in order to preserve this essential distinction 
between civilians and combatants.91  This emphasis has been apparent for both 
regular and irregular fighters.  It has been suggested that ‘the soldier’ means “the 
uniformed regular soldier, fighting under his country’s flag against other similar 
soldiers fighting under theirs.”92  This implies that the requirement that members 
of the regular armed forces wear a uniform is axiomatic.  Furthermore, it has been 
bluntly stated that 
“the absence of a military uniform usually indicates that a person is a civilian, is 
therefore not allowed to perform military functions and must not be attacked.”93 
Undoubtedly the principle of distinction requires that members of regular armed 
forces must, at the very least, wear uniforms.94 
 
Article 44(7) of Additional Protocol I 1977 (which will be discussed in greater 
detail below) states: 
“This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States 
with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, 
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.” 
This clearly shows that the wearing of uniforms is an accepted practice which is 
expected to be upheld by regular armed forces.  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that 
“although this provision was introduced to counterbalance the loosening in 
Protocol I of the identification requirement for guerrilla fighters, it was also 
intended to point out that regular troops normally wear uniforms.”95 
 
In discussing subsection (3) the ICRC commentary explains that the four elements 
required under subsection (2) are not mentioned under subsection (3) because it is 
simply assumed that ‘regular armed forces’ 
“have all the material characteristics and all the attributes of armed forces in the 
sense of subparagraph (1):  they wear uniform, they have an organised hierarchy 
and they know and respect the laws and customs of war.”96 
Clearly if ‘regular armed forces’ under subsection (3) are implicitly required to 
fulfil these conditions then ‘armed forces’ under subsection (1) must be also. 
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There exists much support for the theory that the same requirements that apply to 
irregular forces are also valid for members of regular forces.  Indeed, there is  
“ample evidence that this is a rule of law….Any regular soldier who commits 
acts pertaining to belligerence in civilian clothes loses his privileges and is no 
longer a lawful combatant.  ‘Unlawful’ combatants may thus be either members 
of the regular forces or members of resistance of guerrilla movements who do not 
fulfil the conditions of lawful combatants.”97 
Evidently, members of regular forces will not be entitled to lawful combatancy 
status unless they satisfy the criteria explicitly applied to irregular forces.   
 
In the case of Mohammed Ali v Public Prosecutor98 the Privy Council held that it 
is not enough to establish that a person belongs to the regular armed forces in 
order to guarantee him POW status.  Members of the regular armed forces must 
observe the conditions imposed on irregular forces even though this is not 
expressly stated in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.  The House of Lords 
gave a similar verdict in the 1969 Malaysian case of Osman v Prosecutor.99  Their 
Lordships held: 
“for the ‘fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance’ to serve any useful 
purpose, it must be worn by members of the militias or volunteer corps to which 
the four conditions apply.  It would be anomalous if the requirement for 
recognition of a belligerent, with its accompanying right to treatment as a 
prisoner of war, only existed in relation to members of such forces and there was 
no such requirement in relation to members of the armed forces.  All four 
conditions are present in relation to the armed forces of a country”. 
Clearly both these cases provide support for the position that regular armed forces 
are required to fulfil the four criteria. 
 
The military manuals of many States define the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict by requiring them to be under a command responsible to a party for the 
conduct of its subordinates and be subject to an internal disciplinary system which 
enforces compliance with the laws of war.100  This is compelling evidence 
suggesting that many States believe their armed forces are required to fulfil at 
least requirements (a) and (d) from article 4A(2) in order to be the regular armed 
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forces.  The UK Laws of Armed Conflict Manual101 defines armed forces as being 
under a commander responsible for the conduct of his subordinates and being 
subject to an internal disciplinary system enforcing compliance with the law of 
armed conflict.  It further states that it is “customary” for members of organised 
armed forces to wear uniforms but this is not stated as a necessary part of the 
definition of armed forces.102 
 
In a 2002 memo to the White House Counsel, General Bybee, then Assistant 
Attorney General, now a US federal judge, concluded that “the four basic 
conditions that apply to militias must also apply, at a minimum, to members of 
armed forces”.103  He supports this conclusion with the following assertion: 
“There was no need to list the four Hague conditions in Article 4(A)(1) because it 
was well understood under pre-existing international law that all armed forces 
were already required to meet those conditions.”104 
Bybee continues: 
“there is no evidence that any of the…drafters or ratifiers of [the Third Geneva 
Convention] believed that members of the regular armed forces ought to be 
governed by lower standards in their conduct of warfare than those applicable to 
militia and volunteer forces.” 
This comment is valid – it does not seem reasonable to require members of militia 
and volunteer forces to meet higher standards than those burdening regular armed 
forces. 
 
The law and theories discussed thus far provide evidence for the assertion that 
members of the regular armed forces of a State are required to fulfil the four 
criteria listed under subsection (2) of article 4A.  However, there are also some 
opposing arguments maintaining that members of regular armed forces are 
entitled to POW status regardless of whether they fulfil the criteria, and that the 
criteria consequently only relate to militia or volunteer corps.  The most obvious 
rationale for asserting that members of regular armed forces are not obliged to 
satisfy the four criteria is the structure of article 4A.  The ordinary reading of the 
article clearly only includes the four criteria under subsection (2).  Furthermore, 
the travaux préparatoires show that regular armed forces, including members of 
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militia and volunteer corps forming part of them, do not have to formally fulfil the 
four criteria in order to qualify as POWs.105   
 
It has been suggested that 
“the key factor in determining the lawfulness of a combatant…is the affiliation of 
the combatant to a party to the conflict.”106 
Under this view the organised armed forces (including militias and volunteer 
corps) of a party to the conflict are lawful combatants simply due to their position 
as part of the armed forces and they do not have to fulfil the four criteria to verify 
this position.107  The determinative criterion for POW status for regular armed 
forces of a party to a conflict is purely membership of the armed forces.108  It has 
been observed that the regular armed forces of a State, even if it is a government 
or an ‘authority’ not recognised by the opposing party, “need not necessarily 
satisfy the four criteria in order for their members to be entitled to POW 
status.”109  This analysis of the situation accepts that while compliance of the law 
might reasonably be expected of members of regular armed forces, it is not 
required for their obtaining POW status.  This casts into doubt the assertion that 
members of regular armed forces must fulfil the four criteria in order to be granted 
POW status. 
 
In summary, arguments have been given for and against the question of whether 
regular armed forces are required to satisfy the four criteria specified under article 
4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.  Firstly, the principle distinction protected 
by the laws of war – that between civilians and combatants – requires the criteria 
to be binding on members of regular armed forces as well as irregular forces or 
the distinction cannot be sustained.  Secondly, it would have been unnecessary to 
spell out the criteria for members of armed forces as it is simply assumed that 
members of armed forces do in fact fulfil them as a matter of course.  
Furthermore, the Privy Council, the House of Lords and the military manuals of 
many States add weight to the idea that regular armed forces are required to 
satisfy the requirements.  On the other hand there are arguments to suggest that 
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regular armed forces are not required to satisfy the four criteria in order to be 
treated as POWs, the most obvious of these being that the basic layout of article 
4A does not apply the criteria to subsections (1) and (3).  The only other ground 
given by a variety of commentators as to why regular armed forces do not have to 
fulfil the criteria seems to be that the determinative factor for POW status is the 
simple fact of belonging to the regular armed forces.  Belonging to the forces is 
enough and it is not necessary to fulfil the criteria. 
 
The arguments establishing the theory that regular armed forces are required to 
satisfy the four criteria are much more compelling than those opposing the theory.  
It is a firm condition of the laws of war that soldiers – both regular and irregular – 
be easily distinguishable from the civilian population.  Hence, it is necessary for 
regular armed forces to wear a fixed distinctive sign (such as a uniform) and carry 
their arms openly.  Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to impose harsher 
conditions on irregular fighters than those imposed on regular armed forces.  It 
was simply assumed in 1949, when the Geneva Conventions were drafted, that 
regular armed forces would fulfil the criteria as a matter of course, simply due to 
being regular armed forces.  Therefore, the four criteria were not included under 
subsections (1) and (3) but regular armed forces are required to fulfil them in 
order to qualify for POW status.  Consequently, the rest of this thesis will be 
based on the assumption that in order to be lawful combatants, and therefore 
entitled to POW status, regular armed forces, as well as irregular forces, must 
fulfil the four criteria in article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention. 
 
Additional Protocol I 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions were not the last endeavour to define exactly who 
could be a lawful combatant.  In 1977 Additional Protocol I had another attempt 
at this difficult task and defined lawful combatants as: 
“all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates....  Such armed forces 
shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.”110 
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The reasons for the 1977 rejuvenation of the combatancy criteria; exactly what the 
new definition entailed; and why it is not applicable to this thesis will be 
discussed below.  
 
Historically, wars of national liberation involving struggles against colonial 
domination, alien occupation or racist regimes were considered to be internal 
conflicts, non-international in nature, and entailing the direct involvement of only 
one sovereign State.  The 1949 Geneva Conventions upheld this historical state of 
affairs but in the years following their creation there were many such wars and 
many countries were sympathetic to the cause of national liberation movements.  
However, national liberation movements often had to fight unconventionally, 
using guerrilla tactics in order to have an impact, and hence did not always carry 
arms openly or wear uniforms.  Therefore, they were not fulfilling the criteria to 
be lawful combatants or POWs. 
 
In 1948 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) began an armed struggle to 
overthrow British colonial rule in Malaya.  This was a war of national liberation 
fought for the most part through guerrilla tactics due to the fact that the MCP did 
not have sufficient numbers or weapons to use traditional methods of warfare.  
The loss of civilian lives was extensive as a result of the nature of the conflict.111  
Similarly, guerrilla warfare played a significant part in the Algerian war of 
independence (1954-1962) fought against the French colonists by the Front de 
Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front).112  The war was characterised 
by guerrilla and terrorist tactics utilised by the nationalists and the counter-
insurgency measures with which the French military responded.  De Gaulle 
returned to power in 1958 and increasingly became convinced that while the war 
in Algeria was militarily winnable it was not internationally defensible.  Hence, 
Algeria achieved its independence in 1962.113   Due to the guerrilla tactics of the 
nationalists, the harsh counter-insurgency measures undertaken by the French and 
the extensive loss of civilian lives, the war was generally unpopular with the 
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international community and garnered more sympathy for the plight of national 
liberation movements or freedom fighters.114 
 
The Vietnam war (1959-1975) was also a battle by a liberation movement against 
foreign domination.  Vietnam gained its independence from France following the 
Indochina war (1946-1954) and was temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel.  
Above the parallel the Vietminh established a socialist state under the leadership 
of Ho Chi Minh; below the parallel a non-communist state was established under 
the Emperor Bao Dai.  In 1955 the French-backed Emperor was deposed by US-
supported Ngo Dinh Diem as the President of the newly established Republic of 
Vietnam.115  The 17th parallel had been intended as a temporary partition and it 
was anticipated that general elections would be held by 1956 to bring about the 
reunification of Vietnam.116  However, an election was not held and opposition to 
President Diem’s rule grew in South Vietnam.  A low-level insurgency began in 
the South in 1957 and in 1959 the North agreed to support an armed revolution 
against Saigon.117  The National Liberation Front was formed in order to 
overthrow the government of the South.  The ensuing conflict involved much 
guerrilla warfare due to the mountainous and jungle-covered terrain of Vietnam.  
International condemnation of the war was extensive and once again the 
difficulties faced by people attempting to fight for liberation from foreign 
domination were recognised. 
 
These three examples represent the type of conflict that took place between the 
signing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and the drafting of Additional 
Protocol I in 1977.  Wars of national liberation obtained the sympathy of the 
international community and it was appreciated that it was not possible for 
guerrilla fighters to live up to the high standards required for combatancy status 
under the Third Geneva Convention.  It was thought that more protections needed 
to be extended to guerrilla fighters and hence the combatancy requirements should 
be less strict.118 
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Change was sought through the Diplomatic Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva 1974-1977.  
The ICRC had two declared goals for the Diplomatic Conference.  One was to 
develop international humanitarian law as development was clearly needed in this 
area.  Hague Law was seriously outdated and there were gaps in the protection 
under the Geneva Conventions.  It was thought that there were inadequate 
provisions for guerrilla warfare and a marked absence of environmental 
protections.  The second main aim of the ICRC was to reaffirm the existing 
principles of international humanitarian law commonly considered to be 
customary international law, but neglected or ignored by States in practise during 
WWII and since.119 
 
More than 100 governments sent delegations to the conference and it was notable 
as the first time Third World nations had the opportunity to participate in a 
conference on the codification of humanitarian law.120  Third World countries had 
their own special concerns and their agenda was quite different to the declared 
goals of the ICRC.  They were eager to relax the requirements of combatant status 
so ‘freedom fighters’ waging a guerrilla war could be able to attain the status of 
POWs.121  Furthermore, they wished to have wars of national liberation qualified 
as international armed conflicts rather than internal armed conflicts.  This would 
mean that the majority of the Geneva Conventions would apply to wars of 
national liberation and ‘freedom fighters’ would enjoy greater protections.  
Following a lengthy debate this proposal was adopted by a majority vote.122  The 
Additional Protocols have been called the 
“international community’s most ambitious attempt to escape from the shadow of 
the Second World War and to legislate for a new generation of 
conflicts…frequently conducted by irregular, guerrilla methods rather than by set 
piece battles between opposing bodies of regular, uniformed armed forces.”123 
 
Additional Protocol I was drafted at the Diplomatic Conference with the purpose 
of filling the gaps perceived in the protection provided by the Geneva 
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Conventions.  This was to be done by extending the categories of people entitled 
to combatant status and removing some of the ambiguities to be found in the 
Conventions.  Articles 43 to 47 of the First Additional Protocol reflected a 
compromise between the need to protect civilians during times of armed conflict 
and the need to relax the standard for unconventional fighters, especially those 
acting in occupied territory.  The compromise was essentially to 
“relax the rigid requirements of the Hague and Geneva Standards sufficiently to 
provide guerrillas a possibility of attaining privileged combatant status without 
exposing the forces fighting them to the danger inherent in the use of civilian 
disguise in order to achieve surprise.” 124 
It was thought that this would strengthen the protection of the civilian population 
from the effects of hostilities, particularly in occupied territory.  By extending 
greater protections to irregular fighters, such fighters would no longer be obliged 
to mingle with civilians in order to gain an advantage, and hence the risk to 
civilians of being targeted by the enemy would be lessened.125 
 
Alternatively, articles 43 to 47 of Additional Protocol I can be seen as weakening 
the previously strict distinction required between combatants and civilians which 
acted to protect civilians during wartime.  One of the overarching principles of 
international humanitarian law is the separation of combatants and non-
combatants (civilians).  The Third Geneva Convention provides incentives in 
order to ensure that the laws of war are upheld and that combatants distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.  Additional Protocol I extended greater 
protections to irregular fighters and in doing so the gap between combatants and 
civilians was lessened.  This deteriorated and blurred the previously sharp 
distinction between combatants and civilians. 
 
Article 43(1) of Additional Protocol I outlines the people who are the ‘armed 
forces’ of a Party – 
“all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is 
represented by a government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party.  
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter 
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict.” 
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Article 43(2) states that members of these ‘armed forces’ are combatants – they 
have the right to participate directly in hostilities.  Article 44(1) applies POW 
status to combatants: 
“[a]ny combatant, as defined in article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse 
Party shall be a prisoner of war.” 
Article 43 thus eliminates the distinction between regular armed forces and 
irregular voluntary corps, militias and other organised resistance movements 
advocated by Geneva Convention III.  The article essentially puts all components 
of a party’s armed forces on an equal footing for status.  Furthermore, under the 
Third Geneva Convention, POW status was extended to captured members of the 
regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government or authority not 
recognised by the Detaining Power, but not to irregular fighters professing 
allegiance to such an unrecognised power.  Article 43 removes this distinction so 
regulars and irregulars alike are protected when they fight for an unrecognised 
authority. 
 
Under the Third Geneva Convention’s traditional view of combatancy abiding by 
the laws of war is a firm requirement in order to be granted POW status.  
However, under article 44(2) of Additional Protocol I 
“violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a 
combatant or…a prisoner of war”. 
All combatants are still required to obey the laws of war (such as the non-
targeting of civilians), but if they do not the privilege of POW status will not be 
withheld from them.  Bestowing POW status on all combatants irrespective of 
whether they have complied with the rules of international law removes the 
incentive to comply. 
 
As well as removing the incentive to obey the laws of war the First Additional 
Protocol weakens the strict distinction between combatants and civilians that the 
Third Geneva Convention espouses.  The four criteria under article 4 of the Third 
Convention clearly require combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population.  However, Additional Protocol I recognises that in some armed 
conflict situations combatants are unable to do so and determines that combatants 
indistinguishable from the civilian population will retain their status as 
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combatants provided they carry their arms openly.126  Should a combatant fall into 
the power of the enemy while failing to carry his arms openly he will forfeit his 
POW status but shall, nevertheless, 
“be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of 
war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol.”127 
This means that although official POW status is withheld, combatants who fail to 
carry their arms openly will still be treated like POWs on capture.  To some extent 
this removes the incentive to carry arms openly or for combatants to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.  A combatant who failed to distinguish 
himself under Geneva Convention III lost his position as a privileged combatant, 
was therefore not entitled to POW status on capture, and could be tried as a 
common criminal for his unprivileged involvement in hostilities.  The new rule 
under the First Additional Protocol, as elucidated by article 44(3), makes it clear 
that should a combatant fail to distinguish himself when required the sanction is 
trial and punishment for a breach of the laws of war, but no loss of combatant and 
POW status. 
 
Article 45 of Additional Protocol I requires that a person who has fallen into the 
power of an adverse Party be presumed to be a POW.  If there is any doubt as to a 
person’s status they must be treated as a POW until a competent tribunal has 
adjudicated on the issue.128  Article 45(3) determines that if a person is not 
entitled to POW status and they do not benefit from more favourable treatment 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention they shall have the protection of article 75 
of Additional Protocol I (examined in Chapter Four) which gives a minimum 
standard of treatment. 
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Despite having lowered the threshold requirements for identification as a 
combatant, making it much easier for irregular armed groups such as members of 
guerrilla forces to attain combatancy status, Additional Protocol I still claims to 
protect the distinction between civilians and combatants.  Article 48, entitled 
“Basic rule”, states that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants”.  This is simply a restatement of 
the commonly accepted civilian or non-combatant immunity principle.  However, 
ironically, it follows directly after a number of articles which weaken that very 
principle. 
 
A short break must be taken from the First Additional Protocol to consider the two 
different areas of the laws of war – the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.  The jus 
ad bellum is the part of the laws of war which governs the legality of the use of 
force – whether it is legal to go to war.  The jus in bello refers to the humanitarian 
rules which must be respected during warfare.  Additional Protocol I tends to 
confuse these two areas of law which ought to be kept separate at all times.  
Best129 asks 
“should not the jus in bello go easy on irregular combatants fighting for a cause 
which the jus ad bellum pronounced to be just?” 
He calls it an “embarrassing fact” that international humanitarian law 
“applies impartially and indifferently to both or all sides in an armed conflict 
without regard to the merits of the conflict’s causes.” 
This is known as the doctrine of belligerent equality.  However, as ‘embarrassing’ 
as this fact may be, it is necessary.  It is too hard, and takes to long, to establish 
the rights and wrongs of a war at the time it is being fought in order to determine 
exactly how, and to whom, international humanitarian law should apply.  
Furthermore, in all wars both sides would claim to have a ‘just cause’.  Best130 
cites Sir Robert Craigie, during the final reading through of the articles of the 
Third Geneva Convention, as stating “a war is still a war in the eyes of 
international law even though it has been illegally commenced.”  Once a war has 
begun, the reasons for that beginning have no influence.  However the conflict 
started, the onus is still on both parties to fight the war in accordance with the 
laws of war. 
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The idea of having a ‘just cause’ is in fact the very reason Additional Protocol I 
revisited the definition of lawful combatant status.  People fighting wars of 
national liberation were seen as espousing a ‘just cause’ and therefore it was 
thought that more protections should be accorded to them.  Theories of ‘just war’ 
only concern jus ad bellum and 
“cannot justify (but are in fact frequently used to imply) that those fighting a just 
war have more rights or less obligations under [international humanitarian law] 
than those fighting an unjust war.”131 
 
Additional Protocol I purports to take into account the fact that a party to a 
conflict may be fighting on just grounds but need to use guerrilla warfare in order 
to advance their cause.  This lessening of the standards of the jus in bello due to 
the possibility of a strong jus ad bellum case is unacceptable.  Despite the fact that 
one side of an armed conflict may be using force unlawfully and the other 
lawfully, it remains essential that international humanitarian law be respected by 
both sides and apply to both sides.132  Inevitably, each party to the conflict will 
have civilian victims of war and they are equally entitled to and need the 
protections provided by the laws of war.  It must also be remembered that even if 
the violation of jus ad bellum was committed by their side the civilians are not 
necessarily responsible for that violation and must still benefit from international 
humanitarian law protections. 
 
The right to react in self-defence (a jus ad bellum rule) does not exempt the 
defending State from its obligations under the laws of war (the jus in bello).133  
This principle is even enshrined in the preamble to Additional Protocol I, despite 
the fact that the sections of the Protocol discussed above are guilty of mingling the 
two areas of international humanitarian law.  The preamble includes the statement 
that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol 
“must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by 
those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin 
of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to 
the conflicts”.134 
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It is a firm requirement that all parties to an armed conflict obey the laws of war 
regardless of the justice of the cause they claim to be fighting for.  The fact that 
the First Additional Protocol intermingles the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is 
a distinct mark against it. 
 
In 1977 Additional Protocol I was drafted in an attempt to redefine the 
requirements for combatancy status.  World opinion had been sympathetic to the 
causes of freedom fighters and the Protocol endeavoured to extend some 
protections to these people.  However, in protecting people forced to fight using 
guerrilla tactics the Protocol blurred the previously sharp distinction between 
combatants and civilians.  As civilian immunity is one of the paramount principles 
of the laws of war it should not be sacrificed to allow the inclusion of freedom 
fighters as lawful combatants. 
Inapplicability of Additional Protocol I 
The reasons for the introduction of Additional Protocol I into international law 
and the relevant sections contained in this document have been discussed.  It was 
necessary to do this as Additional Protocol I does play a major part in combatancy 
law due to the fact that it has altered this area of law radically.  However, it will 
now be explained why it is not possible to apply Additional Protocol I to this 
thesis. 
 
As international law currently stands international treaties only become binding 
on a State in so far as they are ratified by that State.  However, should a treaty 
reach the status of customary international law it will be binding on all States 
whether they have ratified it or not.  The US signed Additional Protocol I on 
December 12, 1977 but it has not ratified the Protocol and nor has Afghanistan.  
The reservations the US made to Additional Protocol I were very specific and 
related to the combatancy articles discussed above.  The fact that the US 
reservations were only on the basis of certain specific provisions has meant that 
many other provisions in the Protocol have been able to become customary 
international law despite the reservations.135  This means that the US is bound by 
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those provisions of the Protocol which are customary international law, but not 
those it objected to. 
 
As explained in section 1.5, customary international law is international law 
which develops from the co-existence of two elements:  firstly, there must be a 
consistent and general practice among States; and secondly, those States must 
consider their practice to be in accordance with international law.136  Parts of 
Additional Protocol I have reached this status of being practised by States 
believing that they are acting in accordance with international law.  However, not 
all of the Protocol is considered to be customary international law.  When 
declining to ratify the Protocol the US made it quite clear that it objected on the 
basis of article 44, claiming that this article would extend Geneva Convention 
protections to some unlawful combatants.137  They clearly did not wish to be 
bound by these provisions and hence they cannot be forced to abide by them 
simply as a result of a claim that all of Additional Protocol I is customary 
international law. 
 
The letter written by President Reagan to the Senate138 in 1987 concluded that the 
US could not ratify the First Additional Protocol as it was “fundamentally and 
irreconcilably flawed.”139  According to the President, the Protocol contained 
“provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in 
war” and he emphasised that “we must not… give recognition and protection to 
terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.”140  President Reagan 
foresaw difficulties with the provisions extending combatant status to irregular 
forces, claiming that they “would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and 
other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.”141  He thought that the problems 
in the Protocol were so fundamental in character as to not be able to be remedied 
through reservations even though he considered other parts of the Protocol to be 
“of real humanitarian benefit.”142 
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As the US expressly refused to ratify the First Additional Protocol on the basis of 
articles 43 and 44 those articles cannot be said to have become customary 
international law binding on the US.  Therefore, article 4A of Geneva Convention 
III continues to provide the standard of law regarding combatancy requirements 
and entitlement to POW status applicable to armed conflicts between the US and 
another State, even if the other State has ratified the 1977 Protocol. 
 
Geneva Convention III – article 5 
The law concerning combatants applicable to this thesis is article 4A of the Third 
Geneva Convention.  This article determines the criteria for lawful combatancy 
status and who is entitled to POW status when captured by opposition forces.  
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention deals with a situation in which there is 
doubt as to the status of a detainee and reads as follows: 
“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal.” 
This means that if there is doubt as to whether a detainee is entitled to POW 
status, a competent tribunal must determine the issue and until that determination 
is made the detainee must be treated as a POW.  This provision was inserted into 
the Convention at the request of the ICRC143 as prior to this requirement decisions 
were often made by soldiers of relatively low rank on the battlefield which led to 
situations where a captive could be presumed unlawful and executed on the 
spot.144 
 
The main impediment to the easy application of article 5 is due to the phrase ‘no 
doubt’.  Michaelsen and Shershow145 ask “whose doubt is sufficient to trigger the 
protection of article 5 and to mandate the convening of competent tribunals?”  Not 
surprisingly, the Bush Administration has claimed that there is no doubt about the 
status of the detainees being held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba – they are 
undoubtedly not POWs – so there is no need to give them access to a ‘competent 
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tribunal’ to clarify their status.146  The US position is that the doubt must come 
primarily “or even overwhelmingly” from the detaining power and that as the US 
has no doubts in this case about the classification of the prisoners, there is no need 
to have their status determined by a competent tribunal.147 
 
The issue of doubt under article 5 was mentioned by Justice Souter in his 
dissenting opinion in the 2004 US Supreme Court case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld.148  
He stated that the government’s reliance on the categorical pronouncement that 
there was no doubt to trigger the application of the article was at odds both with 
international law and the incorporation by the US of that law into domestic law.149 
 
Furthermore, the pronouncement by the US that no doubt exists infringes the 
United States Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, which gives the 
following interpretation for article 5: 
“[Article 5] applies to any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner-of-war 
status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in 
aid of the armed forces and who asserts that he is entitled to treatment as a 
prisoner of war or concerning whom any other doubt of a like nature exists”150 
(emphasis added). 
This clearly indicates that doubt arises and a tribunal is required whenever a 
captive who has participated in hostilities claims the right to be a POW.151  All 
that is necessary for doubt to arise is an assertion by the captive that he is entitled 
to POW status.  Once this assertion has been made, doubt has arisen, and a 
competent tribunal must be convened to determine the issue. 
 
The US has not convened tribunals to determine the status of Guantánamo 
detainees where doubt has been claimed.  This needs to be done in order to 
ascertain whether they are in fact entitled to POW status. 
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Levées en masse 
In general civilians who take up arms and join hostilities will be considered as 
unlawful combatants.  They lose their entitlement to civilian immunity and can be 
prosecuted for any belligerent acts they commit.  However, there is one exception 
to this rule – civilians who spontaneously take up arms to resist invading troops, 
provided they fulfil some conditions, are lawful combatants. 
 
Article 10 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration states: 
“The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach 
of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without 
having had time to organise themselves…, shall be regarded as belligerents if 
they respect the laws and customs of war.” 
All material aspects of this article can also be found in article 2 of the annex to 
Hague Convention II, 1899 and Hague Convention IV, 1907.  The phenomenon of 
civilians taking up arms to resist invading forces is similarly described in article 
4A(6) of the Third Geneva Convention, with the added requirement that they 
carry their arms openly as well as respect the laws and customs of war.  As such 
groups form one of the categories under article 4A they are entitled to prisoner of 
war status on capture and are therefore considered to be lawful combatants. 
 
Civilian bodies who spontaneously take up arms on the approach of the enemy are 
known as levées en masse.  As shown by the laws of war documents mentioned, 
civilians participating in a levée en masse are only regarded as combatants as long 
as they carry their weapons openly and comply with the laws and customs of war.  
Unlike normal combatants, they are not required to wear a fixed distinctive sign or 
a uniform but they must be distinguishable from the rest of the civilian population 
– hence the requirement of carrying arms openly.  The promotion to belligerent 
status is not extended to include groups of the inhabitants of occupied territories 
who take up arms subsequent to the occupation in order to harass or engage the 
occupying forces.152  In order to be accorded combatant status due to participation 
in a levee en masse, civilians must not be acting entirely on their own initiative, 
but must be under the control of the government or some other organisation that 
will be responsible for their actions.  Should they not be accountable to such a 
higher authority they will not receive any protection as combatants and will be 
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regarded as “marauders or bandits” and tried as such on capture.153  The 
entitlement to POW status of participants of a levée en masse is a long-standing 
rule of customary international law.154 
 
A levée en masse does not help determine the combatant status of the 
Guantánamo detainees as fighters for neither the Taliban nor al-Qaeda could be 
thought to have been civilians who spontaneously took up arms upon the approach 
of the Northern Alliance or US forces.  However, it is useful as an example of a 
situation in which civilians can legitimately change their status to that of lawful 
combatants. 
 
2.2.2 Unlawful combatants 
Thus far the rules governing lawful combatant status have been discussed.  Now 
the rules which govern unlawful combatants must be considered.  As mentioned 
earlier, there are only two categories of persons during times of armed conflict – 
combatants and civilians.  The whole purpose of the laws of war is to specify for 
each individual a single identity “drawn from a universe of two possibilities – 
either soldier or civilian.”155  There is currently no special third category under 
international law for civilians who take part in hostilities – “a category of persons 
that are neither combatants nor civilians does not exist.”156  However, each group 
– civilians and combatants – includes some people who break the rules.  These 
rule-breakers are referred to as unlawful combatants regardless of whether they 
come from the civilian group or the combatant group.  Hence, there are two types 
of unlawful combatants. 
 
Firstly, from the combatants group, there are people who are authorised to fight 
by a legitimate party to the conflict but whose perfidious conduct disqualifies 
them from combatant privilege.  Some examples of people in this category are 
spies, saboteurs, mercenaries and war criminals.  These people are combatants, 
but they have committed some unlawful act which excludes them from receiving 
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combatant privileges such as POW status.  Secondly, there are rule-breakers in the 
civilians group.  These are civilians who take up arms and fight during an armed 
conflict even though they are not authorised to do so by a party to the conflict.  
Despite the fact that these people are fighting, they remain civilians.  As civilians 
they are not legally allowed to fight and any unlawful actions they commit may be 
considered under civilian law.  For example, killing someone would be murder.  A 
brief example of an unlawful combatant from each of the two groups is given 
below.  Although the two types of unlawful combatants have been split up for 
ease of understanding, a distinction between the two categories is actually 
unnecessary: 
“Once it has been established that a person accused of hostile conduct is not 
entitled to treatment as a POW, there appears to be no reason to inquire whether 
the individual is a civilian or a disguised soldier, as they are subject to the same 
rights and liabilities.”157 
 
Spies 
There are two incentives in place to persuade people to fulfil the requirements of 
lawful combatant status.  These are that lawful combatants cannot be prosecuted 
for any belligerent acts they may have committed which do not breach the laws of 
war; and that should they be captured they will be entitled to POW status.  If 
regular armed forces are caught acting as spies or saboteurs behind enemy lines 
they may be denied POW status.  However, they retain the right to not be 
prosecuted for any belligerent acts they committed prior to becoming a spy which 
were within the laws of war.  They can be prosecuted for acts of espionage or 
sabotage or any other acts which breach the laws of war.  It is clear that spies and 
saboteurs cannot be treated as lawful combatants with both the privileges attached 
to that status as otherwise States would incorporate saboteurs and spies into their 
regular armed forces as a matter of course. 
 
There is a “consensus”158 that espionage does not violate the laws of war but that 
the power of a party to a conflict to punish such conduct 
“arose not from the fact that the law prohibited the activity but from the danger 
which clandestine acts created and the resulting necessity that they be dealt with 
severely.”159 
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The fact that a State is entitled to prosecute the spies they catch should not be 
understood as an assertion that espionage violates international law – given that 
most States engage in espionage themselves.  Rather, the ability to prosecute 
should be considered as an effort to deny information to other States.160  The 
plane in which spies operate is in fact akin to a legal black hole.161  Some 
inconsistencies and hypocrisies are inherent in rules surrounding a clandestine 
activity such as espionage as States wish to denounce the spies of their enemies 
while maintaining agents of their own. 
 
The 1863 Lieber Code, the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1899 Hague 
Regulations define espionage as gathering or attempting to gather information in 
territory controlled by an adverse party through an act undertaken on false 
pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner.162  This includes combatants 
who wear civilian attire or who wear the uniform of the adversary but excludes 
combatants who are gathering information while wearing their own uniform.  If a 
spy is captured in the act of espionage they may be denied POW status.  However, 
a spy who has rejoined his or her armed forces and is subsequently captured is 
entitled to POW status and incurs no responsibility for previous acts of 
espionage.163 
 
Article 88 of the Lieber Code states that a 
“spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether or not he succeeds 
in obtaining the information or in conveying it to the enemy.” 
However, a spy who is captured may not be punished without a trial.  This is 
recognised in article 20 of the Brussels Declaration and article 30 of the Hague 
Regulations.  The fact that captured spies are entitled to fundamental guarantees, 
including the right to a fair trial, is found in article 75 of Additional Protocol I.  
Consequently, the summary execution of spies is prohibited. 
 
The only reference to spies made by the Geneva Conventions can be found in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention – the Convention which relates to the protection of 
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civilian persons in times of war.  Article 5 of this Convention states that a person 
engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State is not entitled to the rights 
and privileges under the Convention if bestowing such rights and privileges would 
prejudice the security of the State.  However, they must still be treated with 
humanity and be accorded the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the 
Convention, if they are tried.164 
 
The laws laid down in the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration and the Hague 
Regulations have been reiterated and consolidated in the First Additional 
Protocol.  Article 46(1) denies POW status to spies captured in the act of 
espionage and allows such a person to be “treated as a spy”; article 46(2) asserts 
that a person is not considered to be a spy if he is acting in the uniform of his 
armed forces; and article 46(4) states that POW status will not be lost if a spy has 
rejoined his armed forces prior to capture. 
 
It is evident that the rule that combatants engaged in espionage do not have the 
right to POW status is well established.  There is some difficulty involved in 
assessing the punishment for people who lose their privileged status but it has 
“generally been understood that such persons are subject to the death penalty.”165  
However, the fact that spies may not be convicted or sentenced without a trial can 
be found in the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Regulations although it is not 
espoused directly by Additional Protocol I.  It is undoubtedly a rule which is less 
well established in international law documents but which has, nevertheless, 
reached the status of customary international law.166  Although Additional 
Protocol I does not directly mention the fact that spies cannot be punished without 
a trial it does point out that anyone who is not entitled to POW status and does not 
benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, will still enjoy the fundamental guarantees of article 75 of the 
Protocol.167  Article 75 includes the guarantee of a fair trial so a spy is entitled to a 
fair trial.  Consequently, the summary execution of spies is prohibited now, just as 
it was a hundred years ago by the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration and the 
Hague Regulations.   
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The fact that spies cannot be summarily executed is of importance to this thesis.  
Despite the fact that they are not lawful combatants and are not entitled to POW 
status, spies are still entitled to a fair trial, although the outcome of that trial can 
be execution if it is provided for by the law of the prosecuting State.  It is not 
suggested that spies cannot be executed – they can be.  What is important 
however is the fact that they must first be granted a fair trial.  To extrapolate this 
issue it seems reasonable that if a spy cannot be detained or executed without a 
trial, nor should other types of combatants who do not satisfy the combatancy 
criteria. 
 
Civilians as unlawful combatants 
The second type of unlawful combatant is civilians who break the rules by 
participating directly in a conflict.  The problem of non-combatants becoming 
involved in hostilities is by no means a new one.  The problem has arisen 
repeatedly since WWII.168  If civilians take up arms and take a direct part in 
hostilities they “remain civilians but become lawful targets of attacks for as long 
as they do so.”169  Civilians who participate in a conflict are not acting on behalf 
of a higher authority with whom peace can be negotiated, and they are therefore 
not immune to punishment for any belligerent acts they commit.  Although 
civilians, by participating in a conflict lose their privileged status and become 
lawful targets, they do not lose the protections they have as civilians under the 
Fourth Geneva Convention if they are captured.  Furthermore, they cannot be 
entitled to POW status but they “retain a claim to certain fundamental guarantees 
regarding their detention and any judicial proceedings against them.”170   
 
An example of a civilian being charged with a criminal action due to unlawfully 
taking part in hostilities can be found in the case of Mohammed Ali v Public 
Prosecutor.171  In this case a member of the Indonesia armed forces operating in 
Malaysia, wearing civilian clothes, committed sabotage in an office building in 
Singapore and killed three civilians.  The court held that as he was not operating 
as a member of the Indonesia armed forces at the time and did not comply with 
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article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention he had neither combatant nor POW 
status and could be tried for murder under Malaysian domestic law. 
 
Unlawful combatants can come from both categories of persons which exist 
during an armed conflict.  That is to say there can be unlawful combatants who 
are combatants who do not satisfy the combatancy criteria or unlawful combatants 
who are civilians who take up arms and participate in hostilities.  These people are 
not entitled to POW status but they will retain some fundamental guarantees under 
international law, such as the right to a trial. 
 
2.3 Combatancy law concluded 
 
The two categories of persons which exist during an armed conflict are civilians 
and combatants.  Both of these groups contain people who break the rules and are 
known as unlawful combatants.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
rights of Taliban and al-Qaeda members who fought in the 2001 Afghanistan war 
and are currently detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility in Cuba.  In 
order to ascertain what rights they have the first step is to decide whether they 
should be classified as lawful or unlawful combatants.  This is necessary as there 
is a distinct difference between the rights in international law of lawful and 
unlawful combatants.  Put simply, the rights of lawful combatants are easy to 
determine because lawful combatants have POW status and the rights of POWs 
are not controversial.  However, if it is concluded that the detainees in question 
are not POWs, the rights of unlawful combatants – a currently shakier and less 
well defined territory – will have to be clarified. 
 
The objective of Chapter Two was to determine exactly what is required for a 
person taking part in an armed conflict to be a lawful combatant.  It has been 
shown that the criteria for lawful combatancy are outlined in article 4A(2) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and that these criteria apply to all participants in an 
armed conflict.  The next step is to apply these criteria to the Taliban and al-
Qaeda fighters during the 2001 Afghanistan conflict to ascertain whether they 
satisfied the criteria. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Combatancy status – the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
 
 
All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many 
countries.  Many others have met a different fate.  Let’s put it this way – they are 
no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.172 
 
President George W. Bush 
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Introduction 
Chapter Two proved that all combatants in an armed conflict must satisfy the 
conditions listed under article 4A(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention in order to 
obtain lawful combatant status.  The purpose of Chapter Three is to apply these 
criteria to the fighters from the Taliban and al-Qaeda to determine whether they 
were lawful combatants.  Chapter Three begins with a very brief history of 
Afghanistan in order to introduce the 2001 conflict.  Secondly, consideration is 
given to whether or not the 2001 conflict was one with an international character.  
This is important as the majority of the Geneva Conventions only apply to 
international armed conflicts.  For non-international conflicts international 
humanitarian law has fewer protections.  Having dealt with these two introductory 
issues we arrive at the crux of the matter – whether or not the Taliban or al-Qaeda 
detainees were lawful combatants and therefore entitled to POW status.  Finally, 
the opinion of the US as regards POW status for the detainees is considered.  It is 
interesting to see how the US has chosen to classify the detainees after having 
discovered what their classification should be under international law. 
 
3.1 A very brief history of Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan gained its independence from the UK in 1919 when foreign 
intervention ceased following the last of the Anglo-Afghan wars.  From 1933-
1973 Afghanistan experienced its longest period of stability under the rule of King 
Zahir Shah.  In 1973 a coup led by the King’s brother-in-law brought this stability 
to an end and another coup followed in 1978 – known as the Great Saur 
Revolution.  In 1979 the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan resulting in a mass 
exodus of over 5 million Afghans to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran.  There 
followed a nine year war between the anti-government Mujahideen insurgents 
(supported by the US and Pakistan), and the Soviets.173  In 1989 the Soviets 
finally withdrew, leaving Afghanistan with a dangerous leadership vacuum.  
There was fighting among the Mujahideen factions which, within a year of the 
Soviet withdrawal, led to a state of warlordism.  The country became divided into 
a number of small fiefdoms led by military commanders or tribal leaders. 
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The Taliban arose out of the midst of this anarchy and confusion and steadily 
grew in power and accrued territory.  Its success was due to its ability to provide 
stability and order in the midst of chaos and its ranks “grew in direct proportion to 
the society’s desperate desire for order.”174  Initially the Taliban was backed by 
the US as well as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  However, the order it imposed was 
based on extremely conservative Islamic principles and employed “repressive and 
often brutal tactics”.175  Furthermore, the Taliban became increasingly intertwined 
with the al-Qaeda terrorist network.  Using violent and peaceful methods the 
Taliban “overran” vast areas of Afghanistan during the early 1990s.176  Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) speaks of a ‘scorched earth campaign’ utilised by the 
Taliban and the summary execution of civilians who remained behind in their 
homes rather than fleeing from the Taliban’s advance.177 
 
On September 27, 1996 the Taliban took Kabul, which had been evacuated the 
previous day by Massoud, the man who was shortly to become the military 
commander of the forces resisting the Taliban.  Out of the groups which resisted 
the Taliban there emerged the United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan 
which became known as the Northern Alliance.178  The Taliban had managed to 
establish order in most of the country, “but it was of a fearsome medieval 
kind.”179  Women were refused work or an education and were beaten if they 
showed an arm or wore white; justice was implemented through the chopping off 
of hands, ears or heads; and public stoning was the punishment for adultery. 180  
HRW reports on torture, deaths and massacres of the Hazara ethnic group by the 
Taliban.181 
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By 1998 the Taliban had backed the Northern Alliance up into the North of 
Afghanistan and held 90 percent of the country.182  Throughout 1998 and 1999 
fighting continued and Northern towns frequently changed hands back and forth.  
But Massoud still defiantly refused to allow the Taliban to claim control of 
Afghanistan.183  By this time the Taliban had established itself as the de facto 
government of Afghanistan.184  However, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, 
had been denied recognition by the international community and would not be 
considered the legitimate leader as long as the Northern Alliance held out in the 
North.  The only countries which recognised the Taliban as the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates.185  The Taliban had successfully consolidated its rule over almost all of 
Afghanistan, but it was ostracised by the world community and the military 
situation in Afghanistan remained at a stalemate.  Tanner succinctly sums up the 
situation: 
“Always one of the most forbidding territories in the world, under Taliban rule 
Afghanistan had also become the most xenophobic, obsessed with pure Islam 
without concern for what the rest of the world thought.”186 
 
The situation in Afghanistan was still at an impasse in 2001 when the tragic 
September 11 terrorist attacks occurred in the US.  On September 11, 2001, a 
small group of men belonging to al-Qaeda carried out simultaneous suicide 
attacks on the US by hijacking civilian aircraft and crashing them.  This resulted 
in substantial material damage and loss of life by almost 3000 people, the great 
majority of whom were civilians.  The US demanded that the Taliban government 
hand over Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda or at least force the terrorist 
organisation out of the country.187  The Bush Administration alleged that there 
was an inexorable link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and that there would be 
“no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who 
harbour them.”188  Security Council Resolution 1368 stressed that “those 
responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and 
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sponsors of these acts will be held accountable”.189  The Taliban refused to 
negotiate in any meaningful manner over the future of Bin Laden and this 
accelerated the US drive to war as well as ensured that the US campaign would be 
against not just al-Qaeda but the Taliban as well.190  On 6 October 2001, President 
Bush authorised Rumsfeld to begin the military action later named ‘Operation 
Enduring Freedom’.191  The military plan of the US was designed to minimise 
American casualties and leave most of the ground combat to the Northern 
Alliance forces. 
 
In the course of the armed conflict in Afghanistan the US detained hundreds of 
persons allegedly associated with either the Taliban or the al-Qaeda terrorist 
network.  Many detainees were transported to the US naval station at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.192 
 
Was there an international armed conflict? 
Over the course of history Afghanistan has seen many wars fought on its soil.  
The most recent one has covered the previous decade and began as a civil war 
fought between the Taliban rebels and the Northern Alliance – the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan.  In 2001 the US along with a number of other 
countries, including Australia, New Zealand and the UK, became involved in this 
war.  The question is:  Did it become an international war?  In order for the 
majority of the rules of international humanitarian law to be applicable there 
needs to be an international armed conflict.  If it can be shown that the 2001 war 
in Afghanistan was international the Geneva Conventions and all other 
international humanitarian laws will apply to it.  However, if the conflict was non-
international in character then only common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and the Second Additional Protocol will apply.   
 
Article 2 of all four of the Geneva Conventions states that the Geneva 
Conventions 
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“apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognised by one of them.” 
It is commonly accepted that all the Geneva Conventions are customary 
international law, so all parties are bound by the provisions regardless of whether 
they have signed the Conventions.193 
 
It is this author’s opinion that, in order to avoid confusion, it is simplest to employ 
the concept that the US was in fact fighting two separate conflicts – one against 
the Taliban and an entirely separate one against al-Qaeda.  In practise the two 
conflicts were not separate and distinct but the legal ramifications are not changed 
if we utilise this effective legal fiction. 
 
Firstly, consideration will be given to whether the conflict between the US and the 
Taliban was international in character.  It could be suggested that as the Taliban 
was not the official or de jure government of Afghanistan it was not possible for it 
to be involved in an international armed conflict.  The concept of State or 
diplomatic recognition will be considered and then the question ‘does a State have 
to be legitimate in order to be able to participate in an armed conflict?’ will be 
answered.  It has been suggested that the criteria required for an entity to be a 
State are a central structure capable of exercising effective control over a 
community; a territory which does not belong to any other state; and a community 
whose members do not owe allegiance to any outside authorities.194  It has also 
been suggested that democracy is a developing condition of statehood and that a 
State will not be recognised as a new State in the international community unless 
it is democratic:  “as far as concerns recognition of new states, democracy is 
clearly an important, or even the most important, condition.”195  Conversely, 
Cassese196 does not consider democracy to be a criterion of new statehood, but he 
suggests that recently some states, especially Western states, have begun to 
require respect for human rights and the rights of minorities and respect for 
existing international frontiers as conditions of granting recognition. 
 
                                                 
193
 Holmes, R The Oxford Companion to military history (2001) 353. 
194
 Cassese, A International law (2nd ed, 2005) 48. 
195
 Detter, I The international legal order (1994) 73. 
196
 Cassese, supra n 194 at 50. 
  
58 
Once an entity fulfils the criteria of statehood the question of international 
recognition arises.  Recognition is not required for a normal democratic change of 
government but if a dramatic and unconstitutional change occurs in government, 
such as a revolution or a coup d’état, the recognition of other states is required in 
order to clarify the situation.197  The act of recognition has no legal effect – it does 
not confer rights or impose obligations on the new state.198  However, recognition 
is politically important as it confirms that the recognising States are ready to 
initiate international interaction with the new State.  Additionally, recognition is 
legally important as it proves that the recognising States consider that the new 
entity fulfils all the factual conditions considered necessary for becoming an 
international subject.199  For diplomatic recognition to occur it is necessary that 
the new government have effective control over the majority of the territory of the 
State and that such control is well established and likely to continue.200 
 
The Taliban government was only recognised as legitimate by three States.201  As 
a State which was not recognised, was Afghanistan able to participate in an 
international armed conflict?  The question is ‘does a State have to be a legitimate 
State to be able to participate in an international armed conflict?’  The answer to 
this question is ‘no’.  For the Geneva Conventions to apply there does not have to 
be a formal state of war between two State parties – all that is necessary is that 
there be an armed conflict.  For an armed conflict to exist it is not obligatory for 
there to be formal recognition of one State by another – therefore the fact that the 
US and the majority of the world did not recognise the Taliban as the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan does not change the status of the armed conflict.202  
The Geneva Conventions would have minimal legal effect if States could simply 
escape their obligations by declaring that an adversary State was not the legitimate 
government of the country.  Furthermore, article 4(A)(3) of the Third Geneva 
Convention confers POW status on members of regular armed forces professing 
allegiance to a government not recognised by the opposition State.  Clearly, the 
recognition of a government is irrelevant to the determination of POW status. 
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Having dealt with the issue raised due to the lack of recognition of the Taliban 
government the question remaining is ‘was the conflict international in character?’  
The ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Conventions broadly defines an armed 
conflict as any difference between two States leading to the intervention of armed 
forces.203  There are differing views on whether the conflict in Afghanistan was an 
international or non-international one.  The most logical analysis is clearly 
summarised by Goldman and Tittemore:204 
“The U.S. intervention on the side of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban 
effectively ‘internationalised’ the conflict…  That intervention satisfied the 
conditions in common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the existence 
of an international armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan.” 
Under this view the conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban was a 
non-international conflict – a civil war.  Following the intervention of the US led 
coalition in October 2001 the conflict became an international conflict and hence 
all international humanitarian laws applied. 
 
It is also possible to look at the situation in terms of an international armed 
conflict on the basis of self-defence.  On September 11 2001 the US was attacked 
by al-Qaeda – a terrorist network harboured by Afghanistan – and the US reacted 
in self-defence.  However, a question arises as to whether 
“an attack against a small part of the United States, albeit one with devastating 
consequences for the people in the area hit, justif[ies] an armed response against 
a whole country, with the aim not only to root out the terrorists but to destroy and 
remove the effective, though unrecognised government.”205 
Dinstein’s206 response to this question is that there is good authority for self-
defence in such a situation in the form of the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour.  This is indeed a good authority for self-defence in reaction to an 
offensive action by a State.  However, in the case of the September 11 attacks the 
offensive action came from a non-state actor – al-Qaeda.  Does the right to react 
in self-defence still exist?  When is a State’s involvement in terrorism sufficient 
for it to be the legitimate target of the victim State’s reaction in armed self-
defence?  This concept of State responsibility for ‘State supported terrorism’ is 
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currently one of the controversial issues in international law.  Whether or not 
responsibility can be accredited to the State from which the non-state actor has 
operated will depend upon the amount of involvement the State had with the non-
state actor.  This is not the place for an in depth consideration of the principles of 
State responsibility.  Whether or not the US acted legally in self-defence207 is 
actually immaterial to this thesis as the jus in bello is not affected by the jus ad 
bellum.  As explained earlier,208 regardless of the reasons for going to war, the 
laws of war must still be followed.  What is of importance here is that the US did 
in fact respond in self-defence to an attack emanating from a non-state actor based 
in another country.  Hence, the ensuing war was one with an international 
character. 
 
Aldrich209 appears to believe that it is unnecessary to debate the issue, simply 
stating that the detainees were “captured in the course of an international armed 
conflict” and making no effort to prove that the conflict was in fact international.  
Later he states: 
“the armed attacks by the United States and other nations against the armed 
forces of the Taliban in Afghanistan clearly constitute an international armed 
conflict to which the Geneva Conventions as well as customary international 
humanitarian law apply.”210 
Other authors211 have similarly claimed that the conflict between the US and 
Afghanistan is an international armed conflict constrained by international 
humanitarian law under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I 
of 1977. 
 
On the other hand, Wedgwood,212 who agrees that in times of conventional 
warfare there is no doubt that the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions 
and, to some extent, the Additional Protocols, apply, contends that these rules and 
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conventions were designed for wars between organised States.  She is not positive 
that they ought to be applied to 
“a deadly armed conflict against a private network that has eschewed the laws of 
war and a belligerent Afghan faction that has sheltered al Qaeda’s terrorist 
operations.”213 
The assertion is that the Geneva Conventions are limited to international armed 
conflicts between two or more High Contracting Parties and cannot apply to 
illegitimate governments or non-state actors.  However, as explained above, 
legitimising a de facto government through State recognition is not necessary in 
order for an international armed conflict to exist.  De facto States are able to take 
part in an international armed conflict and the rules of international humanitarian 
law relate to the conflict, not to the status of the parties.  Furthermore, the Geneva 
Conventions are customary international law and hence are no longer restricted to 
‘High Contracting Parties’ – even actors which are not party to the Geneva 
Conventions are bound by them. 
 
It has been fairly straightforward to determine that the US and the Taliban were 
involved in an international armed conflict.  It is the conflict between al-Qaeda 
and the US coalition which is more difficult to translate into the sphere of 
international humanitarian law.  Al-Qaeda clearly did not resemble a State power, 
whether recognised or not.  It was a  
“clandestine organisation consisting of elements in many countries…dedicated to 
advancing certain political and religious objectives by means of terrorist acts 
directed against the United States and other, largely Western, nations.”214 
Furthermore, the armed conflict between the US coalition and al-Qaeda was not 
limited to Afghan territory.  The question has now become ‘does a war have to be 
between States (legitimate or illegitimate) in order for international humanitarian 
law to apply?  Or, alternatively, can a non-state actor be a party to an international 
armed conflict?’ 
 
The first point to be made in the consideration of this question is that the laws of 
war were created to protect people in times of conflict.  They benefit both sides in 
a war and more importantly, are beneficial to the civilians of both sides and are 
therefore not something to be restricted lightly.  They should in fact be applied 
liberally.  Admittedly, as a group of guerrilla fighters, a terrorist network, al-
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Qaeda is unlikely to comply with the laws of war.  However, it still behoves the 
US and other countries to extend the protections associated with international 
humanitarian law to all opposition forces, not just those with the status of a State.   
 
Furthermore, it is possible to suggest that international humanitarian law does not 
simply apply between States but ought also to apply to non-state actors if the non-
state actor in question is a large, powerful and organised independent group 
participating in hostilities.215  If this is the case then the non-state actor should be 
considered a party to the conflict and have all the rights and obligations to be 
found in international humanitarian law.  The nature of warfare is changing and 
hence the nature of international rules on warfare must change also.  Al-Qaeda is a 
“worldwide movement capable of mobilising a new and hitherto unimagined 
global conflict.”216  It has extensive military, training and intelligence gathering 
capabilities as well as extensive wealth.  Its ability to take part in an international 
armed conflict should not be doubted.217 
 
This author contends that both the Taliban and al-Qaeda were parties to an 
international armed conflict against the US and its allies.  The Taliban was the de 
facto government of Afghanistan which is sufficient to make it a State party to an 
armed conflict.  Al-Qaeda, although a non-state actor, was large, powerful and 
organised enough to also be considered as a party to an international armed 
conflict. 
 
3.2 Application of combatancy requirements 
 
Having decided that international humanitarian law is applicable to both the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda the next step is to determine whether the fighters in either of 
these organisations may have been lawful combatants.  Chapter Two detailed 
exactly what is required under international law in order for a person to be a 
lawful combatant and those requirements will now be applied to the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda to determine whether they were in fact lawful combatants.  It must be 
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noted that the conclusions drawn in this section have been based on the factual 
information and evidence available, but much of this evidence is rudimentary. 
 
Attention must also be drawn to the fact that this Chapter overlooks the caution 
given in the introduction that some people captured in relation to the Afghanistan 
war and incarcerated at Guantánamo may not have any connection whatsoever to 
the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the war.  Prior to a determination on combatancy status it 
must be ascertained that all Afghanistan battlefield detainees were in fact 
associated with the war and were not simply arrested due to being in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.  This Chapter proceeds on the assumption that this has 
been established, and hence only considers the status of people affiliated with the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda. 
 
3.2.1 The Taliban 
Firstly, consideration will be given to the issue of whether the Taliban can be said 
to have fulfilled the combatancy requirements discussed in Chapter Two.  In order 
to fall under article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention, the Taliban had to 
constitute the “armed forces of a Party to the conflict.”218  Prior to the onset of 
war in Afghanistan in 2001 the Taliban had controlled the vast majority of Afghan 
territory for five years.  Despite the fact that the Taliban was not recognised as the 
government of Afghanistan by the UN or most world governments it was, at the 
very least, the de facto government of the country.219  As the de facto government 
of a country at war it can certainly be claimed that the Taliban soldiers were the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict.  However, it is more straightforward to 
classify the Taliban armed forces as falling under article 4A(3) of the Third 
Geneva Convention.  To fulfil this article, the Taliban had to constitute the 
“regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not 
recognised by the Detaining Power.”220  This is a lower threshold than that 
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required by article 4A(1) and it is indisputable that the Taliban are covered by 
article 4A(3).221 
 
As explained in Chapter Two, despite being part of the regular armed forces of a 
Party, a fighter must still fulfil the four combatancy requirements in order to be a 
lawful combatant.  To recap, those four requirements found in article 4A(2) are: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
To determine whether or not members of the Taliban were lawful combatants, and 
therefore are entitled to be accorded the status of POWs, it must be determined 
whether they satisfied these four requirements.  To this end the four requirements 
are laid out separately below with evidence to show whether or not the Taliban 
members, either individually or collectively, can be said to have satisfied each 
one. 
 
Commanded by a person responsible for subordinates 
The first requirement is that armed forces be commanded by a person who is 
responsible for his or her subordinates.  In February 2002 a memo considering the 
status of Taliban forces under article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention was sent 
from Assistant Attorney General Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (then White House 
Counsel, now Attorney General of the US).222  Bybee stated that the Taliban 
militia, as a group, failed to meet three of the four requirements under article 4A 
and were therefore not entitled to POW status.  Firstly, Bybee asserted, the 
Taliban had no organised command structure and that individuals who had 
declared themselves to be ‘commanders’ “were more akin to feudal lords than 
military officers.”  The Taliban militia “functioned more as many different armed 
groups that fought for their own tribal, local, or personal interests.”223 
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Similarly, it has been suggested that there was a lack of organisation of authority, 
decision-making structures and military discipline within the Taliban due to the 
number of Afghan forces fighting under local warlords.224  Furthermore, Bialke225 
asserts that the Taliban were not commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates and nor did they have a viable internal disciplinary system.  He states 
that 
“the Taliban command structure was ambiguous, constantly changing among 
tribal and warlord alliances, with blurred lines between civilian and military 
authority.”226 
 
The suggestion that the Taliban regime did not have a sufficient command 
structure stems from the warlordism inherent in the Taliban regime.  However, 
although a tribal leadership or warlord structure of command may not be a 
modern style of military command it would seem that there were leaders 
responsible for their subordinates.  There may have been “no clear military 
structure with a hierarchy of officers and commanders” but there was a central 
command giving orders to unit commanders.227  These unit commanders were 
responsible for “recruiting men, paying them and looking after their needs in the 
field.”228  The style of command does not have to have been a traditional Western 
military one in order to satisfy the first article 4A(2) requirement.  Clearly 
warlords or tribal leaders did have command over Taliban units and there has 
been no suggestion that anarchy reigned within the Taliban.  Hence, it is likely 
that the Taliban structure did satisfy the first criterion under article 4A(2). 
 
Fixed distinctive sign 
The second requirement under article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention is 
that fighters wear a fixed distinctive sign which is recognisable at a distance.  This 
condition is essential to distinguish opposition fighters from civilians and hence 
reduce civilian casualties.  In the announcement given by the Office of the White 
House Press Secretary on February 7 2002 regarding President Bush’s 
determination of the legal status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, Fleischer 
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explains that the Taliban failed to satisfy the second requirement:  “The Taliban 
have not effectively distinguished themselves from the civilian population of 
Afghanistan.”229  The President’s statement implicitly recognises that Taliban 
combatants were members of Afghanistan’s regular armed forces, but he clearly 
takes the position, argued for in Chapter Two, that even regular armed forces are 
required to fulfil the four criteria under article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention.  Finding no such compliance, the President, “with the stroke of his 
pen and citing essentially anecdotal evidence”230 decided to disqualify all Taliban 
fighters as privileged combatants, thereby precluding them POW status.  Not only 
did the President not have enough evidence to deny POW status to all Taliban 
fighters but he grouped them together collectively rather than undertaking an 
individual determination for each member. 
 
Bybee gives slightly more evidence for the assertion that the Taliban did not wear 
a fixed distinctive sign.  He states: 
“the Taliban wore the same clothes they wore to perform other daily functions, 
and hence they would have been indistinguishable from civilians.  Some have 
alleged that members of the Taliban would wear black turbans, but apparently 
this was done by coincidence rather than design.  Indeed, there is no indication 
that black turbans were systematically worn to serve as an identifying feature of 
the armed group.”231 
Donald Rumsfeld (then US Secretary of Defence) also emphasised the Taliban’s 
lack of uniforms or any kind of insignia.232  He elaborated on this statement given 
in January 2002 with another presented less than a fortnight later, asserting that 
the Taliban 
“did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols, or uniforms.  To the contrary, 
far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of 
Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with the civilian non-combatants, hiding in 
mosques and populated areas.”233 
Rumsfeld’s comments assert a breach of parts (b) and (d) of article 4A(2), as 
seeking to blend in with the civilian population is a direct breach of the laws of 
war. 
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It is necessary to consider the statements provided by the Bush Administration as 
to why Taliban fighters should not be accorded POW status as they are useful in 
determining whether the Taliban fighters fulfilled the four requirements for 
combatancy status.  However, the people mentioned and quoted thus far in this 
section are political actors who gave little specific evidence to substantiate their 
comments and determinations.  Aldrich234 summarises this idea: 
“while I certainly do not know whether or not some or all of the members of the 
Taliban’s armed forces were distinguishable from civilians, either by wearing 
black turbans or by some other visible sign, it seems insufficient for the United 
States merely to assert an absence of distinction without adducing evidence, and 
it appears most unlikely in any event that all units of the Taliban’s armed forces 
were indistinguishable from civilians.” 
What Aldrich is suggesting is that to group all Taliban fighters together as having 
not had a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance and therefore not being 
entitled to POW status seems implausible.  He suggests it may be better to 
consider the circumstances of each individual detainee to determine whether they 
individually fulfilled the four criteria.235  If there was an insignia or distinctive 
sign recognisable at a distance which some groups of Taliban fighters wore to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population we can consider the individual 
circumstances of the detainees to determine whether an individual was wearing 
one.  However, if there was not such a sign that was recognised as distinguishing 
the Taliban armed forces from the civilian population, it must be said that none of 
the Taliban fulfilled this criteria. 
 
The Taliban may not have been dressed in a traditional military uniform but there 
are abundant reports that they sported their trademark black turban and if this is 
enough to distinguish them from the civilian population then it is enough to fulfil 
the requirement in article 4A(2)(b).  Butcher236 refers to a man “dressed in the 
Taliban uniform of black turban, long shirt and baggy trousers”; Goldenberg237 
speaks of a teacher “wearing the black plumed turban of the Taliban militia”; 
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Gannon238 mentions the “distinctive Taliban turban”; and Manyon239 refers to the 
“Taliban turban” as “the symbol of their fanatically religious government.” 
 
The question which arises is how distinctive does the uniform or ‘fixed distinctive 
sign recognisable at a distance’ have to be?  In 1969 an Israeli military court ruled 
in the Kassem240 case that the wearing of mottled caps and green clothes fulfilled 
the requirement of distinction as this was not the usual attire of inhabitants of the 
area in which the Palestinian partisans were operating.  Furthermore, it is stated in 
the US Air Force Pamphlet241 that a uniform ensures that combatants are clearly 
distinguishable but that “less than a complete uniform will suffice provided it 
serves to distinguish clearly combatants from civilians.”  A traditional military 
uniform is by no means necessary to fulfil the requirement of a fixed distinctive 
sign recognisable at a distance.242  It is only the overall requirement of distinction 
between military personnel and the civilian population which is important from an 
international humanitarian law perspective. 
 
It is probable the Taliban and Northern Alliance were able to recognise their 
respective enemy combatants on sight: 
“It is known that the Taliban customarily wear distinctive dark turbans, while 
combatants of the Northern Alliance wear scarves or other distinguishing apparel.  
Both modes of dress, while perhaps not ideal, are, nonetheless, sufficient to 
satisfy the principle of distinction under current law.”243 
It is essential for all soldiers, including members of regular armed forces, to wear 
some kind of fixed distinctive sign which is recognisable at a distance in order to 
ensure that the principle of distinction is upheld and combatants are easily 
distinguishable from civilians.  The evidence shows that such a ‘fixed distinctive 
sign’ may have been worn by some members of the Taliban forces as it is 
commonly accepted that the wearing of a black turban was a distinguishing mark 
of the Taliban.  As there was a sign which could distinguish the Taliban from the 
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civilian population it must be asked of each individual member whether they wore 
that sign.  It is not sufficient to decide that in general the Taliban did not wear a 
uniform and therefore cannot have been lawful combatants.  Provided there is a 
collective sign which is commonly agreed to distinguish a certain armed force 
from civilians, the wearing of that sign is an individual criterion. 
 
In summary, there was a distinctive sign which was recognised as distinguishing 
the Taliban from the civilian population – the black turban.  Whether or not this 
sign was worn should have been determined individually for each soldier.  
 
Carried arms openly 
The third condition is that fighters carry their weapons openly in order to 
distinguish themselves from civilians and hence protect civilians from attack. In 
considering the requirement of carrying arms openly Bybee, as US Assistant 
Attorney General, admitted that the Taliban did in fact do so.  However, he 
asserted that this is of little significance as “many people in Afghanistan carry 
arms openly.”244  He suggested that carrying arms openly was not sufficient to 
distinguish the Taliban from civilians and that the Taliban 
“never attempted to distinguish themselves from other individuals through the 
arms they carried or the manner in which they carried them.”245 
It is true that the requirement of carrying weapons openly is in order to distinguish 
members of the armed forces from the civilian population.  If the civilian 
population itself is in the habit of carrying weapons openly this third requirement 
is unable to fulfil its stated purpose but members of the armed forces should not 
consequently be penalised.  The duty is on the soldier to distinguish him or herself 
from civilians.  However, if a Taliban member can show that they were wearing 
the black turban and carrying their arms openly this is enough to fulfil the criteria 
regardless of the proclivity of the civilian population to carry arms. 
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As with the second requirement, this requirement must be fulfilled on an 
individual basis.  It must be determined of each individual detainee whether they 
did in fact carry their arms openly. 
 
Conducted operations in accordance with the laws of war 
The fourth and final condition which must be satisfied in order for a fighter to be a 
lawful combatant, and therefore a POW on capture, is that all operations were 
conducted in accordance with the laws of war.  In his February 2002 memo Bybee 
mentions this requirement, submitting that the Taliban 
“regularly engaged in practices that flouted fundamental international legal 
principles.  Taliban militia groups have made little attempt to distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants when engaging in hostilities.  They have killed 
for racial or religious purposes.  Furthermore, [the Department of Defence] 
informs us of widespread reports of Taliban massacres of civilians, raping of 
women, pillaging of villages, and various other atrocities that plainly violate the 
laws of war.”246 
Presumably Bybee, as Assistant Attorney General, realised that assertions of 
‘widespread reports’ and anecdotal evidence would be inconclusive in a court of 
law.  
 
Rumsfeld asserts that the Taliban were “tied tightly at the waist to al Qaeda”247 
and the announcement given by the Office of the White House Press Secretary in 
February 2002 contains the allegation that the Taliban  
“have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war.  Instead, they have knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful 
terrorist objectives of the al-Qaeda.” 248 
While it may be true that there were close links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 
providing sanctuary to or ‘harbouring’ a terrorist group is not the same as the 
Taliban failing to conduct its own military operations in accordance with 
international humanitarian law.249  The amount of responsibility which could be 
imputed to the Taliban would depend on how involved the Taliban was with al-
Qaeda’s plans. 
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Rumsfeld also stated that the Taliban, 
“far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of 
Afghanistan, sought to blend in with the civilian non-combatants, hiding in 
mosques and populated areas.”250 
The laws of war place the obligation on armed forces to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population – seeking to blend in with civilians is a direct breach 
of the laws of war.  However, like the second and third criteria, the fourth 
criterion is not collective and has to be determined on an individual basis.  The 
commission of war crimes by one member of an armed force cannot automatically 
disqualify every member of that armed force from entitlement to lawful 
combatant, and therefore POW, status. It is necessary for the US to show that 
individually members of the Taliban did not conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
 
Summary 
At a conference in London in early 2002, US Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, summarised the US position as follows: 
“a careful analysis through the lens of the Geneva Convention leads us to the 
conclusion that the Taliban detainees do not meet the legal criteria under article 4 
of the convention which would have entitled them to POW status.  They are not 
under a responsible command.  They do not conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.  They do not have a fixed 
distinctive sign recognisable from a distance.  And they do not carry their arms 
openly.  Their conduct and history of attacking civilian populations, disregarding 
human life and conventional norms, and promoting barbaric philosophies 
represents firm proof of their denied status.”251 
If this statement were to be supported by evidence on an individual basis and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt then assuredly the Taliban detainees would not 
be entitled to POW status as the combatancy criteria would not have been 
fulfilled.  However, evidence is scant. 
 
It has been difficult to verify whether the Taliban fulfilled the four criteria.  
Obviously, without evidence, a conclusive answer to the question as to whether 
the Taliban should be accorded POW status cannot be given.  However, from the 
evidence which is available it appears that in some cases Taliban members did 
wear a distinguishing mark (the black turban) and carry their arms openly.  It is 
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possible that the command structure in place was sufficient; and some Taliban 
members may have upheld the laws of war.  That is to say, it is possible that some 
Taliban members did in fact satisfy all four of the criteria for lawful combatant 
status.  What is certain is that an individual determination for each Taliban 
detainee at Guantánamo Bay needs to be carried out by the US to determine 
whether they are entitled to POW status.  These individual determinations should 
be executed under article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.252  A rudimentary 
collective determination that no Taliban members were lawful combatants is 
highly unsatisfactory and inadequate. 
 
3.2.2 al-Qaeda 
Having considered the status of Taliban fighters, separate deliberation must be 
given to whether al-Qaeda members satisfied the four conditions under article 4A 
of the Third Geneva Convention to determine whether any members of al-Qaeda 
could have been entitled to POW status.  As previously discussed, in order to be 
lawful combatants the al-Qaeda members needed to fulfil one of the six options 
under article 4A of the Convention while they were fighting in Afghanistan.  The 
only options which might be applicable are articles 4A(1) and (2). 
 
To satisfy article 4A(1) al-Qaeda would have to have been militia or volunteer 
forces ‘forming part of’ the Taliban armed forces; and under 4A(2) they would 
have had to be militia or volunteer forces ‘belonging to’ the Taliban.  As 
previously discussed, the four criteria listed under article 4A(2) apply to regular 
armed forces or militia or volunteer forces under article 4A(1) and to militia and 
volunteer forces covered by article 4A(2).  It is clear therefore that in order for al-
Qaeda fighters to be treated as lawful combatants it needs to be proved that they 
satisfied the four combatancy criteria.  Furthermore, it would need to be proved 
that al-Qaeda fulfilled the requirement of either “forming part of”253 the Taliban 
armed forces or “belonging to”254 the Taliban armed forces.  If it can be shown 
that al-Qaeda did not comply with the four combatancy obligations it is 
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unnecessary to deal with the semantics involved in determining whether or not 
they ‘formed part of’ or ‘belonged to’ the Taliban armed forces. 
 
Commanded by a person responsible for subordinates 
To satisfy the first criterion al-Qaeda forces must have been commanded by a 
person responsible for his or her subordinates.  It has been submitted that it is 
uncertain that al-Qaeda forces were sufficiently organised to satisfy this 
requirement, and that it is highly unlikely that they had an internal disciplinary 
system in place enforcing the laws of war.255  Similarly, it has been suggested that 
the cell structure of the al-Qaeda network “belies the notion of a chain of 
command.”256  However, like the warlord structure of the Taliban, the cell 
structure of the al-Qaeda network does seem to be effective for conducting 
operations.  Al-Qaeda is coordinated 
“via a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical 
support to its horizontal network of compartmentalised cells and associate 
organisations.”257 
It could not be said that al-Qaeda has no leaders and is an anarchical society so it 
is possible that the structure does conform to the requirement of being 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates. 
 
Fixed distinctive sign 
Secondly, al-Qaeda forces would have needed to be wearing a fixed distinctive 
sign recognisable at a distance to claim POW status.  It is unlikely that al-Qaeda 
had any form of fixed recognisable sign or managed to distinguish themselves 
adequately from non-combatants.258  While it is necessary for each individual to 
prove they wore a uniform and upheld the principle of distinction it is not possible 
to do this if there was not an overall sign, symbol or uniform which was 
recognised as distinguishing al-Qaeda from the civilian population.  As a terrorist 
network al-Qaeda did not wish to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and cultivated the anonymity which blending in with civilians could 
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give them.  Terrorist attacks such as the September 11 hijackings could not be 
successfully accomplished in uniform.  There is no evidence to show that there 
was an acknowledged al-Qaeda uniform or sign, and hence no al-Qaeda members 
can have been wearing it. 
 
Carried arms openly 
The third requirement under article 4A(2) requires soldiers to carry arms openly in 
order to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.  As a terrorist 
network, al-Qaeda members deliberately attempted to blend into the civilian 
population259 – violating the requirements of having a fixed distinctive sign and of 
carrying arms openly. 
 
Conducted operations in accordance with the laws of war 
The fourth criterion requires that all operations be conducted in accordance with 
the laws of war.  In 2002 the White House Press Secretary issued a statement 
including the assertion that al-Qaeda was a ‘terrorist’ group.260  This is significant 
as terrorism is illegal under international law – hence, people who commit acts of 
terrorism are not lawful combatants and cannot be entitled to POW status as they 
have breached the fourth combatancy requirement – that of conducting operations 
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.  However, this requirement is an 
individualistic one and it would need to be shown that each individual al-Qaeda 
detainee had breached it rather than grouping them together collectively as 
‘terrorists’. 
 
Summary 
As with the Taliban it has been difficult to find evidence on the actions of al-
Qaeda as regards the four criteria.  However, for lawful combatant status to accrue 
all four criteria must be satisfied.  Ergo, if it can be sufficiently proved that one 
criterion was breached then there is no entitlement to lawful combatant or POW 
status.  It seems clear that al-Qaeda did not have an acknowledged uniform or 
distinctive fixed sign with which they could generally be identified and 
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distinguished from the civilian population.  If there was no overall sign which was 
recognised as al-Qaeda’s uniform then an individual determination is not 
necessary – clearly no al-Qaeda member could have been wearing it.  Therefore, it 
is fair to say that no al-Qaeda detainees were lawful combatants and consequently 
they are not entitled to POW status. 
 
3.3 Application of combatancy requirements summarised 
 
It has been shown that it is possible some members of the Taliban may have 
fulfilled the four combatancy criteria.  As the second, third and fourth combatancy 
criteria are individual conditions it is necessary for the US to carry out an 
individual consideration for each Taliban detainee to determine whether, 
individually, they may be entitled to POW status.  It is possible that some of the 
Taliban detainees may in fact be POWs and they should be treated as such. 
 
As regards al-Qaeda it has been proved that it is impossible for any al-Qaeda 
detainees to have been lawful combatants and therefore none of them are entitled 
to POW status.  
 
The US conclusion 
Having determined the legal combatancy status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
detainees, it will be interesting to examine the position the US has taken and the 
possible reasons for this stance.  The Office of the White House Press Secretary 
gave an announcement on 7 February 2002 regarding President Bush’s 
determination of the legal status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees.261  This 
announcement clarified the position of the US on some of the questions 
surrounding the detainees.  In essence, President Bush decided that: 
(1) The Third Geneva Convention was applicable to the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan between the Taliban and the US; 
(2) However, the Taliban had not fulfilled the requirements of article 4 of the 
Convention so were not entitled to POW status; 
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(3) The Convention was not applicable to the armed conflict in Afghanistan 
between al-Qaeda and the US; 
(4) Nevertheless, all captured Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel were to be 
treated humanely, consistently with the general principles of the Third 
Geneva Convention, and delegates of the ICRC may privately visit each 
detainee. 
 
The question which this provokes is ‘was there any benefit to the US in deciding 
to withhold POW status from captured members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda?’  
There are two plausible advantages to the US.  The first relates to the conditions 
of detention – article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention states that POWs are 
only obliged to give name, rank, date of birth and personal or serial number.  This 
rule dates back to the 1899 Hague Conventions and places a strict limit on the 
right of the Detaining Power to interrogate combatants.  As the US wished to 
obtain considerably more information than this from the detainees it allowed itself 
to do so by not classifying the captured fighters as POWs.262 
 
The second way the US derived benefit due to not according POW status to the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees is that article 102 of the Third Geneva Convention 
requires that any sentence of a POW must be pronounced 
“by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of 
the armed forces of the Detaining Power”.263 
It has been asserted that US officials feared such procedures would provide 
opportunities for al-Qaeda suspects and their lawyers to prolong legal processes 
and attract publicity.264  Furthermore, there were concerns that it would be 
difficult to produce evidence which would meet the high standards of 
admissibility and proof and that al-Qaeda may learn in what areas it was 
vulnerable to intelligence gathering.265  Therefore, categorising Taliban and al-
Qaeda detainees as unlawful combatants means the US was not obliged to 
prosecute them under the same procedures as were used for members of their own 
armed forces. 
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In a memo to President Bush on January 25, 2002, Alberto Gonzales suggests a 
third reason for the blanket decision not to apply the Third Geneva Convention to 
any of the Taliban or al-Qaeda detainees.266  The determination that the 
Convention does not apply “eliminates any argument regarding the need for case-
by-case determinations of POW status.”267  Clearly determining that none of the 
detainees qualify for POW status in one all-embracing statement prevents the 
unnecessary expenditure of time and money on individual determinations of POW 
status. 
 
It is apparent that there were some significant policy reasons behind the US 
decision not to classify the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as POWs and it was in 
the best interests of the US not to do so.  However, this is an unacceptable reason 
for breaching international law.  The US needs to make individual POW status 
determinations for the Taliban members held at Guantánamo Bay to decide 
whether each individual is entitled to POW status or not. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The rights of unlawful combatants 
Those suspected of being terrorists are not outside the law, nor do they forfeit 
their fundamental rights by virtue of that fact.268 
Baron Goldsmith 
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Introduction 
It has been shown in Chapter Three that al-Qaeda fighters and probably many 
Taliban fighters did not satisfy the requirements of lawful combatancy and 
consequently were not entitled to the privilege of POW status.  However, the 
determination that they were unlawful combatants does not place them in legal 
limbo; even unlawful combatants must be accorded basic human rights as well as 
a number of rights under international humanitarian law.  It has been suggested 
that 
“a strong argument can be made that, whether or not they are formally entitled to 
such rights, they should have certain of the basic safeguards accorded to 
PoWs.”269 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated: 
“no person under the authority and control of a State, regardless of his or her 
circumstances, is devoid of legal protection for his or her fundamental and non-
derogable human rights”.270 
 
There are a number of international documents where one can find evidence of 
rights which exist irrespective of combatant status.  Initially consideration will be 
given to the rights of unlawful combatants which can be found under international 
humanitarian law.  The Fourth Geneva Convention – the Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War – contains a number of 
provisions that can conceivably be applied to unlawful combatants.  As previously 
discussed, there are only two categories of persons – if a person is not a lawful 
combatant he or she is a civilian and therefore ought to be protected by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  However, should it be thought that the Geneva Conventions 
ought not to apply to al-Qaeda, common article 3 will apply.  Article 3, common 
to all four Geneva Conventions, applies to armed conflicts which are not of an 
international character and provides evidence of rights which may be applicable to 
unlawful combatants to whom the majority of the Geneva Conventions do not 
apply.  Furthermore, article 75 of the First Additional Protocol gives a number of 
universally applicable minimum guarantees which prevent any person slipping 
between the legal cracks and being treated as though they have no rights 
whatsoever. 
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Secondly, the rights unlawful combatants have under international human rights 
law must be taken into account.  International human rights law is applicable 
during times of armed conflict but during such times international humanitarian 
law will take precedence in the event of an inconsistency or contradiction.  Under 
human rights law unlawful combatants are entitled to a number of fundamental 
human rights which can be found in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). 
 
The majority of this Chapter is organised on the basis of the different international 
law documents rather than on the basis of the different rights owed to unlawful 
combatants.  By structuring the rights in this way it will be more straightforward 
to prove that the conventions drawn upon are applicable to the detainees.  Certain 
fundamental rights are included in both international humanitarian law and human 
rights documents leading to some necessary repetition in the following discussion, 
which highlights the themes running through the documents. 
 
4.1 International humanitarian law 
 
In this section the rights unlawful combatants have under international 
humanitarian law are described.  The Fourth Geneva Convention is the Civilians 
Convention and it contains a number of rights which are applicable to unlawful 
combatants.  It is undoubtedly applicable to the Taliban fighters but whether or 
not it applies to al-Qaeda is a more controversial issue and hence this point forms 
part of the introduction to this section.  Should it be thought that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention does not apply to al-Qaeda, common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions will apply instead.  Although it is important to determine which of 
these documents applies, the rights under them are fairly similar.  Furthermore, 
article 75 of Additional Protocol I bestows minimum guarantees upon both the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. 
 
It is commonly accepted that the Geneva Conventions are customary international 
law, so all States are bound by the provisions whether or not they have signed the 
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Conventions.271  I attempted to establish if the Taliban or al-Qaeda had made any 
comments as to whether they believed the Geneva Conventions applied to them.  
However, I was unable to find any statements made by either group as to their 
intentions or beliefs regarding the Conventions.  It is indisputable that the Taliban 
is bound by the Geneva Conventions.  Afghanistan is a signatory to the 
Conventions and the Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan at the 
time of the conflict.  Although it was not the Taliban government which signed 
the Conventions, a treaty binds successor states “by virtue of attaching to the 
territory itself and establishing a particular regime that transcends the treaty.”272  
Hence, the Taliban is bound, despite not having been the government which 
signed the Conventions. 
 
However, al-Qaeda is not a State.  This author contends that even a non-state-
actor, provided it is sufficiently powerful and organised, is bound by the Geneva 
Conventions when it takes part in an international armed conflict.  Al-Qaeda was 
acting in the international arena as a Party to an international armed conflict and 
hence the rights and obligations of the Conventions should be applicable to them.  
The Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law are not intended to 
exclude non-state-actors simply by virtue of not having status as a State. 
 
However, this assertion, that the Geneva Conventions apply to non-state-actors, is 
controversial and hence an alternative has been provided.  If it is thought that the 
Geneva Conventions, in general, are not applicable to non-state actors then 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions must apply.  This is explained in 
depth below.273 
 
4.1.1 Martens Clause 
The Martens Clause is found in the preamble to the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land.  This clause gives a 
broad, overarching principle for cases not covered by other agreements.  The ICJ 
in its 1996 advisory opinion on nuclear weapons referred to the clause, clearly 
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deeming it to still be in force.274  Furthermore, a modern version of the Martens 
Clause, comparable in all material respects to the original, can be found in article 
1 of the First Additional Protocol, which reads as follows: 
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” 
 
The Martens Clause performs the function of a minimum guarantee, ensuring that 
there will be no situations when the principles of customary international law are 
inapplicable.  Moreover, the principles of humanity and the dictates of public 
conscience are referred to.  These concepts are impossible to define but they serve 
to emphasise the point that even during times of war there are some actions which 
are unacceptable and no legal black hole devoid of all rights can exist. 
 
4.1.2 Geneva Convention IV 
The first international humanitarian law document in which the rights of unlawful 
combatants can be found is the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Unlawful combatants 
are not entitled to POW status and are therefore not covered by the Third Geneva 
Convention which is the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War.  The Fourth Geneva Convention is the Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War.  Article 4 of this Convention explains that 
anyone who is detained during an armed conflict and is not covered by one of the 
other Geneva Conventions will be entitled to the rights of the Fourth Convention, 
provided certain conditions are met. 
 
Article 4 of the Fourth Convention is an all-embracing definition of who is 
entitled to be a ‘protected person,’ with some exceptions.  Everybody who is not 
protected by one of the other three Geneva Conventions is covered by the Fourth 
Convention provided they are not: 
• Nationals of a State not party to the Convention; 
• Nationals of the State in whose hands they are; 
• In the hands of a party with which normal diplomatic representation 
exists.275 
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Those are the only exceptions.  Unlawful participation in hostilities is not listed as 
an exception to the all-encompassing definition and is therefore not enough to 
remove a person from the protection scheme under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 
 
It could be suggested that the first listed exception is irrelevant as the Geneva 
Conventions have reached the status of customary international law and are 
binding on all States whether or not they are a party to them.276  The second 
exception to protection under the Convention is for persons who are nationals of 
the detaining power.  This exception upholds a recognised principle of 
international law – that international law does not interfere in a State’s relations 
with its own nationals.277  Therefore, any US citizens detained by the US at 
Guantánamo Bay, or any other detention facility, are not entitled to the 
Convention’s protections.278  Furthermore, the third exception excludes people 
who are from a State with which normal diplomatic representation exists.  Clearly 
then, the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to nationals of a neutral or co-
belligerent State because normal diplomatic relations will exist between this State 
and the detaining power.  Therefore, al-Qaeda suspects held at Guantánamo Bay 
who are nationals of, for example, the UK, Pakistan, Australia279 or Algeria are 
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excluded from most protections under the Convention.  They would be entitled 
only to the more limited protection provided by Part II, as well as the human 
rights entitlements discussed below. 
 
However, any Taliban or al-Qaeda members who are nationals of Afghanistan do 
fall under the article 4 definition – they are not entitled to protection under the 
other three Geneva Conventions and do not satisfy any of the exclusion clauses so 
must be ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Convention.  It is the rights of these 
people this thesis intends to uncover. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention is entitled ‘Derogations’ and paragraph 1 reads as 
follows: 
“Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an 
individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities 
hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to 
claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if 
exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of 
such State.”280 
Paragraph 3 requires that even individuals suspected of or engaged in activities 
hostile to the security of the State shall 
“be treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights 
of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention.”281 
Furthermore, they must be granted the full rights under the Fourth Convention “at 
the earliest date consistent with the security of the State”. 
 
The authoritative ICRC commentary on the Geneva Conventions points out that 
the security of the State could not be a conceivable reason for denying protected 
persons the benefit of some provisions of the Fourth Convention.282  The 
commentary only gives two examples – articles 37283 and 38284 – but there are 
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many more articles which may be considered in the same category – as rights 
which would not affect the security of the State.  For example, derogation from 
the following articles could not be justified with reference to the security of the 
detaining State:  protected persons are entitled to respect for their person, honour 
and religious convictions and must be humanely treated;285 they may make 
application to the ICRC or other organisations;286 no physical coercion or 
punishment may be exercised against protected persons;287 protected persons shall 
receive adequate medical care;288 protected persons are entitled to practise their 
religion and receive spiritual guidance;289 detainee quarters must be hygienic, 
adequately heated, lighted and ventilated, sufficiently spacious and detainees must 
be allocated suitable bedding;290 detainees must receive sufficient daily food 
                                                                                                                                     
(5) Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years shall 
benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.” 
285
 Geneva Convention IV, article 27(1): 
“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their 
family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall 
at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or 
threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.” 
286
 Ibid, article 30: 
“(1) Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and 
Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist 
them. 
(2) These several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities, 
within the bounds set by military or security considerations.” 
287
 Ibid, article 31: 
“No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain 
information from them or from third parties”; 
and article 32: 
“The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any 
measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons 
in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, 
mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a 
protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military 
agents.” 
288
 Ibid, article 38(2): 
“they shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and hospital treatment to 
the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned”; 
article 81: 
“Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall be bound to provide free of charge for 
their maintenance, and to grant them also the medical attention required by their state of health”; 
and article 92: 
“Medical inspections of internees shall be made at least once a month.” 
289
 Ibid, article 38(3): 
“they shall be allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from ministers of 
their faith”; 
and article 86: 
“The Detaining Power shall place at the disposal of interned persons, of whatever denomination, 
premises suitable for the holding of their religious services.” 
290
 Ibid, article 85: 
“(1) The Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to ensure that 
protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings or 
quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient 
protection against the rigours of the climate and the effects of the war… 
  
86 
rations and drinking water;291 adequate clothing;292 and when detainees are 
transferred such transfer must be effected humanely.293  Derogating from any of 
these articles could not be justified by asserting that upholding them would be 
prejudicial to the security of a State as fulfilling these rights does not in any way 
affect the security of the detaining State.  Hence, all these rights must be accorded 
to the Guantánamo detainees. 
 
Furthermore, article 136 imposes an obligation on the State to transmit to the 
official Information Bureau particulars of any protected person who is kept in 
custody for more than two weeks.  A party cannot derogate from this article by 
citing article 5 as this is not a right or privilege held by the protected person, but 
an obligation placed on the Detaining Power.294 
 
An argument could be made for derogation from the following articles with the 
justification that upholding them may prejudice the security of the detaining State:  
the right of protected persons to correspond with their families;295 the right to 
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receive visitors;296 and the right to be informed of their transfer to a new 
facility.297  However, the ICRC commentary emphasises “most strongly” that 
derogations from the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention under article 5 
“can only be applied in individual cases of an exceptional nature, where the 
existence of specific charges makes it almost certain that penal proceedings will 
follow.  This Article should never be applied as a result of mere suspicion.”298 
There have been no such ‘specific charges’ made against most of the detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay and hence derogations under article 5 appear to be inappropriate 
at this stage. 
 
In considering derogations under article 5 the majority of applicable rights under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention have already been mentioned.  However, there are 
a few more which must be explicitly outlined.  Article 79 of the Convention 
specifically relates to internment and requires that protected persons not be 
interned except in accordance with articles 41, 42, 43, 68 and 78.  Articles 68 and 
78 relate only to persons detained by an Occupying Power so are irrelevant here.  
Article 41 provides that measures of control more severe than assigned 
internment, in accordance with articles 42 and 43, must not be used.299  Articles 
42 and 43 contain rights which are central to this thesis.  Article 42 asserts that 
protected persons may only be interned “if the security of the Detaining Power 
makes it absolutely necessary”.  This means that the detention of each individual 
Taliban or al-Qaeda member at Guantánamo Bay must be justified as ‘absolutely 
necessary’ to the security of the US for it to be lawful.  Article 43 requires that a 
court be entitled to consider detention decisions and that they be periodically 
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reviewed.300  Article 133 also relates to detention requirements and considers the 
cessation of detention.  This article provides that detention must cease “as soon as 
possible after the close of hostilities.”301 
 
Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Convention affirms the right of the ICRC to 
visit detainees protected by the Convention.  ICRC delegates must be able to 
access detention facilities and interview detainees without witnesses.302  These 
visits can only be prohibited for reasons of “imperative military necessity” and if 
they are prohibited it must be an “exceptional and temporary measure.”303  The 
overall rule has been stated as: 
“In international armed conflicts, the ICRC must be granted regular access to all 
persons deprived of their liberty in order to verify the conditions of their 
detention and to restore contacts between those persons and their families.”304  
The recent ICRC textbook on customary international humanitarian law asserts 
that State practice has established this rule as a norm of customary international 
law.305  Furthermore, the UN Security Council has adopted a number of 
resolutions requesting or demanding that the ICRC be granted unimpeded and 
continued access to camps, prisons and detention centres.  Examples of such 
resolutions include the former Yugoslavia (1992);306 Tajikistan (1994);307 and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995).308  In two 1995 resolutions on the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia the Security Council reiterated “its strong support for the 
efforts of the [ICRC] in seeking access to…persons detained” and condemned 
“in the strongest possible terms the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply 
with their commitments in respect of such access.”309 
These resolutions show that the Security Council considers providing access to 
the ICRC to be a rule of international law. 
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The ICRC has been granted access to the detainees at Guantánamo Bay since 
January 2002.310  However, the ICRC keeps the majority of its findings and 
observations about the conditions of detention and the treatment of detainees 
confidential.  Findings are discussed directly with the authorities in charge but the 
ICRC generally does not comment publicly.  The ICRC prefers to work outside 
the spotlight of media attention in order to ensure that it is able to obtain and 
maintain access to detainees around the world.311 
 
It is clear that the Fourth Geneva Convention does apply to, at the very least, the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees held at the Guantánamo Bay detention centre who 
are Afghani nationals.  The main right safeguarded by the Convention for these 
people is a right to basic humane treatment during detention.312  Furthermore, the 
Convention requires that detention be ‘absolutely necessary’ and be periodically 
reviewed by an appropriate court.  Many of the Taliban and al-Qaeda members 
detained at Guantánamo Bay have not had their detention considered by an 
appropriate court and it is certainly not being periodically reviewed.  The Fourth 
Geneva Convention also contains provisions outlining an adequate standard of 
living during detention and that ICRC delegates have access to view conditions.  
As explained above313 there have been many allegations of inhumane treatment of 
prisoners at Guantánamo Bay.  Treatments such as sleep deprivation and exposure 
to extreme temperatures may not, by themselves, amount to torture, but they 
would certainly constitute inhumane treatment.  It appears clear that the US 
authorities are not adequately upholding their obligations under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. 
 
4.1.3 Common article 3 
It has been contended that the Geneva Conventions apply to all Parties taking part 
in an international armed conflict.  They are not limited to State Parties and will 
apply to non-state-actors such as al-Qaeda.  However, as this is a controversial 
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line of reasoning an alternative has been included.  In case the author’s argument 
is disputed, and it is thought that the Geneva Conventions cannot apply to a non-
state actor such as al-Qaeda, it shall be proved that al-Qaeda has the rights 
outlined under common article 3 instead.  It should also be noted that it makes 
little difference which document is thought to apply as common article 3 accords 
very similar rights to those covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
 
The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II share the same article 3 
and hence it is referred to as common article 3.  The first sentence of the article 
reads as follows: 
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions…” 
This article is only to apply in cases which are not of an international character.  
At first glance this phrase appears to refer only to an armed conflict which is 
internal in character, such as a civil war.  However, in the recent case of Hamdan 
v Rumsefeld,314 heard by the US Supreme Court, it was determined that the phrase 
actually encompasses a much broader meaning. 
 
Common article 2 refers to an armed conflict between two High Contracting 
Parties and the phrase “not of an international character” is used as a contra-
distinction to this idea of conflict between nations.  In Hamdan the Supreme Court 
stated that: 
“Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short 
of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a 
signatory nor even a non signatory ‘Power’ who are involved in a conflict ‘in the 
territory of’ a signatory.  The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the 
conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a 
clash between nations (whether signatories or not).  In context, then, the phrase 
‘not of an international character, bears its literal meaning.”315 
Thus, common article 3 applies both to internal armed conflicts and to conflicts 
occurring between Parties one or both of whom are not signatories to the 
Convention and who may not even be a State. 
 
The Supreme Court explained that the term ‘international’ was being used as 
between nation and nation or to include mutual transactions between sovereigns.  
It accepted that the phrase “not of an international character” clearly refers to civil 
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wars but that language limiting common article 3 to only apply to civil wars was 
deliberately excluded from the Geneva Conventions.316  In the Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 it is 
asserted that a non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international 
armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other.317  
In an international armed conflict, as referred to in common article 2, the entities 
opposing each other are States.  In a non-international armed conflict, to which 
common article 3 will apply, the entities opposing each other do not have to be 
sovereign States. 
 
The commentary from the ICRC on the Geneva Conventions explains that the 
Conventions, while discussed, drafted, signed and applied by governments, are 
not actually underpinned by a concept of nations but by a concept of people – “the 
principle of respect for human personality”.318  The article falls far short of 
upholding the ICRC’s original hope – which was that the Conventions would be 
applied, in their entirety, to armed conflicts not of an international character.319  
However, it at least “ensures the application of the rules of humanity which are 
recognised as essential by civilised nations”.320 
 
Common article 3 and the rest of the Geneva Conventions can never apply to the 
same conflict.  They are mutually exclusive as common article 3 can only apply to 
conflicts which are not covered by the other articles in the Geneva Conventions.  
As explained above the idea of a ‘non-international armed conflict’ is the opposite 
of an ‘international armed conflict’.  The majority of the articles of the 
Conventions apply to international armed conflicts.  Common article 3 applies to 
non-international armed conflicts.  It is this author’s contention that the majority 
of the Geneva Conventions are applicable to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  
However, al-Qaeda is a non-state-actor and hence, suggesting the Conventions 
apply to this group is contentious.  Should it be thought that, as a non-state-actor, 
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al-Qaeda is not covered by the Conventions they will nevertheless, indisputably, 
be entitled to the rights under common article 3. 
 
Having considered the situations in which common article 3 is applicable it is now 
necessary to look at the clauses in the article and discover how they apply to 
unlawful combatants.  Common article 3 lays out some minimum provisions 
protecting, inter alia, “[p]ersons…placed hors de combat321 by…detention”.  
Certain acts are listed as being prohibited in relation to these people, including:  
“(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture;… 
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment;  
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”322 
 
Common article 3 asserts some minimum guarantees for people who are detained 
(and others, but the other categories of persons are not relevant here).  Parts (a) 
and (c) prohibit acts which “world opinion finds particularly revolting.”323  The 
meaning of the ambiguous terms used, such as torture and humiliating and 
degrading treatment, will be examined below in the section on torture.  Part (d) 
clearly prohibits summary justice – common article 3 proclaims that even in times 
of war it is still necessary to surround the administration of justice with safeguards 
aimed at eliminating the possibility of judicial errors.  This prohibition does not, 
however, prevent a person from being arrested, prosecuted, sentenced and 
punished according to the law.  The article does not specifically define what is 
meant by a “regularly constituted court” but other sources are helpful here.  For 
example, the Fourth Geneva Convention speaks of a “properly constituted, non-
political military court.”324  Furthermore, the ICRC commentary on this article 
asserts that the wording “definitely excludes all special tribunals” but would 
include “ordinary military courts” provided they were set up in accordance with 
the recognised principles governing the administration of justice.325  It is asserted 
in the recent ICRC customary international humanitarian law textbook that to be 
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‘regularly constituted’ a court must have been “established and organised in 
accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country.”326 
 
In the Hamdan case the Supreme Court acknowledged that common article 3 
tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed 
conflict and that the article’s requirements are general ones “crafted to 
accommodate a wide variety of legal systems.”327  However, the Court also 
emphasised the fact that, although they may be general, they are still requirements 
and must be upheld.328  In the Court’s view the commission convened by the US 
President to try Hamdan did not meet the requirements. 
 
Overall, the most important rights for unlawful combatants protected by common 
article 3 are the prohibition on summary justice and the requirement of humane 
treatment.  People cannot simply be detained or punished without a trial which 
upholds the ordinary concepts of justice.  Unlawful combatants can be detained 
and punished, but they must first be prosecuted within the law.  The vast majority 
of the detainees from the 2001 Afghan war have simply been imprisoned for an 
indefinite period of time without having their detention considered by an 
appropriate court.  In order to comply with its obligations under international law 
the US government must either release the detainees or treat them properly under 
the judicial system. 
 
4.1.4 Additional Protocol I – article 75 
As previously explained the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions was never signed by the US.  However, some parts of the Protocol 
have undeniably become customary international law.  That article 75 of 
Additional Protocol I is customary international law and applies to all States is 
generally accepted329 and therefore, all States must take the guarantees under 
article 75 into consideration even if they are not a party to the Protocol. 
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Article 75 outlines a range of fundamental guarantees that are intended to provide 
minimum rules of protection for all those who do not benefit from more 
favourable treatment under other rules.  Hence, article 75 ensures that no person in 
the power of a Party to an armed conflict is situated in limbo, outside the 
protection of international humanitarian law – “no person can ever fall outside the 
scope of minimum legal protections.  There can be no legal black holes.”330  If an 
unlawful combatant does not fulfil the nationality criteria of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention they will still be covered by article 75 of the First Additional 
Protocol.  If they are covered by the Fourth Convention, article 75 extends their 
protection by defining the minimum guarantees. 
“Any person who is captured by a party to a conflict must be treated humanely 
and is entitled to enjoy the minimum protection, without discrimination.  The 
particular circumstances of any individual are irrelevant.”331 
Hence, it is clear that article 75 applies to all members of the Taliban and al-
Qaeda detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility.  Furthermore, article 
75(7) further clarifies the principle from subsection (1) that article 75 contains 
minimum guarantees for everyone.  Subsection (7) extends the guarantees 
provided for by article 75 to even those accused of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.  Even someone accused of grave breaches of the laws of war is entitled 
to the basic protections espoused by article 75. 
 
Article 75 is entitled ‘Fundamental guarantees’ and subsection (1) gives the 
overarching requirement that persons 
“in the power of a Party to a conflict…who do not benefit from more favourable 
treatment under the [Geneva] Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated 
humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection 
provided by this Article…”332 
Subsection (2) prohibits certain acts, including violence, murder, torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.  
Subsection (3) requires that people who are arrested, detained or interned for 
actions relating to an armed conflict be informed of the reasons why these 
measures have been taken.  Furthermore, except in cases of arrest for penal 
offences, they must be released 
“with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances 
justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.”333 
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Article 75(4) covers the requirements for judicial proceedings for persons charged 
with a penal offence related to an armed conflict.  The court must be impartial and 
regularly constituted and uphold the generally recognised principles of judicial 
procedure.  Some of these principles of judicial procedure are laid out in the 
article, including the requirement that the accused be informed of the particulars 
of the offence; has the right to a defence; the right to examine witnesses; and the 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.334  Article 75(6) espouses the 
important principle that protection under article 75 continues for detainees until 
their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed 
conflict. 
 
To summarise, the minimum guarantees under article 75 are applicable to 
unlawful combatants.  The guarantees primarily include protection from inhumane 
treatment; the requirement that people who are detained are released as soon as it 
is practicable to do so; and the requirement that legal due process guarantees be 
upheld.  There have been many allegations of inhumane treatment of prisoners 
held at Guantánamo Bay335 and such treatment clearly breaches international 
humanitarian law applicable to the detainees.  Furthermore, it seems likely that the 
continued detention of many of the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters is no longer 
necessary and it is therefore required under article 75 that they be released if they 
are not going to be charged with a crime. 
 
4.2 International Human Rights Law 
 
Thus far the rights of unlawful combatants under international humanitarian law 
have been considered.  The following section takes into account any rights 
applicable to unlawful combatants under international human rights law.  Human 
rights are currently separated into three categories which follow the catchphrase of 
the French Revolution – ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’  (Liberty, equality, 
fraternity).  First generation human rights deal essentially with liberty and 
preventing excesses of the State.  They include rights such as freedom of speech, 
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freedom of religion and the right to a fair trial and are codified in the 1966 
ICCPR.  Second generation rights revolve around the idea of equality and are 
fundamentally social, economic and cultural in nature.  They promise equal 
conditions and treatment to people in areas such as employment, housing and 
health care and require a more interventionist State to provide the rights.  Second 
generation rights are codified in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.336  Third generation human rights are a more 
progressive and developing area of international human rights law and the term 
covers a broad spectrum of rights such as the right to self-determination, group 
and collective rights and the right to natural resources. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)337 was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948 but was unable to garner the necessary international 
support and consensus needed to become a binding treaty because it contained 
both first and second generation rights.  A political divide developed between 
mainly Western capitalist nations favouring first generation civil and political 
rights and communist nations favouring second generation economic, social and 
cultural rights.  To solve this problem the two 1966 Covenants were drafted.338  
These two documents, together with the UDHR, form the International Bill of 
Rights. 
 
International humanitarian law vs international human rights law 
The application of international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law are not mutually exclusive; they are in fact complementary.  The Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) stated that the ICCPR 
“applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable.  While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, 
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be especially relevant 
for the purpose of the interpretation of the Covenant rights, both spheres of law 
are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”339 
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This issue has also been addressed by the ICJ in its 1996 advisory opinion on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.340  In this opinion the ICJ clearly 
affirmed the applicability of the ICCPR during times of armed conflict.  The 
Court stated that 
“the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities.  
The test of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then must 
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict.”341 
The ICJ further confirmed this view in its advisory opinion on the 2004 Israeli 
Wall case: 
“the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of 
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to 
be found in article 4 of the [ICCPR].”342 
 
These statements from the ICJ make it clear that international human rights law 
does not cease to function during times of war.  However, the court points out that 
international humanitarian law functions as lex specialis.  This means that if 
international humanitarian law contains different rules to international human 
rights law, the relevant international humanitarian law will trump human rights 
law during times of armed conflict.  Ergo, in the absence of special rules of 
warfare, or international humanitarian law, which derogate from human rights 
law, human rights law will continue to apply.  It has been asserted that: 
“[The] ICCPR sets the general standards for the treatment of prisoners whether 
they are detained on the basis of international humanitarian law, international law 
or national law.”343 
Hence, international human rights law does apply to the Guantánamo detainees to 
the extent that it is not inconsistent with international humanitarian law. 
 
4.2.1 The ICCPR 
As explained above, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) contains first generation rights such as freedom from arbitrary detention 
and freedom of expression.  Part III of the ICCPR is comprised of a list of 
substantive human rights guarantees.  Part II provides supporting guarantees, such 
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as the necessary obligation on State Parties to provide domestic remedies for 
breaches of ICCPR rights.  Part IV establishes the HRC as the treaty-monitoring 
body for the ICCPR and outlines some of its functions.  The HRC was established 
in 1976 and is composed of eighteen independent experts chosen by the State 
parties to monitor implementation of the ICCPR and to consider complaints of 
States and of individuals, but the decisions it issues are not binding.  The ICCPR 
has two Optional Protocols associated with it.  The first of these creates an 
individual complaints mechanism which enables the HRC to consider 
communications from individuals alleging violations of their ICCPR rights by 
State Parties to the Optional Protocol.344  The second Optional Protocol prohibits 
the application of the death penalty.345  The US is not a party to either of the 
Optional Protocols so they will be considered no further. 
 
Article 4 of the ICCPR allows that if there is a public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation State Parties to the Covenant 
“may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. 
However, article 4(2) delineates 7 articles from which no derogation is allowed.  
The rights under these articles must be upheld at all times, even times of public 
emergency.  The non-derogable rights are articles 6 (the inherent right to life); 7 
(prohibition on torture); 8 (prohibition on slavery); 11 (prohibition on 
imprisonment merely due to inability to fulfil a contractual obligation); 15 
(prohibition on retrospective laws); 16 (right to recognition as a person before the 
law); and 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion).  Only two of 
these articles (articles 6 and 7) will be discussed as they are the most relevant to 
this thesis.  It is fairly well accepted that the list of non-derogable rights in article 
4 are norms of customary international law and must be upheld in all situations.346 
 
Derogation is allowed from the majority of the rights under the ICCPR in the 
event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.  However, some 
derogable rights are relevant to the detainees held at the Guantánamo Bay 
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detention facility:  article 9, the right to liberty, and article 14, the right to a fair 
trial.  In order for these two derogable articles to apply it must be shown that the 
US cannot claim that it is currently facing a state of public emergency; or that the 
articles are customary international law and apply at all times regardless of the 
ICCPR derogation provision.  The issue of whether or not the US faces a public 
emergency remains controversial and is a highly-charged political issue.  Hence, 
this issue will be disregarded in favour of proving that the right to liberty and the 
right to a fair trial have both gained customary international law status. 
 
Does the ICCPR apply to the Guantánamo detainees? 
Before considering the rights under the ICCPR it must be determined whether the 
US is obliged to uphold ICCPR rights and whether they must be extended to the 
detainees in Guantánamo Bay.  The first part of this question is the more 
problematic one:  Is the US obliged to uphold the rights under the ICCPR?  The 
US is a State Party to the ICCPR but it does not follow from this that ICCPR 
rights are automatically enforceable in US courts.  In order for international law to 
be directly enforceable by national courts it must either be incorporated into 
domestic law or have the status of customary international law. 
 
When the US ratified the ICCPR in 1992 it was with the reservation that articles 1 
through 26 were not to be self-executing.  This reservation was reiterated in the 
case of Sosa v Alvarez-Machain where Justice Souter stated: 
“although the [ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of international 
law the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it 
was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the 
federal courts.”347 
‘Not self-executing’ simply means that if the rights found in the ICCPR have not 
been specifically incorporated into domestic law they cannot be applied in US 
courts.  The definitive text book on the ICCPR makes it clear that although the 
ICCPR does impose duties upon States in the “international plane of law”, “it is 
envisaged that the implementation of the rights therein is primarily a domestic 
matter.”348  This means that the incorporation of the rights into domestic law is 
left up to the discretion of the signatory States and their impact, in some instances, 
is more persuasive than legal. 
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The outcome of the principle of non-self execution is that while the ICCPR is 
binding on the US as a matter of international law, only ICCPR rights which are 
specifically protected by US domestic law, or have reached the status of 
customary international law, can be enforced in US courts. 
 
The second part of the question posed above asks whether the ICCPR rights 
which are binding on the US must be extended to the detainees in Cuba.  In his 
argument to the US Supreme Court in a 2004 case the US Solicitor General 
bluntly stated that the ICCPR is “inapplicable to conduct by the United States 
outside its sovereign territory.”349  Under this view, rights under the ICCPR would 
not have to be granted to the detainees in Cuba.  However, the declaration from 
the US Solicitor General does not follow the law.  By signing the ICCPR, a State 
undertakes to 
“respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant”.350 
The phrase “individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” 
(emphasis added) clearly includes the detainees being held at the US Naval Base 
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  The detainees are inarguably subject to the 
jurisdiction of the US as it is under US authority that they remain prisoners.  The 
US Supreme Court has determined that although the US does not exercise 
“ultimate sovereignty” over Guantánamo Bay, the long term lease arrangement 
means the detention centre is under the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the US and 
therefore the individuals held there are “subject to its jurisdiction” as required by 
article 2 of the ICCPR.351 
 
In its General Comment No. 31, the HRC, which monitors implementation of the 
ICCPR, has clarified that 
“a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.”352 
Rights under the ICCPR are not limited to citizens but must be “available to all 
individuals…who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the 
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jurisdiction of the State Party.”353  Furthermore, the ICJ in its advisory opinion in 
the Israeli Wall case recognised that the jurisdiction of States is primarily 
territorial, but concluded that the ICCPR extends to “acts done by a State in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory”.354  Accordingly, the 
particular status of the international lease agreement between the US and Cuba 
does not limit the obligations of the US under international human rights law 
towards the detainees.  Rulings from the US Supreme Court, the Human Rights 
Committee, and the International Court of Justice all show that ICCPR rights must 
be extended to the detainees held under US jurisdiction in Cuba. 
 
It is possible to conclude at this point that any rights under the ICCPR which are 
provided for under US domestic law or which have become customary 
international law and which do not clash with any international humanitarian laws 
must be bestowed upon the detainees being held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base. 
 
The right to life 
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR reads as follows: 
“Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected 
by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
The right to life has been described by the HRC as the “supreme right”355 and it 
has two facets to it.  The negative side is the right not to be arbitrarily or 
unlawfully deprived of life by the State or its agents; while the positive side 
requires States to adopt measures that are conducive to allowing one to live.  The 
Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions has referred to the right 
to life as 
“the most important and basic of human rights.  It is the fountain from which all 
human rights spring.  If it is infringed the effects are irreversible…”356 
 
In order for the right to life in article 6 of the ICCPR to be binding on the US it 
must either be shown to be a customary international law right or that it has been 
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incorporated into US domestic law.  Former UN Special Rapporteur on torture, 
Nigel Rodley, asserts that the right to life is a rule of customary international law 
and is binding on all States.357  This view could be challenged by the fact that a 
significant number of States have in fact practised mass murder or genocide, and 
the suggestion that, therefore, State practice cannot be said to prohibit such 
behaviour.  Ergo, the rule cannot have reached customary international law status.  
However, this contention could only survive if States violating the right to life did 
not try to hide the atrocities but publicly asserted their right to commit them.358  
By denying that genocides are happening, States committing such atrocities tacitly 
agree that they are against international law and hence their State practice shows 
that the right to life is a principle of customary international law. 
 
Another problem with the suggestion that the right to life is customary 
international law is the legality of capital punishment.  However, article 6 
explicitly allows that the death penalty may be imposed 
“for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime”.359 
States which assert their right to capital punishment do so openly – claiming that 
they are not violating international law by utilising the death penalty.360  This is a 
very different stance to the one taken with regard to government sanctioned 
murder.  Countries which know they are breaching the right to life try to cover up 
their actions rather than denying or contesting that such a rule of international law 
exists – this is hardly the posture of a government asserting the contrary right to 
kill freely.  With regards to the death penalty, governments which utilise it do so 
openly and do not try to deny their actions.361  Clearly then, State rhetoric and 
State practice point towards the right to life, and its restrictions, being a rule of 
customary international law.  Therefore, it is binding on the US and must be 
extended to the detainees at Guantánamo Bay. 
 
In upholding the right to life, the State has a duty to protect detainees.  In the case 
of Dermit Barbato v Uruguay362 a Uruguayan student of medicine was arrested 
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and detained by the authorities and subsequently died in custody.  The HRC could 
not arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether Hugo Dermit committed suicide, 
was driven to suicide or was killed by others while in custody but held the 
“inescapable conclusion” to be that 
“the Uruguayan authorities either by act or by omission were responsible for not 
taking adequate measures to protect his life, as required by article 6(1) of the 
Covenant.”363 
This shows quite clearly that States have a positive duty to take adequate 
measures to ensure that people do not die in custody. 
 
In the case of Lantsov v Russian Federation364 Mr Lantsov was detained in a 
Russian prison where he fell ill due to the poor conditions – extreme 
overcrowding, poor ventilation, inadequate food and appalling hygiene.  He 
received limited medical treatment despite repeated requests, and subsequently 
died.  The HRC held that it was the refusal of the prison authorities to provide 
adequate medical care that led to Mr Lantsov’s death.365  It affirmed that 
“it is incumbent on States to ensure the right of life of detainees, and not 
incumbent on the latter to request protection.”366 
Furthermore, 
“the State party by arresting and detaining individuals takes the responsibility to 
care for their life.  It is up to the State party by organising its detention facilities 
to know about the state of health of the detainees as far as may be reasonably 
expected.”367 
As the State party had failed to take appropriate measures to protect Mr Lantsov’s 
life while he was in custody it had breached article 6(1) of the ICCPR.  Evidently, 
there is a duty on the State to prevent the deaths of detainees in custody. 
 
In 2005 at least 130 detainees undertook hunger strikes as a protest against their 
detention.368  The hunger strikes were often life-threatening and force feeding 
through nasal tubes was carried out to prevent the detainees dying of hunger.  It 
has been alleged that the force feeding was carried out roughly, without effective 
                                                 
363
 Ibid, para 9.2. 
364
 Lantsova v Russian Federation (2002) UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997. 
365
 Ibid, para 2.3. 
366
 Ibid, para 9.2. 
367
 Ibid. 
368
 Human Rights Watch, “Guantánamo Bay and military commissions” [18 January 2006] 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/usdom12292.htm#Detainee%20Abuse>. 
  
104 
medical care, and in such a way as to constitute torture or ill-treatment.369  What is 
at issue in this section is the extent of the international obligation on the US to 
prevent deaths in custody.  If prisoners are refusing to eat and will die of 
starvation, what action does international law require the detaining country to 
take?  The cases mentioned show that a State must take appropriate measures to 
protect prisoners.  It seems likely that this would extend to force feeding prisoners 
who were attempting to harm themselves by refusing to eat.  However, such force 
feeding would have to be done by medical personnel and with an adequate 
standard of health care.370   
 
In June of 2006 three Guantánamo detainees committed suicide by hanging 
themselves with bed sheets and clothes in their cells.371  In a bizarre statement 
issued by the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, the three men 
were accused of, not acting out of desperation, but in “an act of asymmetric 
warfare against us.”372  The US has a positive duty to take adequate measures to 
protect the detainees being held under their authority and to ensure that prisoners 
do not die in custody.  However, it seems to be stretching the obligation somewhat 
to say that by not preventing these suicides from occurring the US breached 
international law.  The Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees have the inherent right to 
life and while they are detained it is the responsibility of the US government to 
uphold that right, but the obligation on the US is not unlimited.  The US must take 
all reasonable measures to prevent such occurrences but cannot be said to have 
breached the right to life if all reasonable measures have been taken and detainees 
still manage to commit suicide.  It has not been possible to access the official 
report on the suicides so it cannot be determined whether adequate measures had 
been taken to prevent suicides occurring. 
 
The fact that the death penalty is legal under international law has been 
mentioned.  Clearly the right to life is not unlimited and does not preclude the 
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death penalty from being implemented.  The Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees are 
protected by the inherent right to life but this does not prevent them being 
executed.  However, an execution could only follow a fair trial and the death 
penalty would have to have been provided for in the law applicable to the trial.  
Apart from the exception of capital punishment the US has a positive duty to take 
adequate measures to ensure people do not die in custody. 
 
Freedom from torture 
The second applicable non-derogable right is the right to freedom from torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment.  Article 7 asserts that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  This is one of 
the few absolute rights in the ICCPR; no restrictions to this right are permitted.  It 
is commonly accepted that, due to its universal status, the definition of torture 
from UNCAT is to be applied to the article 7 prohibition on torture also.373  The 
prohibition against torture is considered in depth below.374 
 
The right to liberty 
The right to liberty is enshrined in article 9 of the ICCPR but is not included in the 
article 4 list of non-derogable rights.  However, any non-derogable rights which 
have reached customary international law status continue to apply even in the 
event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.  The HRC has made 
it clear that the article 4 rights are not the only peremptory norms protected by the 
ICCPR.375  The HRC asserts that 
“States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the [ICCPR] as 
justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of 
international law, for instance…through arbitrary deprivations of liberty…”376 
Claiming that a public emergency exists does not entitle a State to ignore all 
human rights.  The HRC explains that arbitrarily depriving people of their liberty 
is never acceptable, even in the event of a public emergency, as this is a 
peremptory norm of international law.377 
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State practice has established the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty as 
a norm of customary international law.378  Furthermore, the UN has adopted a 
number of resolutions condemning arbitrary detention.  For example, in 2000 the 
UN General Assembly expressed its deep concern at continuing serious violations 
of human rights, in particular arbitrary detention, in Sudan.379  In 1995 the UN 
Security Council condemned human rights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including overwhelming evidence of a consistent pattern of arbitrary and unlawful 
detentions.380  The decisions of judicial bodies also add weight to the proposition 
that the right to liberty is a norm of customary international law.  For example, in 
its 1998 judgement in the Delalić case, the ICTY stated:  “Clearly, internment is 
only permitted when absolutely necessary.”381  Furthermore, it is a fundamental 
consideration that 
“no civilian should be kept in…an internment camp for a longer time than the 
security of the detaining party absolutely demands.”382 
 
The rhetoric of the HRC and the UN, State practice, and the decisions of judicial 
bodies all show that the right to liberty enshrined in article 9 of the ICCPR, while 
not a non-derogable provision, is a rule of customary international law and must 
be upheld in all circumstances. 
 
Article 9 includes the right to liberty, the corresponding prohibition on arbitrary 
detention and a number of fair trial guarantees.  As it is especially relevant to the 
situation of the detainees in Guantánamo Bay it is laid out in full: 
Article 9 
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person.  No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.  No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law. 
(2) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons 
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
(3) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. 
(4) Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled 
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without 
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delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention 
is not lawful. 
(5) Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation. 
 
Clearly these articles preclude the possibility of detaining prisoners indefinitely 
without recourse to justice.  Any deprivation of liberty must be in accordance with 
procedures established by law which means arrest and detention must be 
specifically authorised and circumscribed by the law.  Furthermore, the law, and 
the enforcement of that law, must not be arbitrary.  The situation at Guantánamo 
Bay is obviously not fulfilling these requirements.  Many of the Taliban and al-
Qaeda prisoners have been held for over five years without any recourse to 
justice.  Their detention has not been authorised or circumscribed by the law as 
they have not had the opportunity to question their detention in any court.383 
 
In the HRC case of Spakmo v Norway384 the Committee recalled that for an arrest 
to be in compliance with article 9(1) “it must not only be lawful, but also 
reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances.”385  In this case the Committee 
accepted that the arrest was reasonable and necessary.  However, the State Party 
failed to show why it was necessary to detain Mr Spakmo for eight hours and the 
Committee held that the detention was unreasonable and breached article 9(1).386  
This case demonstrates that even if the initial arrest is not arbitrary the subsequent 
period of detention may constitute a violation of article 9(1).  Even if the US was 
justified in some of the initial arrests of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters the 
subsequent five years of detention without recourse to justice most certainly 
violates article 9(1). 
 
Article 9(2) contains a strict requirement that a detainee be informed of the 
reasons for their arrest and informed of the charges against him.  In the case of 
Drescher Caldas v Uruguay387 the HRC held that it is not sufficient to be 
informed that one is being arrested “under prompt security measures without any 
indication of the substance” of the reasons for the arrest. 
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Article 9(3) necessitates a prompt trial for anyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge.  One of the difficulties with the interpretation of article 9(3) is 
the meaning of the word ‘promptly’.  HRC General Comment No. 8 specifies that 
in the view of the Committee “delays must not exceed a few days…”388  Although 
this may be thought to be quite a vague pronouncement, when applied to the 
situation in Guantánamo it is clear that the permissible ‘a few days’ has been 
massively exceeded.  In the case of Fillastre and Bizouarn v Bolivia389 the 
claimants were held for ten days before being informed of the charges against 
them and it was three years before the case was adjudicated.  The HRC held that 
both articles 9(2) and 9(3) had been breached and specifically stated that 
“considerations of evidence-gathering do not justify such prolonged detention.”  If 
the HRC considers 10 days to be a breach of articles 9(2) and 9(3) then detention 
for over five years without a trial must certainly constitute a breach of those 
articles.  In the case of Raul v Bush in the US Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy 
stated in his concurring judgment: 
“Perhaps, where detainees are taken from a zone of hostilities, detention without 
proceedings or trial would be justified by military necessity for a matter of 
weeks; but as the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for 
continued detention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.”390 
 
Article 9(4) requires a court to determine on a writ of habeas corpus – anyone 
who has been arrested or detained is entitled to challenge the lawfulness of his or 
her detention in a court without delay.  In the case of Berry v Jamaica391 the HRC 
clearly links the access to legal representation with the enjoyment of the right 
enshrined in article 9(4).  There is a general theory that in practise it is virtually 
impossible for people to challenge their detention without legal representation.392  
Under article 9(4) the Guantánamo detainees are entitled not only to a court 
hearing on a writ of habeas corpus but also access to legal representation to help 
them assert that right.  
 
The UK courts have taken a stance on the Guantánamo issue which exemplifies 
the fact that arbitrary detention must be prevented and detainees must be entitled 
to challenge their incarceration.  In the case of Abbassi v Secretary of State for 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs393 a British citizen held at Guantánamo Bay, 
Ferroz Abbassi, challenged the failure of Britain’s Foreign Office to take adequate 
steps to protect the basic human rights of a British citizen.  The court said that 
what it found objectionable was 
“that Mr Abbassi should be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which 
the United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the 
legitimacy of his detention before any court or tribunal.” 394 
 
Similarly, the US Supreme Court has refused to accept the suggestion that the 
Guantánamo detainees are not entitled to question their detention before a court.  
In Rasul v Bush the Supreme Court affirmed that Guantánamo detainees are 
entitled to access the US courts as the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay is 
functionally US territory to which the jurisdiction of the US courts should 
extend.395  The language used by Justice Stevens suggested an even more 
extensive jurisdiction – that alien enemy combatants held by US forces anywhere 
in the world could seek relief in US federal courts.396 
 
It is important to note that the Rasul case was solely a jurisdiction case admitting 
that internees at Guantánamo Bay do have the right to have a habeas corpus claim 
heard in US federal courts.  It did not address matters of wrongdoing, claims of 
innocence, or issues of interrogation but simply held that the federal courts did 
have the jurisdiction to determine the legality of the potentially indefinite 
detention of individuals being held in Guantánamo Bay.  Put simply, US courts do 
have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at 
Guantánamo Bay.  Despite this announcement, by October 2005 nearly half of the 
Guantánamo detainees had not been given effective access to counsel or provided 
with a fair opportunity to pursue habeas corpus proceedings.397 
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Although article 9 is not one of the non-derogable rights in the ICCPR, it 
encompasses a norm of customary international law and is therefore applicable to 
all countries regardless of states of public emergency or issues of incorporation.  
Through its imprisonment of Taliban and al-Qaeda members at the Guantánamo 
Bay detention facility the US has consistently breached all parts of article 9. 
 
The right to a fair trial 
Every accused has a right to a fair trial, whatever the magnitude of the charge 
against them.398 
Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International 
 
Article 14 of the ICCPR covers the right to a fair trial.  Although this right, like 
article 9, is not included as one of the non-derogable provisions, it has 
nevertheless reached the status of customary international law.399  Hence, article 
14 is applicable in all situations, including a public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation.  That the HRC deems the right to a fair trial to be customary 
international law is clear from its statement that there is no justification for 
violating peremptory norms of international law “by deviating from fundamental 
principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.”400  Furthermore, 
the HRC has asserted that, as “certain elements of the right to a fair trial are 
explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict,” 
there is no justification for derogation from these guarantees during other 
emergency situations.401  War is obviously the greatest public emergency 
conceivable and if the principles of a fair trial are protected during times of war it 
cannot be justifiable to derogate from them during other public emergencies.  
According to the HRC, 
“the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental 
requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.  Only a 
court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.  The 
presumption of innocence must be respected.”402 
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A State cannot diminish the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the 
court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention.403  The Attorney 
General of England and Wales, Baron Goldsmith, has stated: 
“there are certain principles on which there can be no compromise.  Fair trial is 
one of these – which is the reason we in the UK have been unable to accept that 
the US military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantánamo Bay offer 
sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in accordance with international standards.”404 
Although article 14 is not a non-derogable provision of the ICCPR it has become 
a norm of customary international law and hence is applicable to the Guantánamo 
detainees regardless of issues of public emergency situations or incorporation into 
domestic law. 
 
Article 14 encapsulates the right to a fair trial and sets out the requirements to 
ensure the proper administration of justice.  Subparagraph (1) gives the general 
guarantee and subparagraphs (2)-(7) set out specific guarantees in relation to 
criminal trials and appeals.  Article 14(1) states: 
“…everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law….” 
This is similar to article 9(3) in supporting the requirement that a person who has 
been arrested or detained has the right to a trial.  Moreover, a person has the right 
to a fair trial.  The meaning of an independent and impartial tribunal has been 
considered in case-law.  In order to be independent, a court must be able to 
perform its functions independently of any other branch of the government, 
especially the executive: 
“The [HRC] considers that a situation where the functions and competences of 
the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter 
is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an 
independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, 
of the [ICCPR].”405 
In order to be impartial, the judges composing the court “must not harbour 
preconceptions about the matter put before them”, and they “must not act in ways 
that promote the interests of one of the parties.”406 
 
Article 14(2) contains the obligation that everyone be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to the law.  In the case of Gridin v Russian Federation407 
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public assertions of guilt had been made by high-ranking law enforcement 
officials prior to the trial.  The head of police had announced that he was certain 
Grindin was the murderer and this assertion was broadcast on national television.  
Consequently, the HRC determined that a violation of article 14(2) had 
occurred.408  HRC General Comment No. 13 states that it is “a duty for all public 
authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.”409 
 
Despite the fact that future trials must not be prejudiced by public comment on the 
guilt of defendants the Bush Administration has freely broadcast opinions on the 
detainees.  Vice President Cheney stated in 2002 that the detainees “probably 
have information that we need to prosecute the war on terrorism”410 and President 
Bush has announced that “the only thing we know for certain is that these are bad 
people.”411  Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defence, stated that the Guantánamo 
detention facility should not be closed as: 
“We have several hundred terrorists, bad people; people if they went back out on 
the field would try to kill Americans.  That’s just a fact.”412 
Clearly the Bush Administration had decided long before any proceedings could 
be initiated against the detainees that they were terrorists and killers but this 
constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to be presumed innocent under 
article 14(2). 
 
It has been shown that the Guantánamo detainees must not be arbitrarily deprived 
of their liberty and hence have the right to a trial before an impartial tribunal.  
Article 14 specifies some fundamental guarantees which ensure that when a trial 
takes place it will be fair.  These include the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty;413 the right to be informed of the charge;414 the right to be tried 
without undue delay;415 the right to legal counsel;416 the right to examine 
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witnesses;417 the right to an interpreter;418 the right not to be compelled to testify 
against oneself;419 and the right to an appeal.420 
 
The US has sought to use military commissions as a forum for trying people 
suspected of terrorist offences.421  In its General Comment on article 14 the HRC 
considered the phenomenon of military or special courts and noted the problems 
such tribunals could pose as far as the equitable, impartial and independent 
administration of justice is concerned.422  The HRC asserted that such special 
tribunals should be exceptional and “take place under conditions which genuinely 
afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14.”423  The US Supreme Court 
evidently feels that such fair trial guarantees have not been upheld by the US 
military commissions, as is shown by the case of Hamdan v Rumsfeld.424 
 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, the most recent case from the US Supreme Court in relation 
to Guantánamo Bay detainees, has been said to “undercut more than four years of 
White House policy.”425  Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s personal 
driver, was captured in Afghanistan in 2002 and detained in the Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Base.  In July 2004 he was charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism426 
and designated for trial before a military commission, authorised under Military 
Commission Order No. 1 of March 2002.427  Hamdan filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus challenging his confinement at Guantánamo Bay and arguing that 
he was being held without due process.  The case eventually arrived before the 
Supreme Court which determined that the government did not have the authority 
to set up the special military commissions; and that the special military 
commissions were illegal under both the Uniform Military Code of Justice and the 
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Geneva Conventions.428  The illegal procedures included the fact that the accused 
person and their civilian counsel could be excluded from learning what evidence 
was presented during any part of the proceedings which were determined to be 
“closed” and could be denied access to classified information.429 
 
The Supreme Court considered what is meant by a “regularly constituted” court 
and what fair trial guarantees must be upheld.  The justices concluded that 
“ordinary military courts” are acceptable but all “special tribunals” cannot be 
considered to be “regularly constituted.”430  Hence, the proposed military 
commissions would breach the requirement in common article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions of having a regularly constituted court.  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court held the proposed military commissions to be illegal.431  The Supreme 
Court did not discuss the ICCPR, although it was mentioned in passing as an 
international instrument to which the US is a signatory and which contains fair 
trial guarantees.432  However, the fair trial guarantees enunciated under the ICCPR 
are those which are expected to be upheld by a regularly constituted court.  
Clearly, military commissions used thus far by the US do not fulfil the 
requirements of article 14 of the ICCPR. 
 
The response of the Bush Administration to the decision in Hamdan v Rumsfeld 
was to create a new law on military commissions.  The Military Commission Act 
was signed into law by President Bush on October 17, 2006 and gives a solid 
statutory foundation to some of the powers the Bush Administration has been 
asserting since September 11, 2001.  It allows the President to step beyond the 
reach of full court reviews traditionally afforded to criminal defendants and 
ordinary prisoners and to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely and 
interrogate them, although with a ban on the harshest treatment.  The Act 
broadens the definition of an “unlawful enemy combatant” to include not only 
those who fight against the US, but also those who have “purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States” provided they are not a 
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lawful enemy combatant.433  As far as the right to a fair trial is concerned, the Act 
allows the Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Attorney General, to 
determine pre-trial, trial and post-trial procedures which only need to apply the 
principles of law and the rules of evidence “so far as the Secretary considers 
practicable”.434  Moreover, the Act states that: 
“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission 
under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”435 
 
Section 950j(b) of the act requires that the only basis of review of Military 
Commission procedures be those provided for in the act itself.  Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law (for example traditional habeas corpus procedures), 
“no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or 
cause of action whatsoever, including any action pending on or filed after the 
date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, relating to the 
prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under this chapter, 
including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of military commissions 
under this chapter.”436 
In effect this section pre-emptively criminalises any challenge to the legality of 
the Military Commission Act in front of the Supreme Court.437  Overall, the act 
clearly reallocates power among the three branches of government – taking 
control away from the judiciary and bestowing it upon the President.  Habeas 
corpus has long been the method through which suspects can challenge their 
incarceration.  The Military Commission Act removes this longstanding 
traditional recourse to justice and attempts also to restrict the application of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
 
The Act has recently been considered by the US Court of Appeals which ruled 
that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear any habeas corpus appeals from 
Guantánamo detainees.438  In a 2-1 opinion the Court held that the Military 
Commissions Act has retroactively stripped the courts of jurisdiction to hear all 
such petitions.439  It is possible that the Supreme Court may choose to hear the 
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case but, like the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court will not lightly “defy the will 
of Congress.”440  While it may be considered that the very existence of this act 
threatens the rule of law it must also be remembered that it was accepted by both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.  In the 1952 case concerning the 
decision by President Truman to seize the nation’s steel mills during the Korean 
War, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer,441 Justice Robert Jackson stated 
“congressional approval can cure many ills.”  Legal and political commentators 
are forced to accept the fact that under existing constitutional doctrine, a 
“show of explicit congressional support would be a key factor that the Supreme 
Court would consider in assessing the limits of presidential authority.”442 
However, the Geneva Conventions are customary international law and cannot be 
overcome or circumscribed by domestic law.  Similarly, fair trial guarantees are 
protected in international law by the ICCPR, have reached the status of customary 
international law, and must be upheld in all circumstances. 
 
4.2.2 The UNCAT 
The final right which will be discussed is the prohibition against torture.  The 
main document forbidding torture and other forms of ill-treatment is the 1984 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).  However, many other 
international treaties and conventions also prohibit torture and these will be 
briefly mentioned.  The main articles of UNCAT will be examined to determine 
what the definition of torture is.  Torture and the other forms of ill-treatment are 
extremely difficult to define and a great deal of controversy surrounds this area.  
Cases heard by the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the HRC and the European 
Court of Human Rights will be looked at in an attempt to determine what 
circumstances constitute torture.  Two specific areas – sensory deprivation and 
conditions of detention – will be examined as these are particularly relevant to the 
situation at Guantánamo.  Lastly, the relationship between the principle of non-
refoulement and torture will be analysed. 
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Since the end of WWII, torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment has been 
formally internationally outlawed.  The 1948 UDHR states in article 5 that “no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”443  This declaration allows for no exceptions although the UDHR is 
not a legally binding document.  The Third Geneva Convention prohibits physical 
or mental torture and any other form of coercion against a POW in article 17.  
Furthermore, such acts are designated as ‘grave breaches’ in article 130.444  The 
Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the torture of protected persons by an 
occupying power (article 32) as well as other “measures of brutality” (article 283).  
Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions makes it clear that “violence to life 
and person, in particular murder or all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture” in addition to “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment” are banned under any circumstances. 
 
Language similar to that of the UDHR can be found in article 7 of the ICCPR and 
article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights.445  Article 75(2) of the 
First Additional Protocol prohibits torture of all kinds, whether physical or 
mental, at any time and in any place, whether committed by civilian or by military 
agents.  The 1998 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court446 includes 
torture and other inhuman treatment as a war crime and a crime against humanity 
and, although the US has not ratified the Rome Statute, it has not objected to these 
particular parts of it. 
 
UNCAT was the codification of the general obligation against torture into more 
specific rules.  144 States are party to UNCAT (including the US) with a further 8 
having signed but not yet ratified.447  However, it is commonly accepted that the 
prohibition on torture has developed into a rule of customary international law and 
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therefore applies equally to all States regardless of whether they are party to the 
various torture conventions or not.448 
 
Furthermore, the prohibition against torture occupies an even higher position in 
international law than simply having the status of customary international law – it 
is in fact a jus cogens norm.449  In 1998 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia held in the Furundžija450 case that the prohibition against 
torture constitutes a peremptory norm of customary international law – jus cogens.  
The fact that freedom from torture is an example of a norm which has reached this 
elevated status is uncontroversial.451  An individual cannot be prosecuted for an 
action which was not prohibited by domestic law at the time that the action 
occurred.  However, a State is bound by customary international law and jus 
cogens norms regardless of whether the State has incorporated them into domestic 
law.  Hence, regardless of whether the US has incorporated torture provisions into 
domestic law, it is bound by the prohibition against torture. 
 
Important articles 
As demonstrated, the prohibition on torture is detailed in a large number of 
international law documents.  In discussing international law on torture the focus 
will be on UNCAT as this is the most specific and detailed document.  The 
definitions it contains are applied to the other treaties and conventions which 
mention torture.452  There is an Additional Protocol to UNCAT which was opened 
for signature, ratification and accession in 2003.453  However, it has not been 
signed or ratified by the US so will not be considered in detail. 
 
The following section will introduce and examine the most important articles in 
the Torture Convention.  There are three elements required by the definition of 
torture as found in article 1 of UNCAT.  Torture is: 
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(1) any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person; 
(2) for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession, 
punishment, intimidation, or for any reason based on discrimination; 
and 
(3) by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. 
To summarise, torture must involve a prohibited action, done for a specific 
purpose, by an official person.  The pain or suffering inflicted must be ‘severe’ 
which conveys the idea that only acts of a certain gravity will be considered to 
constitute torture.  Article 1 requires that torture be inflicted for a purpose but the 
examples given are simply the most common ones and the list is by no means 
exhaustive.  The list is preceded by the words “such purposes as” which clearly 
implies there can be other purposes.  However, this cannot be understood to mean 
‘any other purpose’ as “such purposes as” expresses the idea that any purposes 
must be similar to, or have something in common with, the enumerated 
purposes.454  In their handbook on UNCAT, Burgers and Danelius455 assert that 
“the primary objective of the Convention is to eliminate torture committed by or 
under the responsibility of public officials for purposes connected with their 
public functions.  Precisely because the public interest is sometimes seen in such 
cases as a justification, the authorities may be reluctant to suppress these 
practises.  The provisions of the Convention are intended to ensure that torture 
does not occur in such cases or that, if it occurs, action is taken against the 
offender.” 
 
In order to constitute torture under the article 1 definition, severe pain or suffering 
must have been inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.456  
There was some discussion during the drafting of UNCAT as to whether such acts 
could constitute torture irrespective of who had committed the act.  However, it 
was determined that such acts committed in the private sphere, without any 
involvement of the authorities, would be prosecuted and punished under the 
normal conditions of the domestic legal system.457  UNCAT was intended to deal 
with a situation where the authorities of a country were involved in torture and 
hence the machinery of investigation and prosecution might not function 
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normally.  If the public officials of a country are engaged in torturous activities 
the government of that country is unable to claim as a defence that it was unaware 
of the act or disapproved of it once it was informed.458 
 
The UNCAT definition of torture gives no mention of the categories of persons 
who may be the ‘victims’ of torture.  However, this does not mean the category of 
victims is indefinite.  The history of the UDHR and UNCAT make it clear that in 
order to be a victim of torture a person must have been deprived of their liberty or 
at least be under the factual power or control of the person inflicting the pain or 
suffering.459 
 
Finally, it must be noted that calling article 1 a ‘definition’ of torture is perhaps 
somewhat misleading.  Rather than being a definition of torture in the strict penal 
law sense, article 1 is a description of torture for the purpose of understanding and 
implementing UNCAT.460  This explains how the non-exhaustive, open ended list 
of purposes in article 1 does not breach the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
(the principle that the law must be clear and ascertainable prior to the commission 
of a prohibited act).  Furthermore, despite appearing to clarify what torture is, one 
of the fundamental concepts article 1 contains is ill-defined – exactly what is 
required to constitute “severe pain or suffering” remains unclear and is discussed 
further below. 
 
Article 16 of UNCAT prohibits “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture” provided such acts are 
committed with the acquiescence of a public official.  Unlike in the article 1 
definition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment does not have to be 
committed for a specified purpose.  Hence, it seems justified to conclude that the 
purpose of the act is irrelevant in determining whether it constitutes cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  In 1977 The UN General 
Assembly instructed the Commission on Human Rights to create a draft 
convention prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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punishment.461  The Working Group set up by the Commission on Human Rights 
found that while it was possible to create, to some extent, a concise definition or 
description of torture the same was not true for other forms of ill-treatment.462  
Hence, the concept of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment must 
be extrapolated from the decisions of the HRC and the CAT, discussed below. 
 
The US ratified UNCAT with an express reservation to article 16 – rather than 
applying the article 16 meaning of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment the US would instead defer to the standard articulated in the 8th 
Amendment to the US Constitution entitled ‘Cruel and unusual punishment’.  The 
8th Amendment reads as follows: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”463  This 
appears to be less strict than UNCAT article 16, but as UNCAT is customary 
international law the US cannot side-step its obligations by invoking the 
Constitution. 
 
Article 2 of UNCAT is particularly relevant to the issue under consideration in 
this thesis.  Article 2(2) reads as follows: 
“no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture.” 
This article makes it clear that, whatever the circumstances, torture is never 
justifiable.  The idea of the ‘ticking bomb’ case refers to a scenario in which a 
suspect who possesses critical knowledge, such as the location of a time bomb 
that would soon explode and cause great loss of life, is in custody, but refuses to 
inform the authorities of the whereabouts of the bomb.  In this situation would the 
police be allowed to use torture in order to save thousands of people whose lives 
may be under threat?  A utilitarian argument would say ‘yes’, but the Torture 
Convention answers this question with an unequivocal ‘no’.  Torture is never 
justifiable, whatever the circumstances.464  To relate this to the current situation in 
Guantánamo Bay:  the US cannot claim that it is necessary to torture the detainees 
in order to gain information to prevent potential terrorist attacks.  The absolute 
prohibition on torture is one area in which the rules of international law are clear: 
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“It does not matter whether a person is a criminal, or a warrior combatant, or a 
lawful combatant or an unlawful combatant, or an al-Qaeda militant, or a private 
American contractor.  He may not be tortured.  He may not be subjected to other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  If he is, then the perpetrator of such acts 
must be punished under the criminal law.”465 
 
In 1978 the European Court of Human Rights considered the question of whether 
torture could ever be justifiable in the case of Ireland v United Kingdom.466  The 
Court considered the ticking bomb scenario and gave a very unambiguous 
response:  the responsibility of a State for acts of torture and inhuman treatment 
remains, even in the ticking bomb case.  The European Court of Human Rights 
firmly excluded the concept of justification on utilitarian grounds. 
 
Article 15 of UNCAT prohibits statements which were made as a result of torture 
being invoked as evidence in any proceedings.467  This prohibition appears to be 
based on two considerations.  Firstly, statements made under torture cannot be 
held to be reliable and invoking statements of such inherent unreliability would be 
contrary to the principle of a fair trial.  Secondly, torture is often aimed at 
ensuring evidence in judicial proceedings.  If statements made under torture 
cannot be invoked in such proceedings an important reason for using torturous 
tactics is removed.468 
 
The 2002 Optional Protocol to UNCAT entered into force in June 2006 and 
currently has 54 signatories and 32 State Parties.469  The US has not signed or 
ratified the Protocol and hence it will only be considered briefly.  The objective of 
the Protocol is: 
“to establish a system of regular visits undertaken by independent international 
and national bodies to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order 
to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”470 
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The Protocol introduces procedures for the establishment of a subcommittee 
designated to achieve this objective.471  State Parties to the Protocol are required 
to allow the subcommittee unrestricted access to, inter alia, places of detention,472 
and information on detainees.473  This Protocol could play an effective role in 
increasing the transparency of conditions and treatment at detention facilities. 
 
The right to be treated with humanity and respect is a collary to the prohibition on 
torture.  Article 10(1) of the ICCPR contains the requirement that 
“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
According to the HRC this is a right that cannot be derogated from despite the fact 
that it is not included in the article 4 list of non-derogable rights.  In the 
Committee’s opinion, article 10 expresses a norm of general international law and 
is not subject to derogation.474  Furthermore, there can be no reason to derogate 
from this principle as treating people inhumanly or disrespecting their inherent 
dignity would not help to prevent or conclude a public emergency and nor would 
it protect the life of the nation during a public emergency. 
 
HRC General Comment No. 21 comments on article 10 of the ICCPR.  Paragraph 
3 contains the general principle: 
“not only may persons deprived of their liberty not be subjected to treatment that 
is contrary to article 7 [the prohibition on torture], including medical or scientific 
experimentation, but neither may they be subjected to any hardship or constraint 
other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty; respect for the dignity of 
such persons must be guaranteed under the same conditions as for that of free 
persons.  Persons deprived of their liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the 
Covenant, subject to the restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed 
environment.”475 
The detainees at Guantánamo Bay, and in fact all detainees wherever held, have 
the inherent right to be treated with humanity and respect. 
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Cases concerning torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
It is quite clear that torture and other forms of inhuman treatment are prohibited 
under international law but determining whether an action constitutes torture is 
not a straightforward matter.  Where is the dividing line between legal 
interrogation and torture?  In order to constitute torture, pain or suffering must be 
severe but how does one define this term or create an objective scale for 
determining the severity of pain?  Maybe the scale is not in fact required to be 
objective:  is there an element of subjectivity in determining whether torture or 
inhuman treatment has occurred?  Cases concerning torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment will be examined.  Furthermore, the specific situations of 
whether sensory deprivation or inadequate detention conditions can constitute 
torture or ill-treatment will be considered.  Finally, the state of affairs at the 
Guantánamo detention facility will be applied to the stated law to determine 
whether torture or other ill-treatment is being committed. 
 
The HRC has considered the following acts to constitute torture:  systematic 
beatings, electroshocks, burns, extended hanging from hand and/or leg chains, 
repeated immersions in a mixture of blood, urine, vomit and excrement 
(‘submarino’), standing for great lengths of time, simulated executions and 
amputations.476  Furthermore, various combinations of the following acts also 
constituted torture:  beatings, electric shocks to the genitals, mock executions, 
deprivation of food and water, and thumb presses.477 
 
According to the HRC the treatment in the following cases was deemed to be 
cruel and inhuman.  In Hylton v Jamaica478 a prisoner was severely beaten by, 
and received repeated death threats from, prison warders.  In Linton v Jamaica479 
a detainee was beaten unconscious, subjected to a mock execution and denied 
appropriate medical care.  Similarly, in Bailey v Jamaica480 a prisoner was 
severely beaten with clubs, iron pipes and batons, and denied medical treatment 
for the consequent injuries. 
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The HRC found degrading treatment to have occurred in the following cases:  in 
Francis v Jamaica481 the prisoner was assaulted by warders who beat him, 
emptied a urine bucket over his head, and threw his food and water on the floor 
and his mattress out of the cell; in Young v Jamaica482 the detainee was held in a 
tiny cell, allowed few visitors, assaulted by wardens, had his effects stolen and his 
bed repeatedly soaked; in Polay Campos v Peru483 the prisoner was displayed to 
the press in a cage. 
 
In the Vuolanne v Finland484 decision the HRC expressed the view that 
“for punishment to be degrading, the humiliation or debasement involved must 
exceed a particular level and must, in any event, entail other elements beyond the 
mere fact of deprivation of liberty.” 
This decision also confirmed that the determination of whether torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment has occurred is, at least in part, a subjective 
evaluation.  Factors such as the victim’s age and mental health can aggravate the 
effect of certain treatment so as to bring it under the definition whereas similar 
treatment on someone else might not constitute torture. 
 
In many other HRC cases the Committee has refrained from specifying which 
limb of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has been breached and has 
just referred to a combination of actions as constituting a breach.485 
Sensory deprivation 
There are some actions which are undoubtedly torture – applying electricity to the 
genitals; tearing out fingernails; systematic beatings.  However, there are many 
actions which inhabit a grey area between what is clearly torture and what is 
clearly not.  For example, it is unclear whether sensory deprivation – the 
deliberate reduction or removal of stimuli from one or more of the senses – 
constitutes torture.  Deprivation of food and drink; subjection to noise; deprivation 
of sleep; hooding; and standing against a wall for prolonged periods of time are all 
examples of sensory deprivation and their legality is controversial. 
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International decisions, although not legally binding on the US, can prove of some 
value in assessing what conduct may be considered to meet the threshold of 
torture.  In the 1978 case between Ireland and the United Kingdom486 heard by the 
European Court of Human Rights five particular techniques were considered and 
were referred to as “disorientation” or “sensory deprivation” techniques.  They 
consisted of the following: 
(1) wall-standing:  forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some 
hours in a ‘stress position’, described by those who underwent it as 
being ‘spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above 
the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, 
causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly 
on the fingers’; 
(2) hooding:  putting a dark bag over the detainees’ heads and keeping it 
there except during interrogation; 
(3) subjection to noise:  holding detainees in a room with a continuous 
loud and hissing noise prior to interrogation; 
(4) deprivation of sleep:  depriving the detainees of sleep prior to 
interrogation; and 
(5) deprivation of food and drink prior to interrogation.487 
The Court held that the five techniques “undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment” but that “they did not occasion suffering of the particular 
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood”.488 
 
Although this case is from the European Court of Human Rights it does have 
relevance to a discussion of international law as it shows the stance a 
supranational body has taken on the classification of sensory deprivation.  The 
Court used the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as its main 
source of law, article 3 of which simply states “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  The ECHR does 
not give the three UNCAT requirements for torture and hence may be thought to 
have a wider realm of application for the meaning of ‘torture or inhuman or 
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degrading treatment’.  Under the ECHR the Court found that sensory deprivation 
did not constitute torture but did amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
In another case of sensory deprivation, Cariboni v Uruguay,489 a detainee was 
blindfolded (the eyes became inflamed and purulent), hooded, forced to sit up 
straight, day and night, for a week, in the presence of piercing shrieks apparently 
coming from others being tortured, and threatened with torture himself.  The HRC 
determined that this treatment amounted to torture.490 
 
In 1997 Israel asserted that interrogation, including the use of ‘moderate physical 
pressure’ where it is thought that interrogatees have information of imminent 
attacks against the State which may involve deaths of innocent citizens, is lawful 
if conducted in accordance with the ‘Landau rules’, which permit ‘moderate 
physical pressure’ to be used in strictly defined interrogation circumstances.  The 
methods the CAT found had been applied systematically were the standard 
methods of sensory deprivation previously mentioned:  the restraining of 
detainees in painful positions; hooding; sounding of loud music for prolonged 
periods; sleep deprivation for prolonged periods; threats, including death threats; 
violent shaking; and using cold air to chill.491  In its concluding observations on 
the special report from Israel, the CAT stated that these methods breached article 
16 prohibiting inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment and also constituted torture 
as defined in article 1 of UNCAT.  The CAT also stated that the conclusion was 
“particularly evident where such methods of interrogation are used in 
combination, which appears to be the standard case.”492  In reference to this 
situation the Special Rapporteur submitted that the techniques, particularly if used 
in combination could be 
“expected to induce pain or suffering, especially if applied on a protracted basis 
of, say, several hours.  In fact, they are sometimes apparently applied for days or 
even weeks on end.  Under those circumstances, they can only be described as 
torture...”493 
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It seems clear that techniques of sensory deprivation will amount to torture or at 
the very least to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment particularly if such 
techniques are used in combination and for prolonged periods of time. 
Conditions of detention 
The HRC has adjudicated on a number of cases involving the conditions of 
detention.  These are particularly relevant to the question of the rights of the 
detainees in Guantánamo Bay as many of them have been held there in less than 
adequate conditions for extreme lengths of time.  Conditions of detention can 
amount to torture, or at least to the other forms of ill-treatment.  Amnesty 
International condemns the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, designating it a 
“human rights scandal” and stating: 
“[t]he totality of the detention regime in Guantánamo – harsh, indefinite, isolating 
and punitive – can in itself amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in 
violation of international law.”494 
 
In Portorreal v Dominican Republic495 the claimant was arrested and detained in a 
cell measuring 20 metres by 5 metres holding approximately 125 other persons, 
and where, owing to lack of space, some detainees had to sit on excrement.  He 
received no food or water until the following day and was released after 50 hours 
of detention.496  At no time during the detention was he informed of the reasons 
for his arrest.  The HRC held that this constituted subjection to inhuman and 
degrading treatment and to lack of respect for his inherent human dignity.497 
 
In making its decision in the case of Mukong v Cameroon,498 the HRC considered 
minimum standards of conditions of detention.  It asserted the requirements for 
minimum floor space and cubic content of air for each prisoner, adequate sanitary 
facilities, clothing which was to be in no manner degrading or humiliating, the 
provision of a separate bed, and the provision of food of nutritional value 
adequate for health and strength.499  The Committee further noted that total 
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isolation of a detained or imprisoned person could amount to acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.500 
 
In Edwards v Jamaica501 a man was detained for 10 years alone in a cell 
measuring 6 feet by 14 feet, let out for three and a half hours a day, and was 
provided with no recreational facilities.  The HRC held that, as well as violating 
his right to be treated with humanity and respect, this treatment also constituted a 
violation of the prohibition on torture. 
 
In its General Comment No. 20 the HRC not only censures prolonged solitary 
confinement502 but it also condemns ‘incommunicado detention.’503  Detention 
incommunicado is an aggravated form of detention where a prisoner is not 
necessarily in solitary confinement, but is denied access to family, friends, and 
others (for example lawyers).  The HRC has considered a few cases in which 
detention incommunicado was determined to breach the ICCPR article 7 
prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  Detention 
incommunicado for a year constituted ‘inhuman treatment’ in Polay Campos v 
Peru504 and continued solitary confinement for over three years was held to be a  
breach of the prohibition against torture in Marais v Madagascar505 and El-
Megreisi v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.506  In Shaw v Jamaica507 eight months’ 
detention incommunicado in overcrowded, damp conditions constituted ‘inhuman 
and degrading treatment.’ 
 
In summary, case law shows that conditions of detention can amount to ill-
treatment or torture.  Furthermore, the HRC clearly deems that a State holding 
prisoners incommunicado is a breach of the prohibition against torture and other 
forms of ill-treatment. 
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Torture at Guantánamo 
Despite our best efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current 
interrogation methods.508 
General James T. Hill (US Army) 
 
International law relating to torture has been comprehensively examined above.  
Now it is necessary to consider the treatment of the Guantánamo detainees by the 
US authorities and determine whether international law is being maintained.  In a 
2002 memo to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, on counter-
resistance techniques General James T. Hill of the US Army requested a review of 
certain interrogation techniques under US law as the methods in use were not 
obtaining the desired information.509  The methods which were being used were 
Category I techniques (yelling at the detainees, using multiple interrogators, and 
the use of deception), and Category II techniques (the use of stress positions such 
as standing for four hours, the use of isolation for up to 30 days, interrogation in 
environments other than the standard interrogation booths, deprivation of light 
and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, and removal of clothing).510  
All these techniques were determined by the US Department of Defence to be 
legally permissible provided that they be used only when there is an important 
governmental objective (such as to obtain information necessary for the protection 
of the national security of the US, its citizens, and allies), and not for the “very 
malicious and sadistic purpose” of causing harm or with the intent to cause 
prolonged mental suffering.511 
 
In April 2003 a memo from then Secretary of Defence, Rumsfeld, authorised the 
use of interrogation techniques such as sleep adjustment, dietary manipulation, 
prolonged isolation and extreme environmental manipulation.512  Human Rights 
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First asserts that either alone or in combination these techniques may well amount 
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.513  Furthermore, an 
investigation into FBI allegations of detainee abuse led to a report which 
confirmed the authorisation of techniques that included sexual humiliation, the 
use of dogs, isolation for periods of up to 160 days, forced nudity and tying a 
detainee to a leash.514 
 
In a joint statement issued on May 13, 2004, Britons Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal 
described interrogation practices, including ‘short shackling’: 
“Our interrogations in Guantánamo…were conducted with us chained to the floor 
for hours on end in circumstances so prolonged that it was practice to have plastic 
chairs…that could be easily hosed off because prisoners would be forced to 
urinate during the course of them and were not allowed to go to the toilet.  One 
practice…was ‘short shackling’ where we were forced to squat without a chair 
with our hands chained between our legs and chained to the floor.  If we fell over, 
the chains would cut into our hands.  We would be left in this position for hours 
before an interrogation, during the interrogations (which could last as long as 
twelve hours), and sometimes for hours while the interrogators left the room.  
The air conditioning was turned up so high that within minutes we would be 
freezing.  There was strobe lighting and loud music played that was itself a form 
of torture.  Sometimes dogs were brought in to frighten us…  Sometimes 
detainees would be taken to the interrogation room day after day and kept short-
shackled without interrogation ever happening, sometimes for weeks on end.”515 
 
Tarek Dergoul, a British citizen, born and brought up in London was detained in 
Guantánamo and released in March 2004.  He made the following statement to a 
reporter from The Observer: 
“I heard a guard talking into his radio, ‘ERF, ERF, ERF,’ and I knew what was 
coming – the Extreme Reaction Force.  The five cowards, I called them – five 
guys running in with riot gear.  They pepper-sprayed me in the face and I started 
vomiting….  They pinned me down and attacked me, poking their fingers in my 
eyes, and forced my head into the toilet pan and flushed.  They tied me up like a 
beast and then they were kneeling on me, kicking and punching.”516 
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In June 2004 the ICRC made a confidential report to the US Government on the 
conditions at Guantánamo Bay, parts of which were leaked to the press.  In the 
report the ICRC found that US detention and interrogation operations at 
Guantánamo Bay “cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, 
unusual and degrading treatment and a form of torture.”517  Among the report’s 
findings, the ICRC describes the participation of physicians and other medical 
staff in providing information about detainees’ mental health and weaknesses to 
interrogators, as well as the use of humiliating acts, solitary confinement, 
temperature extremes, use of forced positions, exposure to loud and continuous 
noise, and beatings.518 
 
The US President and the Department of Defence claimed in 2005 that the US 
“remains committed to complying with its obligations” under UNCAT, “denies 
any allegations of torture at Guantánamo and restates its commitment to treating 
detainees humanely.”519  Furthermore, they stated that any allegations of detainee 
abuse are investigated and if any wrongdoing is found then it is punished – as of 
December 2004, 
“major independent investigations at Guantánamo have documented eight 
instances of infractions which have resulted in action ranging from 
admonishment to court-martial.”520 
It is troublesome that the Department of Defence, the very institution alleged to be 
responsible for the instances of abuse, is the institution to undertake internal 
investigations into the allegations.  This calls into question the impartiality of the 
measures taken. 
 
As of October 2006 official interrogation policy permits interrogation techniques 
including dietary manipulation, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep 
deprivation and isolation.521  It must be emphasised that these are the officially 
sanctioned interrogation techniques and many others may, in actuality, be in use.  
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So-called ‘alternative’ methods of interrogation at Guantánamo have included 
forcing prisoners to stand for 40 hours, depriving them of sleep and use of the 
‘cold cell,’ in which the prisoner is left naked in a cell kept near 10 degrees 
Celsius and doused with cold water.522  President Bush insisted that these 
techniques did not amount to torture.523  HRW reports the use of sleep 
deprivation, isolation and sexual humiliation.524 
 
There are obvious similarities between the treatment in the CAT and HRC cases 
discussed above – which was deemed to be torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment – and the summary of the treatment of the detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay.  It is difficult to determine exactly what treatment amounts to torture but it is 
certain that some of the methods outlined which are used at Guantánamo Bay 
amount, at least, to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  Furthermore, some of 
the treatments mentioned, particularly if used in conjunction, would almost 
certainly be held to constitute torture under international law.  The torture 
definition requires that torture be an act by which severe pain or suffering is 
inflicted; for the purposes of obtaining information, for punishment, or for 
intimidation; and that the act be inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a person acting in an official capacity.  There can be no doubt that the prison 
wardens and interrogators at Guantánamo Bay are acting in their official capacity.  
That the actions mentioned above were and are committed to obtain information 
has been explicitly stated by the US Department of Defence.525  The hardest part 
of the definition to prove is that severe pain or suffering is being inflicted.  As 
previously mentioned, exactly what constitutes severe pain or suffering is open to 
interpretation.  However, it is evident that the methods mentioned above such as 
beating, short-shackling, exposure to extreme temperatures and partial drowning 
would cause severe pain or suffering, made more extreme when used in 
combination. 
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The most controversial interrogation method discussed is the use of sensory 
deprivation.  As proved above, sensory deprivation, despite the opinion of 
President Bush to the contrary,526 is not a lawful interrogation technique, and 
while it may not necessarily amount to torture it has been deemed, by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the CAT and the HRC to at least amount to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  In severe cases sensory deprivation can 
constitute torture. 
 
Overall, it is evident that some of the interrogation methods used at Guantánamo 
Bay amount to torture or at least to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under 
international law.  The international prohibition against torture is absolute and 
cannot legally be breached in any circumstances.  Therefore, the actions of the US 
are most certainly breaching international law. 
 
Torture at Abu Ghraib 
In April 2004 photographs depicting US military personal “humiliating, torturing, 
and otherwise mistreating”527 prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were 
published across the world.  President Bush and then Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld repeatedly referred to the publicised abuse as “an exceptional, isolated” 
case, and condemned the “disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who 
dishonoured our country and disregarded our values”.528  The ‘interrogation 
techniques’ employed in Iraq included hooding, subjecting detainees to extremes 
of heat, cold, noise and light, beatings, prolonged sleep and sensory deprivation, 
stripping detainees naked, and being held in painful stress positions.529 
 
The allegations of detainee abuse became the subject of a series of comprehensive 
investigations conducted by the US Department of Defence.  These investigations 
culminated in the convictions for “maltreatment of prisoners” and “dereliction of 
duty” of a number of the soldiers involved.530  The abuse committed at Abu 
Ghraib was openly admitted to have been unlawful and was due to the 
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“misconduct…by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians” and a 
failure or lack of leadership.531  The actions of the Bush Administration and 
Department of Defence in condemning the actions at Abu Ghraib and charging 
those involved are commendable.  However, it is now necessary for these two 
bodies to accept that sensory deprivation and conditions of detention can amount 
to torture and, with this in mind, a comprehensive investigation needs to be made 
into interrogation techniques at Guantánamo Bay. 
 
Principle of non-refoulement 
Article 3 UNCAT states: 
“no State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.”532 
The principle of non-refoulement means that detainees must not be returned to 
countries where they would face a real risk of torture.  It is necessary to consider 
this principle as a number of Guantánamo detainees have been returned to 
countries where they may face torture.533  Article 3(2) requires that in making a 
determination on whether a person can be returned, the competent authorities 
must take into account: 
“all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State 
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights.”534 
Returning people to States which are known to violate fundamental human rights 
and, in particular, the Torture Convention requires careful examination of the 
circumstances of the individual, their relationship with the government and 
whether they may face violations of their human rights on return. 
 
Legal advisor to Amnesty International, Boris Wijkström,535 uses strong language 
in discussing the prohibition on refoulement: 
“International law absolutely prohibits States from returning persons to a country 
where they face a real risk of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  The prohibition is now recognised to be a part of the general and 
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absolute prohibition of torture and as part of this general prohibition it is binding 
on all States at all times regardless of whether the State in question has or has not 
ratified a treaty which specifically prohibits it.” 
It is important to realise that the non-refoulement rule acts in all cases when an 
individual can show that there are substantial grounds for believing he or she 
faces a real risk of torture if returned.  The prohibition does not permit any 
countervailing considerations or exceptions such as ‘for reasons of national 
security’ to negate the principle of non-refoulement.  This has been made quite 
clear by the CAT in its decision in Tapia Paez v Sweden.536  In this case the CAT 
stated that the article 3 prohibition on torture is absolute: 
“Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State 
party is under an obligation not to return the person concerned to that State.  The 
nature of the activities in which the person engaged cannot be a material 
consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the Convention.”537 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled similarly on this issue of possible 
exceptions to the prohibition on non-refoulement.  In the Chahal538 case an Indian 
man, his wife, and two children were ordered to be deported to India from the UK 
on national security grounds.  Chahal was a Sikh activist suspected by the UK 
authorities of involvement in terrorist activities.  The majority of the Court agreed 
that the evidence suggested that if Mr Chahal was to be deported he would face a 
real risk of torture or ill-treatment.539  The legal issue was whether, as the 
government and Court’s minority argued, the risk to the individual could be 
balanced against the risk to national security.  Under international refugee law, 
national security can trump the individual’s right not to be exposed to torture or 
other ill-treatment.540  However, the majority of the court pointed to the absolute 
nature of the article 3 ECHR prohibition on torture and ill-treatment, with no 
exceptions or derogations permitted even in the event of a public emergency 
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threatening the life of the nation.541  Therefore, the UK was unable to return Mr 
Chahal and his family to India, despite the risk he posed to national security. 
 
Article 3 of UNCAT expressly applies only to cases where a person foreseeably 
faces torture on return to another State.  It does not apply to cases where a person 
may face cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  This was 
confirmed by the CAT in the case of B.S. v Canada.542  In contrast, in General 
Comment No. 20, the HRC makes it clear that the prohibition on refoulement 
applies also to the lesser forms of bad treatment: 
“States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by 
way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.”543 
However, this is simply a comment or recommendation from the HRC and does 
not amount to law.  Under international law the prohibition of non-refoulement 
appears to currently only cover cases of torture, not the lesser forms of ill-
treatment. 
 
It is incontrovertible that refoulement is illegal under international law.544  
However, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights claims that 247 
detainees once held at Guantánamo have been transferred to other countries, 
including Egypt, Iran, Yemen and Tajikistan, in circumstances that do not 
adequately protect against the possibility that the transferees may be subjected to 
torture or other inhuman treatment.545  Despite attempts by the US government to 
negotiate transfer agreements 
“great concerns remain that many of those transferred will be subjected to 
indefinite detention without trial, torture and other abuse.”546 
Returning a person to a country where they would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture is illegal and hence, the US may well have breached its international 
obligations concerning non-refoulement. 
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Diplomatic assurances 
Many countries have come to rely on diplomatic assurances when transferring 
alleged terrorists or national security suspects to countries where they are at risk 
of torture or ill-treatment.547  A diplomatic assurance gives a government a 
justification or an excuse for an action which would otherwise be considered to 
breach the absolute prohibition on refoulement.  It is a formal guarantee from the 
government of the country of return that the returned person will not be subject to 
torture or other ill-treatment upon return.  As discussed above there is an absolute 
prohibition in international law against returning a person – no matter what the 
alleged crime or status – to a place where he or she would be at risk of torture.  By 
securing a governmental assurance that a person will not be tortured or ill-treated 
on return, States are able to claim they are complying with this absolute 
prohibition. 
 
Wijkström,548 legal advisor to Amnesty International, observes that 
“diplomatic assurances are used by States to refoule persons to other States where 
there is a real risk of torture, because in the absence of such a clear risk 
diplomatic assurance would not be necessary.” 
Clearly, diplomatic assurances are only sought in cases in which torture is 
suspected or expected.  HRW claims, with good reason, that by seeking 
diplomatic assurances against abusive conduct, governments are tacitly 
acknowledging that a risk of torture or ill-treatment exists in that country.  HRW 
states that 
“Once a sending government acknowledges that a risk of torture exists in a 
specific country, it is incumbent upon its authorities to refuse to transfer a person 
to that country.”549 
Returning a person to such a country clearly breaches the ‘real risk of torture’ 
threshold and the very practice of employing diplomatic assurances undermines 
international human rights law.  Furthermore, HRW indicates that the use of 
diplomatic assurances has proved not to be an adequate safeguard against torture 
as there have been reports of widespread or systematic torture in many of the 
countries to which people have been returned, despite such assurances.550   
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US law permits the use of diplomatic assurances in immigration cases,551 and 
HRW asserts that 
“authorities have disclosed that it is US policy to seek them as well in so-called 
‘extraordinary rendition’ cases and to effect transfers of detainees from custody at 
Guantánamo Bay.”552 
HRW perceives problems with the US law due to the discretionary nature of 
measures to verify the reliability of diplomatic assurances.  The affected person 
has no procedural guarantees, including no opportunity to challenge the credibility 
or reliability of the diplomatic assurances before an independent judicial body.553  
In some cases, the US State Department may choose to put a monitoring or review 
mechanism in place to ensure the assuring State complies with its assurances, but 
monitoring is discretionary rather than obligatory.  Furthermore, HRW is 
concerned by the fact that there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to take 
into account the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass 
violations of human rights in the requesting State, in conformity with UNCAT 
article 3(2).554  HRW is also perturbed by the possibility that diplomatic 
assurances may be used to return persons suspected of having information about 
terrorism-related activities to countries where torture is routinely used, 
specifically to extract such information.555  Such practise is known as 
‘outsourcing’ torture. 
 
The Chahal case, mentioned above,556 also involved the use of diplomatic 
assurances.  The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the return to India of 
a Sikh activist would violate the obligations of the UK under article 3 of the 
ECHR, despite the fact that diplomatic assurances had been received from the 
government of India asserting that Mr Chahal would not suffer mistreatment at the 
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hands of the Indian authorities.  The statements of the Court established that, at 
least within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, diplomatic 
assurances are an inadequate guarantee where torture is “endemic,” or a 
“recalcitrant and enduring problem,” that results, in some cases, in fatalities.557  
The Court took into account the credibility of the requesting government (India) 
and whether this government had effective control over the forces responsible for 
acts of torture. 
 
The US has indicated that it takes the principle of non-refoulement seriously: 
“It states in this respect that its policy is to obtain specific assurances from a 
receiving country that it will not torture the individual being transferred to that 
country, that it would take steps to investigate credible allegations of torture and 
take appropriate action if there were reasons to believe that those assurances were 
not being honoured, and that it would not transfer a detainee where those 
assurances are not sufficient when balanced against an individual’s specific 
claim.”558 
Accepting diplomatic assurances acknowledges the fact that there are doubts 
about the returned person’s safety in the country to which they have been 
returned.  Despite these doubts about their safety on return, the person is 
nevertheless returned.  This breaches the international prohibition against 
refoulement.  The US openly admits that it accepts diplomatic assurances which is 
tantamount to admitting that it breaches international law. 
 
4.3 The rights of unlawful combatants summarised 
 
Despite not being entitled to POW status, unlawful combatants have a number of 
important rights under international law.  From a detention perspective, the most 
important of these rights is the right to liberty.  The right to liberty is the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained and is a norm of customary international law.  
Deprivation of liberty can only be justified when there is a valid reason for both 
the initial detention and the continuance of such detention.  Any deprivation of 
liberty which continues beyond that provided for by law amounts to arbitrary 
detention.  The right to liberty is supported by the ICCPR which gives the 
fundamental requirement that no-one may be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
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detention.559  Furthermore, to prevent an arrest being arbitrary a person must be 
advised of the reasons for the arrest.560  A detained person must be brought 
promptly before a judge and be entitled to question the lawfulness of the detention 
without delay.561  The Fourth Geneva Convention holds that detention is only 
legitimate if it is absolutely necessary to the security of the Detaining Power.562  
Furthermore, the decision to detain must be considered by an appropriate court 
and if detention is maintained it must be reviewed twice yearly.563  Finally, 
unlawful combatants who have been detained must be released as soon as the 
circumstances justifying the arrest cease to exist;564 or as soon as possible after the 
close of hostilities.565  
 
Another important right which unlawful combatants are entitled to under 
international law is the right to a fair trial.  The right to a fair trial means that 
summary justice or execution is prohibited.  Unlawful combatants can be tried and 
punished, and even executed if it is permitted under the laws of the prosecuting 
State.  However, any trial must uphold the normal concepts of justice.  A trial 
must be undertaken by a regularly constituted court, which is a court established 
in accordance with the laws already in force in the country.566  A court must be 
independent and impartial567 and trials must uphold judicial guarantees which are 
generally recognised by civilised peoples.568  The most important of these judicial 
guarantees are the right to be tried without undue delay;569 the presumption of 
innocence;570 the right to a defence, to legal counsel, and to examine witnesses;571 
the right to an interpreter;572 and the right to an appeal.573 
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Unlawful combatants also have the protection of a number of rights while they are 
incarcerated.  Firstly, they have the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life.574  
The HRC has determined that this places a positive duty on States to take 
adequate measures to ensure people do not die in custody.575  Secondly, the 
detainees are protected by the fundamental prohibition on torture.576  The 
prohibition on torture is a jus cogens norm of international law from which no 
derogation is permitted.  Torture is the infliction of severe mental or physical pain 
or suffering, for a specific prohibited purpose (such as obtaining information), 
committed by or with the consent of a public official.577  The prohibition is 
absolute and torture is not justifiable under any circumstances.  Other forms of ill-
treatment are also prohibited, such as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.578  It has been shown that techniques of sensory deprivation, 
particularly if used in conjunction, can breach the prohibition on torture or the 
other forms of ill-treatment.  Furthermore, conditions of detention can also 
amount to torture or ill-treatment.  Thirdly, while detained, unlawful combatants 
have a number of rights which ensure conditions of detention are acceptable.  
They are entitled to adequate health care;579 adequate food and water;580 adequate 
clothing;581 hygienic quarters;582 to respect for their religious practices and 
convictions;583 and to receive visits from the ICRC.584 
 
Finally, unlawful combatants benefit from the principle of non-refoulement.  The 
principle of non-refoulement prohibits people being returned to countries where 
they will face a real risk of torture.585  This rule is absolute and must be upheld in 
all circumstances. 
 
                                                 
574
 ICCPR, article 6. 
575
 Dermit Barbato v Uruguay (1982) UN Doc. CCPR/C/17/D/84/1981, para 9.2. 
576
 Geneva Convention IV, articles 31 and 32; Geneva Conventions, common article 3; ICCPR, 
article 7; Additional Protocol I, article 75(2)(a)(ii). 
577
 UNCAT, article 1. 
578
 Geneva Conventions, common article 3; ICCPR, article 7; Additional Protocol I, article 
75(2)(b); UNCAT, article 16. 
579
 Geneva Convention IV, article 38(2). 
580
 Ibid, article 89. 
581
 Ibid, article 90. 
582
 Ibid, article 85. 
583
 Ibid, articles 27(1) and 38(3); Additional Protocol I, article 75(1). 
584
 Geneva Convention IV, article 143. 
585
 UNCAT, article 3. 
  
143 
To summarise, unlawful combatants have the right to liberty and must not be 
arbitrarily detained.  If detained, unlawful combatants have the right to a fair trial 
and the corresponding judicial guarantees.  While incarcerated, detainees must not 
be tortured or ill-treated; their right to life must be protected; and conditions of 
detention must be adequate.  Detention must cease when the circumstances 
justifying arrest no longer exist and detainees must not be returned to a country 
where they would face a real risk of torture.  These protections for unlawful 
combatants continue until their final release or repatriation, even after the close of 
hostilities.586 
 
As has been shown, the US may have breached many of these rights.  The 
majority of the detainees have not been given the opportunity to contest their 
detention.  They have been held in inadequate conditions for a period of over five 
years with no charges being laid against them.  Allegations of torture have been 
made repeatedly during the last five years, and the US openly admits to using 
some methods which it has been shown do amount to, at the very least, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment under international law. 
 
Rights:  POWs vs unlawful combatants 
That all al-Qaeda prisoners held at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility are 
unlawful combatants and therefore not entitled to POW status has been accepted.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that it is likely that the majority of Taliban 
members held there are also, most likely, unlawful combatants.  The rights owed 
to unlawful combatants have been extrapolated from the various international law 
documents and summarised.  It will be interesting now to consider what 
differences there are between the rights of unlawful combatants and the rights of 
lawful combatants.  Lawful combatants fulfil the combatancy criteria in article 4A 
of the Third Geneva Convention and must consequently be treated as POWs.  
Fundamental international law on the capture, internment, treatment and 
repatriation of POWs is contained in the Third Geneva Convention – the 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 
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This Convention contains very specific provisions on a wide range of diverse 
issues relating to POWs in captivity such as labour,587 financial resources588 and 
penal and disciplinary sanctions.589  The majority of these are not relevant to the 
current discussion.  However, it must be emphasised that there is one 
comprehensive document explicitly delineating the rights and obligations of 
POWs.  This automatically puts POWs in a much more secure position than that 
of unlawful combatants.  The rights of unlawful combatants have to be searched 
for and drawn out of a number of different documents.  My research has allowed a 
clear comparison of the rights of POWs and unlawful combatants.  The following 
is a summary of the rights they have in common:  the right to a fair trial;590 to be 
treated humanely;591 to practise their religion;592 and to respect for their persons 
and honour.593  No physical or mental torture or coercion may be used to secure 
information of any kind;594 the Detaining Power is prohibited from causing death 
or seriously endangering the health of a detainee due to an unlawful act or 
omission;595 and any transfer of detainees must be effected humanely.596  Detainee 
quarters must be adequately heated, lighted and protected from dampness;597 and 
the cleanliness of camps must be ensured.598  Detainees must be allocated 
sufficient clothing and footwear;599 sufficient daily food and drinking water 
rations;600 and provided with adequate medical attention.601  Finally, detainees 
must be released as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.602 
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Clearly, these rights are all to do with conditions essential to humane treatment.  
Due to their special status POWs have some other rights which unlawful 
combatants do not share.  The most significant is that POWs cannot be prosecuted 
simply for taking part in hostilities whereas unlawful combatants can.  When non-
combatants take part in hostilities they are acting unlawfully and hence can be 
prosecuted for their unlawful actions.  Furthermore, following a trial, unlawful 
combatants can be sentenced to execution, if such a punishment is provided for in 
the law used at the trial.  POWs can also be executed but there are more strict 
requirements surrounding such a sentence.  The death sentence cannot be 
pronounced on a POW unless the court has been made aware of the fact that the 
POW is not a national of the Detaining Power and owes no duty of allegiance to 
that Detaining Power.603  Moreover, the execution cannot be carried out until six 
months after the Protecting Power receives notice of the sentence.604 
 
The second significant difference is that POWs must be released and repatriated 
without delay on the close of hostilities.605  This obligation is contained in article 
118 of the Third Geneva Convention and has been commented on by the US 
Supreme Court in the case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld.606  Justice O’Connor stated that 
it is a clearly established principle of the law of war that the detention of enemy 
combatants is limited to the duration of the particular conflict in which the 
detainees participated.607  Detention during an armed-conflict is for the purpose of 
holding the detainees off the battlefield – once the armed-conflict is over their 
continued detention is not justifiable.608  Conversely, non-POWs may be held 
beyond the end of hostilities but must be charged with a crime and given a fair 
trial. 
 
POWs are only required to give “surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and 
army, regimental, personal or serial number”609 whereas no such restriction is 
placed on information from unlawful combatants.  POWs must be able to inform 
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their family and the Central Prisoners of War Agency of their whereabouts610 and 
are allowed to send and receive letters and cards (not less than two letters and four 
cards monthly).611  Unlawful combatants are only entitled to communicate with 
the outside world if reasons of security do not prevent it.612  POWs can only be 
tried by military courts unless the law of the Detaining Power permits civil courts 
to try a member of the armed forces in respect of the particular offence under 
consideration.613  On the other hand, unlawful combatants are, in many cases, 
civilians so can be tried under civilian law.  Many other rights held by POWs but 
not by unlawful combatants are found in the comprehensive Convention.  
However, it is the essential human rights that are the focus of this thesis – the 
rights which deal with physical treatment and conditions of detention and it is 
these life and health preserving rights which are virtually identical regardless of 
combatancy status. 
 
The classification of lawful or unlawful combatant is important as only lawful 
combatants are entitled to POW status.  POWs do possess many more protections 
under international law than unlawful combatants.  However, the fundamental 
rights and protections of POWs and unlawful combatants are very similar.  People 
in either group must be treated humanely, have the right to a fair trial, must be 
released as soon as the reasons for incarceration have ended, and must not be 
tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The problem under investigation was the incarceration since 2001 of hundreds of 
men allegedly involved in the conflict in Afghanistan.  These men had been 
detained for over five years without recourse to justice, and allegations from well 
respected international human rights groups of ill-treatment and torture were 
frequent.  Despite international outrage that the rights of the prisoners had been 
ignored, the Bush Administration continued to not bring charges or accord trials 
to the detainees.  It was the hypothesis of the author that there are certain rights 
under international law which must be granted to everyone, regardless of the 
crimes it is thought they may have committed.  Hence, I set out to discover 
exactly what these rights were. 
 
As explained in the introduction, it was decided to focus the thesis on a detailed 
investigation of the rights of unlawful combatants.  The detention centre at the US 
Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was chosen as a current high-profile 
prison where unlawful combatants are held.  It is appreciated that this is not the 
only facility in which rights are being denied to detainees.  Nor are Taliban and al-
Qaeda members the only detainees in these facilities.  However, using the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo Bay as an example, provided an 
opportunity to research and present a thesis that synthesises relevant human rights 
and international law in a manageable way.  The rights which pertain to the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda are minimum guarantees under international law.  
Therefore, they will apply to other detainees the world over.   
 
To establish the rights of members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda who fought in the 
2001 Afghanistan conflict and are currently detained at the Guantánamo Bay 
detention facility, a determination as to their combatancy status had to be made.  
Lawful combatants are entitled to POW status on capture whereas unlawful 
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combatants are not.  The rights of POWs are clearly laid out in the Third Geneva 
Convention and are uncontroversial.  In order to be a lawful combatant, and 
therefore entitled to POW status, a fighter must satisfy a number of conditions.  
These conditions are found in article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.  To 
be a lawful combatant a fighter must: 
(1) be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(2) wear a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 
(3) carry arms openly; and 
(4) conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war. 
All participants of an armed conflict, including members of regular armed forces, 
must fulfil the conditions in order to be a lawful combatant. 
 
Having defined the law on combatancy, the next task was to apply these 
conditions to the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in order to determine whether it 
was possible for them to qualify as lawful combatants.  It was difficult to gather 
evidence regarding the actions of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in the field but 
some conclusions can be drawn from the information available.  It is possible that 
some members of the Taliban did satisfy the four conditions.  As regards the first 
criterion it has been suggested that the Taliban was structured under a number of 
local leaders rather than having an overall command organisation.  However, it 
has also been suggested that the warlord structure of the Taliban, while not a 
Western style of military leadership, still fulfils the condition of being 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.  The other three criteria 
must be considered on an individual, rather than a collective, basis.  The black 
turban was a fixed distinctive sign which was known to be worn by Taliban 
members; many Taliban fighters did carry their weapons openly; and there is no 
proof that every Taliban fighter breached the laws of war.  Therefore, it is possible 
that individual Taliban members may have satisfied all four required conditions 
and hence have fulfilled the lawful combatancy requirements.  As a result, the 
blanket decision made by the US that no Taliban members were entitled to POW 
status is illegitimate and must be revisited.  The US needs to carry out an 
evaluation (under article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention) for each individual 
Taliban member detained at Guantánamo Bay to determine whether they are a 
lawful combatant and therefore entitled to POW status.  Until this article 5 
determination has been performed, all Taliban detainees should be treated as 
POWs as there is doubt as to their status.  It is even possible that an article 5 
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determination will find some of the detainees do not belong to the Taliban and 
were not involved with the war in Afghanistan. 
 
The four criteria also had to be applied to the actions of al-Qaeda during the 
armed conflict in Afghanistan to establish whether any al-Qaeda members could 
be entitled to lawful combatant status.  As a terrorist network al-Qaeda did not set 
out to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.  To the contrary, they 
cultivated the anonymity which blending in with civilians could give them.  The 
requirement to wear a fixed distinctive sign is an individual requirement.  
However, it is clear that as there was no sign or uniform recognised as showing 
membership of al-Qaeda, it is not possible for any al-Qaeda members to have 
satisfied the second combatancy requirement.  As no al-Qaeda member could 
have satisfied this second requirement individual determinations as to status are 
not required.  All members of al-Qaeda who fought in the 2001 Afghanistan 
conflict and are detained at Guantánamo Bay are unlawful combatants and 
consequently not entitled to POW status. 
 
The conclusion at the end of Chapter Three was that some Taliban members may 
be entitled to POW status but no al-Qaeda members would be.  Therefore, the 
next step was to determine what rights, if any, these unlawful combatants were 
entitled to. 
 
A comprehensive look at a number of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights documents shows that unlawful combatants do not 
exist in legal limbo and do in fact have several significant rights that are intended 
to provide protection to them.  The right to liberty can be found in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I and the ICCPR.  The Fourth Geneva 
Convention requires that people only be incarcerated if it is absolutely necessary.  
Similarly, the First Additional Protocol requires that detainees be released as soon 
as the reasons for detention have ended.  Under the ICCPR arbitrary arrest or 
detention is unlawful. 
 
The right to a fair trial is espoused by the Fourth Geneva Convention, common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I and the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The right to a fair trial 
covers the right to have a court consider the fact of detention.  It also includes 
fundamental principles such as the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty and the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest.  The right to a fair 
trial means that summary justice is unlawful.  Punishment or detention may not 
occur until a fair trial has been held. 
 
The third essential right which unlawful combatants have the benefit of is the 
prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  This jus 
cogens norm of international law can be found in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR, the American Convention 
on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.  The prohibition against torture and 
the other forms of ill-treatment is absolute.  There are no circumstances under 
which torture is justifiable. 
 
Finally, unlawful combatants have the right to humane treatment and adequate 
conditions of detention.  In particular, detention facilities must be hygienic and 
adequately heated and lighted; and adequate food, water and medical treatment 
must be provided. 
 
These essential rights are the minimum rights owed to unlawful combatants and 
yet the available evidence shows that they are not being upheld for the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo Bay.  Some of the prisoners have been 
incarcerated for more than five years with no access to justice and allegations of 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment have been convincing.  The facility at 
Guantánamo Bay should be closed and the detainees released or charged with a 
crime, and moved to a detention centre on US soil for a fair trial. 
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